

to become ... except perhaps the receipt of the territories of the United States and Canada, and, moreover, still sparsely populated, unplowed, ready to accept new peasant waves - as the Volga, Kuban, Southern Siberia, Altai, Novorossia were previously received ...

Entering half a step into the realm of the subjunctive mood, which "history does not like," one can still assume that over time the plastic world of the Russian countryside could learn to live next to the kulak. After all, once he learned to live next to the landowner. And that the landlord of the first half of the 20th century (the owner, the serf-owner and the monopoly representative of the state) was by no means the original in the countryside, that he fell there only a hundred and fifty years ago - this has already been considered in Chapter 10.

And half a century after the events described, the rural world, having received an even more severe novelty from the city - the "Collective Farm Charter", also got used to it within one generation, somehow digested it and formed another Way: Soviet-collective farm life. In one conversation, the Russian classicist Valentin Grigoryevich Rasputin, an expert on village life, told me that by the end of the 1950s, the village got used to the collective farm and formed a sustainable way of life. It was not about economic indicators, not comparing them with farm or something else. No, it was psychology, self-sustaining habituality, the mastered cycle of life that he had in mind.

And he also pointed out to me then (after reading the manuscript of this book) the enormous difference between the peasantry of the 1950s and the 1980s, between the collective farm and the state farm. Collective farms, slightly tweaked by life, "on the ground", have become more organic for the village, the point of formation of the way of life. And their forced replacement by state farms turned out to be a heavy blow to the psychology of village life. With his characteristic self-restraint, Valentin Grigoryevich made the reservation several times that he could say this - only for the Siberian village, but still I remember this remark (with a generally favorable assessment) as a harsh critical article. I didn't know the importance of this distinction. I could only imagine how in the 1970s, for some "reporting indicator for the republic," they could transfer five to seven hundred collective farms to state farms with one Central Committee circular. So, he thought, if it was so easy, formally: that the collective farm "Zavety Ilyich", that the state farm "Zavety ..." - to change it, then there was not much difference!

, only signs

And that, in general, a passing, complementary remark by Valentin Rasputin (my book dealt only with the peasant question of the 20th century) became a kind of "needle", a reminder. So, that in the twentieth, that the twentieth century, they looked from the city to the village, without particularly going into local

particular.

But at least one generation is needed to form a new to @ u \$ uvepa1 (33 years according to Herodotus), and Stolypin allocated only 5-6 years. A century of big wars began, not just World Wars according to the "title", namely, wars for living space. Wars that have become a decisive test - not for governments, commanders, as before, but for civilizations. An exam for the nations. And most likely, 65 years from among

the incompetently spent by Pavel, Alexander and Nikolai was enough for a landless, and then a communityless way of life to take shape in the Russian countryside. And I emphasize again that

"Communityless" is here only in the Stolypin sense: without the absolute power of the community, without identity, the peasant = community member.

The new way of life would not only draw the boundaries of a more or less stable cohabitation of the kulak and the community, but, most importantly, would establish a mechanism for smoothly squeezing out the excess rural population into the cities and onto the lands of the Amur and Primorye newly acquired during the "Two Alexandria" period.

Social tension in the countryside would decrease, and the marketability of agricultural production, on the contrary, would rise sharply. Marketability, somewhat simplifying this most important indicator, can be defined as the difference between what the village produced and what it ate itself. What the country ends up with. It is the marketability in the conditions of agrarian overpopulation that theoretically tends to zero.

And, finally, one must also say this to someone: the eternal object of idealization - the peasantry became very heterogeneous in the second half of the 20th century, and this heterogeneity was by no means similar to the difference between the textbook, "passed at school" Turgenev's Khorem and Kalinich, brought up several generations of Russian readers.

Maxim Gorky in his article "On the Russian Peasantry" (1922) wrote:

"In my youth, I intensively searched the villages of Russia for that good-natured, thoughtful Russian peasant, a tireless seeker of truth and justice, about whom Russian literature of the 20th century so convincingly and beautifully told the world, and I did not find him. I met there a stern realist and cunning who, when it suits him, perfectly knows how to show himself to be a simpleton ... He knows that "a man is not stupid, but the world is a fool", that "the world is strong as water, but stupid as a pig ". He says: "Don't be afraid of devils, be afraid of people." "Beat your own - strangers will be afraid" ... "

Perhaps the words of Gorky, whose youth and searches just fell on the 1880-1890s, are not the ultimate truth. But what can we notice at the junction of "literature/life"?

After all, this is, perhaps, another cliché, the inertia of perception: to consider that the "superfluous people" popular in Russian literature, who were aware that they were not created for their environment, were weighed down by it, but this syndrome can only be found among the nobles. (Like a "noble disease" gout.) And a peasant, if he was already born in the village, then, along with his hands and feet, he is equipped with a cherished dream - to go all his life behind a plow.

Even today, favorite village writers have preserved this: a peasant who moved to the city - or a lazy person, an egoist who could not stay in the countryside, rejected by the peasant world, or -

an object of regret, sympathy ... But this is normal, a real Russian writer should, simply by definition, be obliged to pity the peasant, as everyone, except Maxim Gorky, pitied him: Nekrasov, Leo Tolstoy, Turgenev (who helped Alexander P to decide ...), Gleb Uspensky, Leskov.

Pity the peasant and wish him to remain so.

But the ruler, the politician, in addition to admiring and pity, had to decide on some steps, operations. Stolypin was just cursed because he launched a kind of centrifuge, and yesterday's villagers flew to the cities. And the whole "guilt" of Stolypin is only that he did not appear 40 years earlier. And he could not come and start his business earlier, because ... and so on (see all the equations and timelines described above).

The new way of life would not only reduce the number, but would also improve the quality of the Russian peasantry. As well as any mechanism of "natural selection". He would allow the "excess people" of the village, who did not like work and life on earth (let's call them Onegin in zipuns, Pechorins in bast shoes) - to leave for the cities. After all, it was they who became the catalysts for unrest, riots, and arson in the village in the summer of 1917 and beyond. Turning the village from a pillar of the stability of the Russian state into an open wound. And in the city, some part of them became quite normal, average workers, the city simply broke the other part, "grind": after all, there was no "mother" community here. The folk saying "Peter - wiped his sides" reflected precisely this reality. Well, some part, say, one tenth, remained "inflexible" bandits, the fuse of all revolutions. But that's the trick (which inflicted one of the strongest blows on Russian statehood) that in the countryside they remained the "fuse of revolutions" - not 10%, but all the "superfluous" ones! Plus, the police in the city - in general, the power apparatus was immeasurably more powerful. And the bailiff comes to the village on big occasions, leaving the maintenance of law and order to the community itself, where these "extra people" of the peasant rank are the same full-fledged equity holders. Arson of estates, and then "kombedy", "dispossession" - their work.

And one more of the obligations of the city to the countryside: to absorb, digest not only quantitative surpluses, but also this potentially incendiary element. And this duty of the Russian City is also one of the unfulfilled. (Other obligations of the city to the countryside, the head to the body, have already been mentioned.)

This is how the situation in the countryside approached in the summer of 1917 to robberies and arson of estates. And the letters sent to the front from such villages finished off the army. So much has been written about the agitators and conspirators of 1917: "the Cadets, Freemasons, Bolsheviks, German spies ..." The victory of historians: the connection between German and Schiff money and the soaring circulations of treacherous,

defeatist newspapers. But the main thing, in my opinion, was the connection between newspaper propaganda and news from the villages: "while we are feeding lice in the trenches, without us, they began to divide the land."

Further, it is already a completely well-known provision that the Bolsheviks in 1917 were able to gain power by promising Peace and Earth. As they wrote for 70 years: "The first decree of Comrade Lenin "On Peace and Land" ... etc. Or the current version, from the opposite part of the political spectrum: "Lenin is the first deceiver, he promised the peasants land ..."

In an interview with the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper (October 2012), I had to refute: if he is a deceiver, then he is by no means the first. Here is the situation immediately after 1905, when the authorities and the opposition were dancing around the peasantry. It was believed that the peasantry was the stronghold of the autocracy, and the tsar, by means of electoral laws, sought to give them as much representation as possible. Further: Count Witte was amazed in his "Memoirs": "The peasantry appeared in significant numbers, but it turned out ... it has only one program: an additional allotment of land. The government (refused) ... and the peasantry followed those who said: "The first thing is - we will give you land and freedom as an appendage," i.e., the Cadets (Milyukov, Hessen) and the Trudoviks "..."

You see, and Count Witte, the first Russian Chairman of the Council of Ministers, testifies that long before the Bolsheviks, liberals began to manipulate the peasants.

The Cadets, of course, did not even have half an idea: where to get this land promised to the peasants, but ... the intrigue began to spin, "the work of the Duma began to boil." I don't want to reduce everything to the "cynicism of the Duma members", but the intrigue of the Milyukov-Hessen Cadets was also longer-lasting, and a significant part of the intelligentsia sincerely "believed in the people" ...

There is also the topic of boundless disputes related to the fact that this very insufficient wedge of peasant land was burdened with unsustainable debts for a long time. The government paid the landowners about 80% of the value of the land (according to tax officials). The remaining 20% had to be paid to the landowner by the peasant. The law of 1861 left the peasants to decide whether to redeem their share or not. In 1883, ransom became mandatory.

Peasants borrowed money from village usurers ("world eaters, kulaks") at a high percentage. Later, the Peasants' Bank, which began operating, secured loans on better terms. Indebtedness on redemption payments was superimposed on interest on loans. Only in 1907, bowing to the inevitable, (the government) canceled the redemption payments altogether and annulled the arrears...

"... But (final quote from Richard Pipes' reliable adder of many estimates) the damage done was already

cannot be corrected ... Radical critics of the Regulations of 1861,

those who argued that the land should have been handed over to the peasants without redemption, turned out to be right in hindsight not only in a moral, but in a practical sense ... The economic condition of the Russian peasant worsened, in 1900 he was generally poorer than in

1800 ... A man, who at the end of the eighteenth century. foreigners portrayed him as cheerful and good-natured, around 1900 he appears in the stories of travelers as gloomy and unfriendly ... "

And here is the testimony of NOT a foreigner: Ivan Bunin, "Cursed Days": October (1917). There were posters, rallies, appeals:

"Citizens! Comrades! Fulfill your great duty to the Constituent Assembly, your cherished dream, the sovereign master of the Russian land! Everyone vote for list number three!

The men who listened to these calls say:

- Well, the dog! Debts, screaming, there are great ones behind you! Everyone will vote, he says, everything, which means I will describe your property before the Constituent Assembly. And who do we owe? Should he cover his eyes? No, this new boss is nowhere at all. He lures into comrades, promises mountains of gold, but he himself yells, threatens, strives to tear the cross from his neck. Well, wait a minute: if you didn't have to vote, then you yourself in three voices! .. "

Outcome. The solution to the problem of land scarcity, which did not please anyone

Today, as you know, there is "freedom of the press", and you can find a lot of articles and books describing this main Russian problem of the early 20th century from diametrically opposed positions. The "Whites" quote, for example, those same "Cursed Days" by Ivan Bunin:

"What nonsense! There was a people of 160 million who owned a sixth of the globe, and what part? - truly fabulously rich and prospering with fabulous speed! - and this people for a hundred years have been hammered that their only salvation is to take away from thousands of landowners those tithes that were already melting in their hands by leaps and bounds!

Bunin's truth is that by 1917 the landowners did not have much land left. So much so that even if we take it all away to the last square meter and divide it up, the "land shortage" of the peasants will still remain. Only I would advise "white" publicists, for greater effect, to base themselves not on their own Bunin, the Oryol landowner, but on other people's (from the opposite side) evidence. For example, on the Materials of the XV Congress of the CPSU (6). (Verbatim report. Part 2)".

"The biggest negative feature of the modern countryside, expressing its historical past and the remnants of the general backwardness of the country, is the so-called "agrarian overpopulation" ...

Overpopulation in the countryside must be overcome along with the development of industry, the growth of the intensification of agriculture and the development of cultures of great labor intensity, which in turn is associated with the industrialization of agriculture and the construction of factories for the primary processing of agricultural products, as well as a correct resettlement policy ...

It is necessary to draw up a plan of resettlement measures and, on its basis, to intensify work on resettlement, which, by facilitating the rise of the productive forces of agriculture and improving the situation of the poor and needy groups of the peasantry, will help to reduce the "agrarian overpopulation" ... "

That is, even despite the serious decline in the population, peasants in the First World and Civil Wars, epidemics, etc. (losses are estimated at 25 million people, it is clear that the vast majority are peasants) and the distribution of all landlord, monastic, appanage (Ministry appanages ruled over the lands of the tsar and the grand dukes) of the clan, the lands by the mid-1920s were not

enough.

Even amazing! Have you come across, the reader, in books on this topic - such deadly simple arithmetic?! The land was taken from the tsar, the landowners were taken away to the last meter, distributed to the peasants, who became 20-22 million less, and ... read further Materials of the XV Congress of the Party, this is 1927.

But what a difference between approaches!

1917: "Salvation lies in distributing the land of the hated landlords to our dear peasants."

1925-1932: "salvation lies in throwing out excess peasants from the village to the construction of five-year plans (even at the cost of famines)".

So what is the "Paradox"? The fact that the Bolsheviks came to power under the slogan of solving the problem of "shortage of land" - and really solved it (and how they decided! The villages are now simply empty in places, free land, at least ...).

But they decided from the opposite end: not to increase the amount of land, but to reduce the number of peasants. This reminds me of a saying popular among our brother - the developer of automated control systems (automated control systems) in Soviet ministries,

headquarters, associations, factories: "We will give the customer not what he asks, but what he needs!"

These decadent-Cadet cynics Milyukov, Gessen, Rodichev could promise the peasants more land. And the rulers of the period of 1929, the "Great Break", understood that not only would the new land not arrive (it stopped arriving after the era of Catherine the Great), but for the preservation of the old one, they would have to fight and fight in a completely different way in the 20th century. It was in the 20th century that one could indulge in campaigns in the name of the Holy Alliance, in fulfillment of the "solemn royal oath over the coffin of Frederick the Great" (a well-known melodrama with the participation of Alexander Guy of the Prussian king and Queen Louise) ... And, most importantly, Russia's neighbors in the 20th century still they did not proclaim the "Struggle for Lebensraum" (for living space, for survival, and not for dynastic bows).

And now, according to the goals, the means of war also changed. And the old model - the nobles will give officers, the peasants - soldiers, and three thousand Tula people will give them swords and guns - should also be forgotten. Now half of the nation must "plow" (already in quotation marks!) in cities, mines, power plants, mines, railways, design bureaus, so that an armed nation can defend its living space.

And millions of peasants were expelled to cities, factories, construction sites (but also to institutes (!), And to academies, workers' faculties, military schools ... and to the NKVD bodies, in order to get even with the commissars of the "Leninist guard"). And their exact number, like our losses in the Second World War, in my opinion, will never be calculated, because in general it is in the sphere of action not of arithmetic, but of politics or even philosophy.

For such a tough and cruel decision, the Bolsheviks had to get a reserve of power and authority, which was not even close to the tsarist governments. To put it more precisely, everyone who embarked on this painful reform needed a reserve of confidence, a reserve of peasant confidence that this government was definitely NOT a landowner! That there are no descendants and even the spirit of that vile swindler, "the Russian nobleman Pravdin, model of 1817" for their own reasons, but they hate the nobles as much as the peasants.

and that they, commissars, let

For a long time thinking about the reasons for the burning of landowners' estates, even in the conditions of complete physical control of the peasants over the situation in the countryside, I mentally hung a sign with the great, most famous quote from Pushkin about "Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless" and ... closed the question. It seems that it would be more profitable to somehow divide these estates, use them, but after all ... a "meaningless" rebellion.

And somehow I came across a very useful work, which included quotes from authentic peasant leaflets from the period - starting from the summer of 1917

of the year. It turns out that their unknown authors wrote, and they wrote that it was necessary "... to destroy the landowners' estates so that they had nowhere to return to." That is, the affectionate lady Ranevskaya, who sold the last cherry orchard, was literally left with a house, a barn, a front garden (whose few meters could not, even theoretically, - the aforementioned Ivan Bunin was rightly indignant - help out land-poor peasants), was the same dangerous, harmful element in the countryside, like those terrible feudal lords Zakrevsky, before whom in 1860 even Tsar Alexander the Liberator himself was forced to trick, maneuver.

And by taking away land from the landlords, the Bolsheviks solved the problem of land shortage, relatively speaking, by 5%, but at the same time they acquired the right to solve it further, just as they decided in 1929-1932.

Remember that amazement of Konstantin Kavelin and Dmitry Milyutin, prominent Russian figures: "Well, this is Rostovtsev! Yashka Rostovtsev, tongue-tied rogue and scoundrel, freed the peasants! This would be an absurdity crying to heaven if it were not for the truth! »

And this contrast of the centuries-old problem and its final solution could cause a similar cry, something like: "This is Vovka! The burry rogue Vovka Ulyanov (plus the pockmarked scoundrel Oskan Dzhugashvili!) put an end to the Russian land shortage!

It can be seen that the fate of such an intellectual is to be forever dumbfounded by History. Eternally surprised: how was it all decided without him?

And finally. There is such a popular "topic of historical disputes" that fills the magazines of the last 25 years: "Was the murder of Tsar Nicholas ritual?".

I would call the "murder" of the landowners as a class ritual in a slightly different sense. After all, the simple liquidation of the landowner as a class required the taking away only of the estate. But everything that happened in 1917-1921 corresponded to the well-known term - "ritual cruelty."

Chapter 16

Chapters 1-9 deal with the predominantly subjective causes of the crisis in the Russian Empire. Political life slipped to a bunch: terror - anti-terror. How correctly M. N. Katkov noted then: "The revolutionary said to the government: Give in, or I will shoot! The liberal said to the government: Give in, or he will shoot! The logic of terror embraced the entire part of society opposing the authorities. And in the government camp, the "power, anti-terrorist bloc" gradually became the entire power itself, starting from Boris Melikov, appointed by Alexander P.

all-Russian dictators precisely by the results

anti-terrorist work in the Kharkov province. The example of Loris Melikov is indicative: the track record includes the Caucasian War, the Russian-Turkish War, and the fight against the plague in the Volga region, which was remembered by all of Russia, then the governorship in Kharkov, marked by successful opposition to terror. February 5, 1880, an explosion in the Winter Palace, the highest (as it seemed then) success of the Narodnaya Volya Zhelyabov and Khalturin, a meeting of the country's top leadership in St. Petersburg to discuss measures of war against terrorists. On February 12, the Supreme Administrative Commission with enormous powers was established, on February 14, Loris-Melikov was appointed its head. The definitions of that period are known: "dictatorship in velvet gloves", "dictatorship of the heart", and in general, the anti-terrorist bloc becomes a government over the government of the country.

And so it was until 1911, until the removal of Prime Minister Stolypin by him, the "anti-terrorist bloc". Displacement, carried out by the "Okhrankov" method: a general terror-anti-terrorist conspiracy, putting a pistol in the hands of Bogrov, a revolutionary and a police agent (a third one can be added to this combination: "symbol of the era").

All this is politics, public action on the "day of the dynasty." And social thought in that period degraded and hysterized (hysteria, decadence, "Solovievism", Melchior's age and its idols were given, perhaps even too much space). In sum, what is called the subjective causes of the 1917 revolution.

Chapters 10-15 are devoted to the objective causes of the crisis. Only the peasant question has been considered in detail, although, I hope, its global, all-pervading significance for Russia has been illustrated. Economy, demography, defense capability were its functions.

Both subjective and objective reasons, crisis tendencies are opposed by what is usually called power in the most general sense: from the quality and quantity of the bureaucracy to the character of the monarch, the mood of his family, and the health of children.

Regarding the definition of the concept of "power", people argue forever, sorting through its sources (faith, traditions, knowledge, violence, authority), its forms, functions, "branches" ...

But there is one very popular verbal expression, which includes the word "< power", a wording that leaves no room for disputes about definitions: "the authorities have coped", "the authorities have not coped".

Often in this phrase, without any damage to the logic, to the meaning of the phrase, the word "power" is replaced by the word "state". Although it is intuitively understood by everyone that power is something closer to a property, possibility, and the state is closer to an object, nevertheless

less Russian perfective verb "to cope" is equally suitable for them, functional.

For the purpose of this book, the mentioned wording is quite enough, it remains to consider the options for the application, with which the authorities coped / did not cope. That is: wars, uprisings, revolutions, economic crises, well, maybe more - epidemics.

The events of this series, their final results, and "power in persons" (persons of some monarchs, ministers, generals) will be the subject of further consideration.

The general state of the state in any period can be, although approximately, estimated by the wars that have taken place and their results. Militarism has long been condemned by everyone (including the "advanced" military), but it seems that no other, unconditionally reliable test, an exam to test the strength and health of the state, the direction of development of society, has yet been invented. Today, speeches, documents in the UN, PACE, WTO, O8, C20 are somehow replacing forceful measures, and the Nobel Peace Prizes are trying to consolidate this sublimation ... but during the period under review, under the Romanovs, there was definitely nothing of the kind.

Exam in general A
small historical digression

A good omen, some "full buckets towards you", for me was the fact that it was Sergei Kara-Murza, a historian with an excellent natural science base, a doctor of chemical sciences, in his work "The Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet System", among the variety of those very reasons, leaves room for the formula "War = exam for the state."

And I, preparing to defend this generally almost trivial formula from reproaches in the "militarization of thinking", suddenly remembered that today the second part of this "equation" is also being criticized. "War", of course, is not *comme il faut*, but the "exam" becomes just as politically incorrect. In general, the exam is like an idea. Firstly, competition by the very presence of winners / losers reminds of conflicts, maybe even wars. Secondly, it is stress for the examinee. And, most importantly, an undemocratic hierarchy: Examinee and Examiner. This is where the "rights of the (examined) child", "juvenile justice", and a powerful number of factors and trends that undermine the very idea of the "examination" come into play today.

and political correctness, and

In addition, the final hierarchy, based on the results of exams, also undermines the idea of "democratic equality". Here, in turn, today there are also many anti-examination examples: special

benefits for various minorities, quotas for holding positions, etc. e. For 10-15 years in the USA, Europe, a tolerant replacement has been adopted: mentally retarded = alternatively gifted ...

Considering many previously familiar words (negro, cripple, blind) as politically incorrect, contradicting the new picture of the world, they ingeniously compiled a list of substitutions: black = African American, and closer to our topic: failure, loss = delayed success; blind = visually obstructed (y15iaPu Pppra! ygechd).

The source of this fearful politeness is the rights of minorities carried to the limit, to the point of absurdity. Any right of any minority is sacred. At the limit of this politically correct trend, you can wait for, say, a secretary of state appointed under a quota for gays, a visually impaired astronomer, an art gallery director, or an alternatively gifted secretary of defense.

Daiu us Unified State Examination also made a significant contribution to leveling, smoothing the mental level of the generation. It just seems that a guessing game, the Unified State Exam, is a kind of competition. In one of our conversations, Professor Sergei Petrovich Kapitsa formulated the difference: the previous exams revealed the ability to think, and the USE, in fact, is a test for the presence of a certain amount of information. That is, if we continue Kapitsa's thesis, the exam, differentiating the flow of examinees into smart / stupid, is "against universal equality." But the exam reminds me very much of television games, all sorts of quizzes "Who wants to become a millionaire?" They are all for equality. The USE successfully equalizes the participants in the game, like the most democratic meeting in the world - the television audience. Knowledge or ignorance - mmm ... "the longest river in Mozambique", or "how many feature films starred Alla Pugacheva?", Or something like that - certainly not the basis for any deep differentiation of the audience .

Without delving further into such oppositions, I leave one, as I understand it, the idea of the Exam - manufacturability. Study - 11 years, exam - hour. You can, probably, without stress, smoothly guide, correct the learning process for all 11 years, assigning each student a tutor, a curator. But one-time examination is easier, more technologically advanced. Therefore, in books where there are hundreds of mutually exclusive information and assessments for most historical figures, it will be more technologically advanced to use the "assessments" put down by history in exams-wars.

"God's Judgment"

Here is the second similitude I propose - "war = God's judgment." The further we retreat on the scale of historical time, the

clearer, more thorough will be this assimilation. The idea of a court decision - based on the result of the duel - is just not new, coming from the Middle Ages. But: if, as it was recognized then, the will of God is manifested in the battle of two people, then, with even greater (statistical) reliability, the will of God can be recognized in military results.

Here, Hugo Grotius, the founder of most of the modern military-legal provisions and terms, will serve as some confirmation to me.

Hugo Grotius - Dutch scientist of the 17th century. Historian and lawyer. The author of the theory of "natural law". His "Three Books on the Law of War and Peace" is the foundation of military jurisprudence. His idea of national sovereignty became the theoretical basis for the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648.

I spoke about Grotius in more detail in the book The Second World Reset. Here I will only talk about his study of the origin of the word "war" - BePit. It turns out that it came from the ancient Roman form ChaiePiat, which meant a duel.

In general, as an exam, or as God's judgment, but wars were perceived as the main result of the life of countries and peoples. And the whole history is like wars or preparations for them.

The Romanovs are rightly called a dynasty of reformers. The contrast with the Ruriks is truly striking. And according to the postulate "war is an exam for the state", it is quite possible and productive to consider the history of continuous Romanov reforms as either war, or "military construction" (training), or their combination.

If we are going to evaluate a series of statesmen of the Romanov era based on the results of wars, it is necessary to say something about wars in world history, to systematize them somewhat, and, if I may say so, to reduce them ... picturesque.

Actually, the famous "History" of Herodotus, the "father of history" is the Greco-Persian wars plus all geographical deviations - from Africa (the problem of the source of the Nile) to the systematization of the Scythians, and all this is given in connection with the Greco-Persian war. Similarly, the next great historian, Thucydides, world history = the history of the Peloponnesian War + everything else, right down to the definition of the nature of democracy, that same funeral speech of Pericles, studied in Western schools to this day.

Having traced the path of the "fathers of history", it is impossible not to note that, having gone through all the ethnic, political, mental features, the line of the most important division of the then humanity into

Europeans / Asians are carried out by ancient authors precisely on the basis of military successes / failures.

True, the same "fathers of history" also set a high literary standard: they brought both Hellenic and Asian characters so vivid and interesting, they painted pictures of campaigns and battles so colorfully that with

since then, military history has occupied a huge sector of the popular literature of the world.

And in this book, removing a layer of rich painting, I have to leave some regularities, first of all: the size of the armies, the quality of training of soldiers, weapons, the results of battles.

These regularities are known to military specialists, but they are projected worst of all on the sphere of popular historical literature. The peculiar obscurations, distortions of these regularities, according to my observations, give great obstacles in assessing the two most important periods of our history: the Petrine reforms, the crisis and the death of the Romanov Empire. I will try to use the concrete results of the wars to characterize the Russian government, including in these key periods of history.

Serifs on the Russian time scale

When 1917 is called the end of the Petrine (imperial, Petersburg) period of Russian history, there is both truth and therapy in this. Therapy: "It was not Russia that fell, but only one specific model of Russian power," - the realization of this heals. True (that it was not Russia that disappeared in 1917) - and this has its own litmus test: after all, already 24 years after the "controversial serif", the country took up the usual "Russian business", the salvation of mankind (1941-1945), which means that for sure - Russia .

The interconnected consideration of wars and power forced, even in the "peasant chapters" of this book, to contrast the now highly criticized magnificent Catherine's century with the Pavlovian period of "thinking, putting things in order ...". Catherine's wars solved and solved the most important national tasks (the acquisition of territories suitable for a rapidly growing population, the achievement of "natural borders", the reunification of the heritage of Kievan Rus ...). Paul's wars were sort of... "Maltese" wars. Pampering, donating to the euromonarchs (although not for good, but for - "play and return ... partially") 8,000 "tin soldiers" each.

But even more, in my opinion, the popular modern perception of Peter I, the founder of the empire, the eponym of the "Petrine period of Russian history", the main Russian tsar, needs to be corrected.

From the vast sea of criticism of the Petrine reforms, two directions can be distinguished. Slavophiles: "Peter distorted the history of the development of Russia,

forcibly introduced alien European elements, paid too high a price for reforms.

The second line is led by historians who seem to be absolutely incompatible, opposite in spirit, but their rejection of the Petrine period

comes down to an even more humiliating conclusion for Peter: he had no real reforms, only feverish, senseless fuss.

The famous "historians of the Pokrovsky school", in fact, are ideological Russophobes, for whom Russia is a blot of world reaction, an enemy of human progress, the only benefit of which is that after 1917 it served as a detonator of the world revolution.

Pokrovsky argues that the main Peter's military reform was already largely implemented before Peter, and in his reign, with all the noise and self-praise he made, progress was very weak. In the administrative reform of 1698, Peter only renamed the "voivode" into "burmistrov" (a fashionable word brought from Holland) ...

But, paradoxically, unconditional patriots eventually agree with the "Pokrovsky school". Ivan Solonevich, the author of the well-known book "People's Monarchy", where he very expressively, convincingly showed the essence of the "Moscow project" of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky - the People's Monarchy, eventually destroyed by Peter.

One of today's most popular historians is A. M. Burovsky, assistant to State Duma deputy (now Minister of Culture) Vladimir Medinsky, and the titles of his books are even more telling: "The Truth about Pre-Petrine Rus'", "Peter the Great - the Damned Emperor", "Failed Empire . Russia, which could be.

The common slogan of Solonevich, Burovsky, and a huge number of their followers is "The Russia that we have lost is pre-Petrine Russia." Here is their picture of the Petrine reforms:

"Peter issued 20,000 decrees alone, for the most part completely ridiculous or incomprehensible (including with an admixture of Dutch words or simply written illegibly). Moreover, he was almost never interested in their further fate; most of them were seen only by his inner circle, only a small part of these decrees were sent out, and quite a bit got into the outback.

"Peter's activity is only an imitation of the activity of a statesman... Since childhood, Peter has manifested and developed the so-called syndrome of hyperactivity and attention deficit" (Burovsky).

"Peter traveled somewhere all his life, because in principle he could not sit for more than a few days in one place;

and to govern the state, being all the time on the road, in any case, at that time, it was simply impossible. This is confirmed by foreigners who traveled with Peter: they wrote that they did not

they understand that when the Russian tsar rules the state, they were inseparably near him for days or even weeks and never saw him doing any state affairs "(Solonevich).

"The failure of the Crimean campaigns (Vasily Golitsyn, Peter's predecessor and opponent. - I. Sh.) is greatly exaggerated in order to raise the prestige of Peter's Azov campaigns.

And Peter himself in those Azov campaigns lost half of the entire army and received only access to the inland Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov ... "

Solonevich in the book "People's Monarchy", part 5 "Peter the Great", writes about the military reform:

"Grozny has already embarked on the path of this reorganization. A few years before the accession of Peter - in 1681 - out of 164 thousand of the Moscow army - 89, i.e., more than thousand , half were transferred to a foreign system, i.e., they were turned into a regular standing army. As you can see, the "reform" was carried out even without Peter. Under Peter, it was, firstly, reduced and, secondly, crippled ... "

This series of solid accusations can be continued indefinitely. That is why I propose to apply the "examination of war", to consider precisely its results as the final assessment.

Peter really was not quite a normal person, after the Streltsy riots he became ... in a Russian expression, a fit. You can describe his behavior as much as you like, and I can even replenish the treasury of Peter's bright mistakes with one very significant fact missed by his accusers. As a biographer of the Golitsyn family, the author of a book about them, I found this fact among the reliable, but underestimated, forgotten ones from the Northern War. Having learned about it (will be given later), readers or listeners at conferences or TV shows, even quite qualified specialists, showed great surprise, a desire to double-check.

But it is more important to introduce an objective criterion into the set of Petrine-Anti-Petrine texture. The attentive reader himself, probably, will notice in the above books a suspicious bias in favor of imperfective verbs to the detriment, respectively, of the perfective verb. That is, basically it is "<how I did it" (stupidly, inconsistently, imitating, stupidly rushing about ...) and much less often - <what I did>".

So, what was done by Peter unconditionally and fixed firmly on the maps of the world.

Crimean theorem

The Crimean Khanate provides an excellent basis for comparative analysis. Having entered, according to Gumilyov's definition, the stage of "homeostasis", a state of equilibrium with the environment, the Crimean Khanate is remarkable in that for more than 200 years it has set a task for Russia with the same "initial conditions". From the time of Ivan the Terrible to the time of Catherine II, an army of 100-150 thousand people has always been put up. Armament and tactics also remained virtually unchanged.

The Russian, pre-Petrine army in terms of specific combat capability was approximately equal to the Crimean one. And if our main forces were involved, for example, in Livonia, then the Crimeans of Devlet-Girey reached Moscow. And the defeat of the Russian army near Konotop in 1659, historians explain (excuse) the approach of the Crimean army to the traitor hetman Vyhovsky. The combined Cossack-Tatar army of 40-43 thousand people defeated the 36,000-strong Russian army of Trubetskoy. It is significant that there were no complaints against our commander then, and the "German" (Dane) commander of the rearguard, Colonel Nikolai Bauman (Bodman), was promoted to general, and his Russian glory began from this battle. Yes, and today's our historians excuse the defeat by the numerical superiority of the Cossack-Crimean army ...

Russia was on the rise and eventually got the opportunity to increase the size of the army (the qualitative ratio was preserved!), To push the Crimean Khan. BUT: Crimea itself was fundamentally inaccessible, which was proved, among other things, by two campaigns of Vasily Golitsyn in 1687 and 1689.

(For accuracy, we mention that the Cossacks made light raids, attacks from the sea to the Crimea, and once, while helping Vishnevetsky, they were joined by a small detachment of Daniil Adashev.)

The Tatar cavalry, 100-150 thousand horsemen, easily slipped through deserted, waterless places from Perekop to the Dnieper, the less mobile Russian army could not do this, the then level of logistics simply did not allow, there were not enough supplies. But to go on a campaign of the Russian army with a number less than the threshold value - 100-150 thousand, already meant a loss in battle. That is why Vasily Golitsyn collected those same 100-150 thousand, but at the same time exceeded the threshold for maintaining mobility. To crawl to Perekop and retreat (only because of a lack of supplies, food, as they excused him) is the limit of the possibilities of logistics, the maneuverability of the pre-Petrine army.

A real military revolution (which reached Russia under Peter) is an increase in the combat capability of European armies by 5-7 times. And for the new

it became common for the Russian army to attack the vastly superior Turkish-Tatar armies. Battle of Cahul, 1770: Rumyantsev has 35,000 soldiers against 90,000 Turks and

80,000 Tatars - a complete victory. Battle of Rymnik, 1789: Suvorov has 25,000 soldiers against 100,000 Turks - a victory. The European

Asian fighting proportion. The victory (which saved Georgia) of General Kotlyarevsky at Aslanduz over the 15-fold superior Persian army of Abbas Mirza was, of course, a notable event even in this series ... but in general, the Russian leadership in the 18th-19th centuries, making plans for campaigns against the Crimeans, Turks, Persians, Khivans, never aspired to quantitative parity. The victories were calculated in advance, assuming a 2-3-fold or more quantitative superiority of the enemy.

Solonevich venomously, in great detail, criticizes the failure of Peter's Prut campaign in 1711. Yes, at the same time as the Swedish war, he was not able to fight the Turkish one (and his heirs were completely!). Peter himself described the results of 1711 in a decree absolutely, in my opinion, understandable, "not gibberish": "I deserved 100 blows with sticks for the Prut campaign. But I only got 50. He was surrounded in the camp, escaped only at the cost of the return of Azov and the bribery of the Turkish commander Baltaji Pasha.

But if we still talk not about Peter, but about the entire Peter's military reform, then the continuation is as follows. 11 years after Peter's death, a new, 40,000-strong Peter's army under the command of Minikh broke into the Crimea and in 1736 for the first time in history took the capital, Bakhchisarai, however, then suffering huge losses from diseases. But one must also understand this: the Russian army for the first time climbed so far to the south! And in 1739, at Stavuchany, Minich with 60,000 army attacks and defeats 95,000 Turks. And criticism like Solonevich's about the "mediocre war of 1735-1739" can be answered with the old advertising slogan: "Our jeep will get stuck where others will not reach." (Of course, one cannot limit oneself to such an answer and "close the question", the matter will come to a detailed consideration.)

And in the era of Rumyantsev and Potemkin, the Crimean Khanate was conquered. General Vasily Dolgoruky had enough 30,000 soldiers to defeat the 70- and 95-thousandth Crimean Tatar armies. The "Crimean theorem" has been proven. But like other theorems, "Krymskaya" has one important consequence that is directly related to the topic of this book.

Statements that "military reform - was already largely carried out before Peter", are incompatible with reality. Solonevich counted as many as 89,000 Russian army of the "new system", created before Peter. One could simply chuckle at the naivety of a person, as if unfamiliar with the realities of life, when with one stroke of the pen they can call the old crowd - "regiments of the new system", and even share the awards "for the successful modernization of the army" ...

"You could smile ..." - if it really was only naivety. No, of course, there was also a huge interest in this Homeric lie: Sophia and Vasily Golitsyn have their own interest, the current historians have their own (which will be discussed).

But it was the war, the result of the Crimean campaigns of Vasily Golitsyn, that showed that the "new army" was not the one that was named (by interested

PEOPLE) "new", but one that can quantitatively defeat the large "old". In 1687-1789, the old 150,000th clumsy went to the Crimea with Golitsyn - and in comparison with the future army
_ still a crowd.

And the argument that "the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated in order to raise the prestige of Peter's Azov campaigns", this is completely at the level of well-known hopes that propaganda can replace everything. Including simple military certainty: taken / not taken Crimea, Warsaw ...

In the book "Golitsyns and All Russia", I considered this trend, which is present both in Alexei Tolstoy's novel "Peter the First", and in some part of historiography, especially Soviet: against the backdrop of Vasily Golitsyn's unsuccessful reforms, to emphasize Peter's success. But, believe me, this was a petty, indirect humiliation, even to the point of not mentioning that Prince Vasily was often called "The Great Golitsyn" by foreign authors. But this belittling cannot in any way obscure the objective material results... No matter how you exaggerate or underestimate, the trajectories of the Golitsyn and Petrovsky campaigns are fixed, drawn forever on the maps of wars.

The pre-Petrine Russian army was completely Asian. Here I step on my old Eurasian path. 60% of our nobility come from the horde. Since the Battle of the Kalka, they have been our main teachers and rivals. The well-known "choice of Alexander Nevsky", that is, Eurasianism - "alliance in the East, defense in the West." In various articles and televised debates, I suggested the following wording: "Rus' has freed itself from the horde - with the horde to boot."

So the readers of my previous books, the audience of television and radio programs will confirm that I used the epithet "Asian army" here without the slightest thought of humiliating the Asian part of our Eurasian Union. The campaign of the Mongols to Northern Italy, the humiliated letters of the German emperor to the Mongol Khan, the emergence of some European "Mongolophobia", "Tatarophobia" I also gave a place in the book "The Great Forgery, or a Short Course in the Falsification of History" (2010).

But the mission of Russia was not limited to winning the championship in Ulus Dzhuchiev, and, starting from Ivan 11, European contacts brought new technologies to Rus'.

About the amazing fact - the appearance in Europe of "a new military in terms of final (and this will importance even surpassing the appearance of the system" ,, firearms be discussed), they learned in Russia during the second half of the reign of Ivan the Terrible. And since then, the modernization of the army has become almost the main goal, sometimes almost an obsession of Russian governments. Foreign mercenaries in the Russian army, starting around the time of Boris Godunov, are not an invention of Russophobes. Their proficiency and combat readiness impressed the Russians, aroused a desire to master this notorious "new system".

What is its essence? The most superficial mistake is to attribute the superiority of the European army over the Asian ones to technical superiority in weapons. I propose to look at the problem through the eyes of Nikolai Spafariy, the Russian envoy to China in the 1670s. In his book "What is the nature of the Chinese and what are their natural customs and what are they most inclined to" (16778), there is both a historical base from the time of Aristotle and a modern view:

"What Aristotle wrote about the Asian peoples in ancient books, that the Asian peoples are more reasonable than the European peoples, and the European peoples in the military are much braver than the Asian peoples. Also, now the essence of the war is about the Chinese, who are the people of Asia, it's easy to tell us, because in the distance of the military, the Chinese are before them, before the Europeans, as if wives are against husbands. And what in the mind they are much superior, because they are evil-witted ... "

Chapter 17

The first reliably described clash between European and Asian armies is the famous Marathon, a clear morning of European civilization. Holding almost the same weapon in their hands, 60,000 Persians win. 11,000 Greeks

And, for example, the most famous of the disciples of Aristotle (quoted by the Russian ambassador Spafarius in explaining the main feature of all the Euro-Asian wars) fixed the proportion: under Issus, Alexander the Great with 35,000 army crushes Darius with 120,000 army (and even then a trend was revealed: the best Greek hoplite mercenaries are fighting in the Persian army). In the famous battle of Gaugamela, 47 thousand Greek-Macedonians of Alexander were opposed by the Persian army, in numbers ... already leaving for Asian uncertainty, almost to the point of absurdity. The author of the most detailed ancient history, "Alexander's Campaign," Arrian, had Darius with a million infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 chariots, and 15 elephants. However, the figure of 500,000 is recognized by most historians, this figure boasted (!) And the unfortunate Darius himself ...

But the graph of the results of the Euro-Asian military confrontation is by no means a straight line. The advantage achieved by the Greek, Roman civilizations was significantly reduced by the time

crisis of antiquity. The Middle Ages records only a minimal increase in this desired specific combat capability, from almost complete equality during the period of the Crusades to a slight advantage by the period until about the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 (the defeat of the Turks).

Then discipline and technological effectiveness lead Europe into the lead. Gunpowder, as you know, was invented by the Chinese. That they only used it for entertainment (fireworks) is a popular misconception. In the Chinese, and then the Mongolian armies, real grenades, fire spears (guns) were used. Even combat missiles. But to improve

to standardize, to put the production of firearms on stream, to rework tactical formations taking into account their use and, most importantly, to train, to bring to automatism their use by significant military masses - this is the European approach. Leading to results.

I, a long-time Eurasian, of course, would like to dwell in more detail on one important exception - on the Mongols of Genghis Khan, also, like the Europeans, who fought not in numbers, but in skill and battles that reached Cremona (Northern Italy). But... The Yasa of Genghis Khan (the Bible, the Constitution and the Military Regulations of the Mongols) worked, only a short time period remained effective. Further, starting from the 15th century, about the combat behavior of the Mongols, and all their military heirs, Tatars, Russians, Turks, an accurate observation was made: the Asian battle is a formidable first attack, with a cry and a thought addressed to the enemy "Run, or we let's run!"

Yes, the Russian battle cry "Hurrah!", transferred from the Mongolian "Khurr!", At a certain time, ceased to be an unconditionally victorious cry. Like all the military legacy of Genghis Khan. What is there to hide: "deflated", again huddled on the outskirts of China, Mongolia is NOT the empire of Genghis, the conqueror of Eurasia. The continuity of it and, most importantly, of its part - the Ulus of Dzhuchiev - is historically extremely important to us, this is the legitimate justification for the Russian possession of the Volga region, the Urals of Siberia, that is, this Ulus itself. But to deny its complete military-political collapse under the Genghisides is stupidity and meaninglessness of the very essence of history.

Which, in general, is simple: the new capital of the Ulus, its former periphery Moscow, having absorbed important elements of European (including military) culture, picked up the falling banner of the Chinggisids...

I would like to emphasize that this is not about any anthropological European advantage. Moreover, it was from the Egyptian campaign that Napoleon made one important observation that refutes any racist constructions. All of Napoleon's other military campaigns were purely European, and his corresponding statements and aphorisms overshadowed this, in my opinion, underestimated, revealing the essence of the Euro-Asian competition.

Background. During the Egyptian campaign (1799-1801), the headquarters accumulated a fair amount of combat statistics - from general battles to skirmishes and city fights. Here is how Napoleon summarizes it:

One Frenchman in an isolated fight almost always lost to one Mameluke. Five Frenchmen - five Mamluks - never.

20 French (platoon) - easily defeated 40-60 Mamelukes. 100 French (company) - always defeated 500-600 Mamelukes. French regiment (1.5-2 thousand) - defeated 7-8000 Mamelukes.

And, finally, the entire Napoleonic army, for example, in the Battle of the Pyramids in 1799 - 20,000 Frenchmen smash 60,000 Mamelukes. The proportion of losses in that battle was also quite European-Asian - 300 against 10,000.

It is only necessary to understand the essence of this ladder of comparisons. At the base is a "separately taken" Mameluke, a distant social relative of the Janissary and, like him, trained from childhood to shoot, wave a scimitar, and ride a horse. His whole life is combat, but only individual training is practiced. And the Frenchman is a craftsman, a peasant's son, a vagabond, an urban proletarian, a drunkard, a reveler, in general, a sans-culotte who made up the French army, about whom decently has been written.

They took up arms and went into service, they, the sans-culottes, on average 20-25 years old, when their counterparts, the Mamelukes, had waved their sabers for 10-15 years already. Further - organization, discipline, tactics - that same victorious "new system" (which has become the main goal of the Russian government since the second half of the 15th century). And the result.

It is necessary already to move on to the actual Russian details, but the whole bulk of the anti-Petrine literature I have looked at makes me stop and give one more example. The Slavophiles criticized Peter, the "Pokrovsky school", and today Solonevich and Burovsky criticized from opposite positions (I repeat that two of the most popular of several dozen writers were named. The quantity and "quality" of the train of authors trailing behind them is amazing).

And only in the interval between these waves did Soviet post-war historiography manage to say the main thing. When Pokrovsky was already overthrown, Karamzin, Solovyov, Klyuchevsky were not yet officially "rehabilitated", but the most severe and sensible word was conveyed to our Soviet school curricula: pre-reform Russia could well have lost its state independence. I imagine that now this argument is more and more difficult to convey to

consciousness. But it was precisely this threat that gave Peter such a gigantic reserve of society's consent to his reforms.

And to paint the enormity of Peter's repressions, cruelty without recognizing the fact of that real threat - this is, in the most final logical conclusions, real Russophobia. A nation that bowed so obediently before such "senseless and cruel" actions of the king, indeed, could be considered a crowd of the most miserable slaves.

You will find an abyss of objections to the thesis "Peter solved the problem of Russia's military security", which in the end can be reduced to two counter-theses: 1) "no, he didn't solve it", 2) "there was no such problem" ...

Therefore, I ask you to look again at the details of the European-Asian military campaigns. How did the conquest of India happen? The famous Battle of Plassey in 1757. The Englishman Robert Clive has 910 European soldiers + 2000 trained sepoys, 8 guns. The Indian Siraj ud-Dawud has 50,000 soldiers, 50 guns.

The complete defeat of the Indians, demoralization, the split of the ruling elite, the general internal turmoil (does the trajectory familiar?) and as a result ... 200 years of British domination.

But the proportions of the forces participating in the battles are not yet all listed. To explain the geopolitical outcomes (the creation of colonial empires, in the Russian case, the expansion and achievement of natural borders, the disappearance of entire states from the map), it is absolutely necessary to take into account such a specifically military indicator as the proportions of losses.

In the battle that decided the fate of India, the British lost 7 of their soldiers and 16 sepoys, the Indians - about 500 on the battlefield, and the rest of the army practically fled. Think about this: if the losses of the parties were even close to comparable, could Britain conquer a geographically very remote country with 20 times its population? Victories with "little bloodshed" (and if we leave this wording of our well-known brave song of 1940 and put it more precisely): victories focused on achieving the desired result, with calculated losses. And these calculations, of course, could not even close equal losses - this is the result of the work of the new army, in contrast to the old one. Or, relatively speaking, European as opposed to Asian.

And this indicator, the proportion of losses, was also achieved by the new Russian army. For example, Rumyantsev at Cahul lost 353 people killed, and the Turks - 3000 + 5000 prisoners, on the battlefield and during the pursuit - another 7300. That is, approximately 1: 40. Without a "new army", a machine that works with such indicators, Britain and not

would have gone to India, and Russia would not have approached the Crimea, the Black Sea, the Kuban.

Often referred to as "the first Russian economist," Ivan Pososhkov actually covered many spheres of state life with his eyes. Here is his living testimony (Pososhkov was born around 1670) about the pre-Petrine army: "The infantry had a bad gun and they didn't know how to use it, they fought with manual combat, with spears and berdyts ... and in battles they exchanged their heads three by four for one enemy head."

It will be important and productive to analyze how such a new proportion of losses was achieved. After all, Europe by no means raised 5-meter giants, invulnerable supermen, and even the quality of weapons in the 18th century remained almost the same, according to

Europe broke away from him only in the first half of the 20th century (rifled, rapid-fire rifles and cannons). In the mentioned battle of 1809 at Aslanduz, General Kotlyarevsky defeated the 15-fold superior Persians, who had English guns and artillery. For more than a hundred years, Georgians, saved in that battle as a nation, admired in Tbilisi the exhibits of captured cannons with cast inscriptions: "From the King (England) to Shahintakha". (After that, Saakashvili's "Museum of (Russian) Occupation" and his flirting with the British, Americans is ... But this is a separate issue.)

I consider the following division into parts of the "World History of Wars" by Ernest and Trevor Dupuis quite thorough:

Part XSh. 1500-1600 Spanish square and ship of the line

Part of HGU. 1600-1700 The birth of modern strategy and tactics

Part XU. 1700-1750 European military superiority

Part of HUG. 1750-1800 dominance of maneuver

The names of these parts reflect the most important thing that happened in that period. True, the authors do not delve into the issues being discussed at the moment, and somehow do not particularly single out the Euro-Asian wars, do not speak out about a possible reason (this is not included in the task of their global work), but simply record, "photograph" the Military European supremacy, 1700-1750 Bearing in mind, of course, not that it, superiority, allegedly ended in 1775, but that this "leadership", prepared earlier, became a symbol of the 18th century,

the most notable military trend of that period, coinciding with the wave of world colonization.

So, the question is: "Due to what exactly is the multiple superiority achieved?"

In other words: "What was actually the main damaging factor of the regiments of the new system?" The visual image: an impeccably even, geometrically correct formation (square, line, column) of the 10,000-strong new army repels the onslaught, almost without loss, puts the 100,000-strong cloud of the old, Asian army to flight ... - this is not yet an explanation. By itself, the evenness of the system will not kill or injure any enemy. However, it has a strong demoralizing effect on the crowd. An analysis of dozens of European-Asian battles states that the Asian armies, having lost much more than the enemy, but still remaining in significant numerical superiority, nevertheless simply fled from the battlefield. A characterization given by many seasoned military men of their usual first impulse, with the implied "Run or we will run!" - not an insult at all, this is a generalization taken from

many battles. For reasons of political correctness, these facts are rarely brought to public attention from their highly specialized military historical niche. Therefore, in rare discussions, such explanations emerge: the Turkish army never withstood the bayonet strike of the Russian army because it was the bayonet wound in the face that the Turks considered especially terrible, having an impact even on the afterlife. (Promised in paradise 72 virgin-hours will not be so affectionate?)

Political correctness, pre-emptive fear of accusations of racism simply closed this centuries-old experience from discussion, but in reality, if you think about it, the matter does not boil down to a simple and wrong conclusion: the European is brave, the Asian is cowardly. Moreover, I ask you once again to recall Napoleon's exact observation, taken from Egypt, that ... one Frenchman in an isolated battle almost always lost to one Mameluke. Five Frenchmen - five Mamelukes - never ... and as a result, the French regiment, 1.5 thousand soldiers - always smashed 7-8000 Mamelukes ...

The training, discipline, drill of the new European soldier made it possible to put aside the question of his personal courage / cowardice. And the Asian (or "old European") on the battlefield remained a man with all his human characteristics, and therefore the first impulse, and then the natural human fear. Here is a paradox that writers have given little thought to. There is a popular conclusion of thousands of studies: Europe allows human individualities to reveal themselves, and Asia levels them, forcing them to submit to tradition, "herd mentality".

BUT ... a paradox: in battles, it was the Asians who remained human human weaknesses, and the Europeans in the ranks became a machine,

a single mechanism, the correctness, inexorability of the course of which inspires the thought of its invulnerability, the futility of resistance.

The Macedonian phalanx is a good, including a visible example. An invulnerable vehicle (skating rink or tank) crawling on enemy crowds. Some battles against many times large crowds were completed by the phalanx without losing a single person. And at the same time, there is no technical superiority in weapons: the same spears, swords, shields. And if anyone (at least for reference) objects that the spears, the Macedonian "sarissa", in the 2-5th rows of the phalanx were longer, up to 6 meters (exposed through the rows, they multiplied the impact force of the first rank) - this is will be a confirmation of my argument: no technological separation! The Persians (Asians) could cut and fit 6-meter shafts to their spears in one day. But to gain sufficient psychological stability, to learn to listen and follow commands, to "walk in a phalanx" (in fact, there was a set of rearrangements more complicated than just "Forward march!"), Asians could not even for hundreds of years.

And therefore, I repeat what our envoy to China, Nikolai Spafariy, recorded: "What did Aristotle write that the Asian

European peoples, and European peoples in military distances are much braver ... in military distances, the Chinese are before them, before European ones, as if wives are against husbands.

Only constant clarification is needed: not anthropologically, but socially - "much braver."

All of the above gives a highly simplified picture of military history. After all, there are Cossacks, "an individual article", who have reached the world championship in their category - "light cavalry" with little or no influence of European culture. But the "light cavalry" is an auxiliary branch of the army, it played a strategic role only in 1812, in the war on communication lines (as the defeated Napoleon admitted).

The equal quality of European and Asian guns and cannons in the "smooth-bore, pre-rifled era" is also a bit of a simplification. But still, a higher European rate of fire was also achieved mainly by drill, mechanistic action of artillerymen and infantrymen.

The mechanical, automatic nature of the actions of the new European soldier, which, as it was said, "outside the brackets" the questions of his personal courage, were also manifested in the clashes of the Russian army with the North Caucasian peoples. In terms of personal courage, audacity, physical fitness, the highlanders are probably at the top of the world rankings. Plus, the mountain war is the most difficult for the new European armies precisely because it is difficult to act in masses there, the war breaks up into a greater number of individual skirmishes, and here - see "Napoleon's Egyptian Equations" ... But during the Caucasian War, Russian discipline - it can be call it a form of collective

heroism - won the individual courage of the highlanders. The proportions of the armies are not at all the same as in the battles with the Turks, most often the Russians had to send numerically superior forces. However, even here the Russian army won, including in the minority. For example, the famous battle of the Valerik River in 1840, described by its hero Mikhail Lermontov: 3,400 Russians defeated 6,000 mountaineers.

Further, I will quote, but with a certain clarification, such an authority as the historian, philosopher Arnold Toynbee:

"Since the 17th century, there has been a continuous advance in technology in the West, the development of which has presented a challenge to the rest of the majority of mankind. He had no choice but to master Western technology or submit to the powers that owned it. Russia, faced with such a problem, was the first to decide to preserve its independence by adopting a broad program of technological transformation in a Western way... The pioneer in solving the problem was Peter the Great. It is the happiness of Russia that Peter turned out to be a born technocrat, who, moreover, possessed the dictatorial power of the Moscow Tsar ... "

My clarification is that these "Western technologies" are not only and not so much the technology of gunsmiths. This is social technology. Discipline.

To understand the whole gulf between the two cultures, in addition to military statistics, I hope such an expressive detail will help. According to the new military regulations of Peter, an officer in battle can and must stab his soldier, who arbitrarily shouted "Hurrah!" Not "Sentry! Save who can! Let's run!" . Both, from the point of view of strict expediency, are just a cry that prevents other soldiers from hearing the words of the command. Complete, deathly silence is the ideal response required. And only at a certain moment, when the officer shouts "Hurrah!", the soldiers are obliged to immediately pick up his cry.

And, if you think about it, there is an iron logic in this, understandable even ... for example, to a theater director: a long-held emotion, having got an outlet against the background of silence, and not a bird market, will have a much stronger effect. Yes, and the psychologist will confirm: those unauthorized "Hurrah!" someone, perhaps, simply drowned out their fear, and it became clear to the neighbors, and, consequently, this "battle" cry did not fulfill the necessary communicative function.

Further consideration of just this detail, one point of the "military regulations" can give an important and certainly fresh, additional argument in the dispute about the "price of Petrine reforms", "distortion of Russian folk psychology". Disclosure and presentation of the main logical and even arithmetic "gaps", inconsistencies among the critics of the Petrine reforms is yet to come. Now I turn to those

readers who nevertheless noted the author's unusual increased attention to the military side of public life.

If an unbiased review of the history of Karamzin, one can note the high specific level of attention of kings and governments to the military side of life. But the Rurik dynasty ended, and then, at the time of the Time of Troubles, the history of Karamzin also ends. Further, if, for example, we take Sergei Solovyov as our "escort", almost the entire history of the Romanovs is either a war or diplomatic negotiations, which in turn boiled down either to fixing the results of the past war, or to diplomatic preparations for a new one. And who will accuse the Romanovs of "militarism", that at the cost of these efforts the country has avoided the fate of the same India?

Social, too social

That's why Arnold Toynbee himself had to be clarified: what should be understood by "Western technologies". Why did he emphasize the long historical periods of victories of Europeans, armed not one iota better than Asians. And the fact that gunpowder, grenades, fire spears (guns) were the first to be invented by Asians.

Discipline, drill, that is, purely social technologies were much more important, more effective - until the first third of the twentieth century inclusive. This is the explanation of Peter's policy, which is unexpected for many, sometimes rationalistically regretting that he "did not limit himself to European rifles and cannons, but took up beards, caftans, assemblies, customs ..." (And in the limit of the trend of purely technical borrowing, one also sees today's "new Russian" who bought a Mercedes, "rights" and bloody swine on the roads.)

The step of the undoubted technological, already - the technical separation of Europe - is only the turn of the second third of the twentieth century: rifled, rapid-fire guns, cannons, armored steamships, then machine guns. The picture of battles changes radically only during this period: an Englishman, calmly lying at a machine gun in front of a growing mountain of bodies of rebellious Sudanese with spears, guns in his hands ...

But it is important to note that this picture is by no means the last in the kaleidoscope of world history. The next one has not yet been fully manifested today. But if it turns out that the West paid for the scientific progress that gave aviation, tanks, nuclear weapons with the complete loss of religion (the question is not completely clear), then this next picture may be sad for the "white man". After all, then all those "social technologies" will collapse, which, as emphasized, were ahead, were always more important, more effective than technical innovations. In a non-religious society, the original impetus to the adoption of discipline, to self-improvement and self-restraint, which went hand in hand for all 3000 years and gave that power, examples of which were briefly mentioned, will be lost.

And the picture can suddenly remind Herbert Wells: the gelatinous, jellyfish commander of the almighty, with lasers, chemical weapons, Martian self-propelled tripod helplessly falls from behind the control panel, struck down by a slight "influenza".

Of course, I don't want to repeat, with all the sympathies for them, the Slavophiles, the entire 19th century depicted the decline and collapse of the bourgeois West, and in 1918, sent their children as taxi drivers to Berlin and Paris ... but there is something to look at.

Chapter 18

Like war, an exam in the history of states, the military topic becomes a good examiner for historiographers. A typical example is Evgeny Anisimov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, professor at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, laureate, author and presenter of the series of programs on the Culture channel - Palace Secrets, Captives of Fate, on the Russia channel - History Cabinet ". (Wikipedia lists Anisimov as one of the 9-10 authors whose scores add up to become the final score for Peter [and his era.]

Here is Anisimov's book "History of Russia from Rurik to Putin." That 90% of its volume is a retelling of well-known facts, this is not yet an accusation. The author should not come up with an alternative history, for this there is a separate cohort of writers who mix historiography with fantasy, sometimes even in a 1: 3 ratio - a cocktail that is very popular today. Of course, I would also like to find some fresh look at old facts, a new relationship, a historical parallel, a vivid example within the real, not alternative history ... And so, I called!

Page 299, annexation of Georgia to Russia:

"With the death of Heraclius II in 1801, his kingdom fell apart, and Eastern Georgia became part of the Russian Empire. In 1803-1810. Russia also annexed Western Georgia. "Under the shadow of friendly bayonets" the Georgians found salvation from their enemy - Persia ..."

That is, in addition to the usual book filler, reference links - "date fact", Yevgeny Anisimov also quotes from himself here, quoted "Under the shadow of friendly bayonets", referring to Lermontov, "Mtsyri":

And God's grace came down

To Georgia! She bloomed

Since then, in the shade of their gardens,

Without fear of enemies,
Beyond friendly bayonets.

It's not a quotation error (that's Lermontov, "Mtsyri" is a school curriculum), but a total misunderstanding of the historical texture, which in that era was largely a military texture. canopy. According to the texture: the canopy and the edge are confused. The matter, a rag ... A face (a face of a crystal, a diamond) is the , canopy is a curtain of border of something solid. The stable, reliable and correct order of the Russian soldiers, who put up their bayonets, really looked like a solid crystal. The infantry square and on the battle maps are very similar to a diamond, and the straight lines of the exposed bayonets are on the verge. Waves of many times superior Turkish, Persian troops broke into dozens of battles about Russian infantry squares, and their infantry, in turn, firmly keeping the square formation was an inaccessible art, from where all the above results, the proportions of losses ...

Lermontov was a junior officer, he looked at the pictures of the battles by no means from above, not from the command hill, but the image of an even Russian system, similar to a solid impregnable crystal, he saw absolutely exactly, and was understandable (as I used to think!) To absolutely everyone - and civilians, both women and children. Reality stands behind this exact image: Russia, the bearer of a new, higher culture, including military culture, came to the Caucasus, sheltering bayonets behind the saving "edge" (and not covering it with a rag, "canopy") from massacre, genocide

Georgians, Armenians. Behind this image are the historical results of the battles and the twice mentioned General Kotlyarevsky, who from 2000 soldiers defeats 30,000 Persians.

Today, to say, as in the previous paragraph: "bearer of a higher culture", cultures are equal, all are against the backdrop of an off-screen politically correct background ("everything equal, everyone is equal to everyone"), is fraught with involvement in an endless, I would say, uncriterial dispute. That is why such highly specific, down-to-earth evidence is important. Yes, the commander of the enemy army, perhaps the second Harun ar-Rashid, and his officers are all Firdowsi, Omar Khayyam, Avicenna ... Just such and such a number, there were 170,000 at the Kagul River, and 35,000 in Rumyantsev's army. The results of the battle are...

It is on the "military exam" that the smooth retelling of reference books gets lost. Book by Evgeny Anisimov. Page 294:

"At the head of the Russian-Austrian troops, Suvorov made a trip to Northern Italy, where in the battles on the Adda River, Trebia, and also at Novi, he defeated the French troops. However, once in the actual environment, the Russians hastily retreated through the Alps. Simultaneously with the ground forces, the Russian squadron of Ushakov won in the Mediterranean, driving the French out of the Ionian archipelago, where a republic arose under the protectorate of Russia - the first Greek state independent of the Turks.

After that, the emperor rather unexpectedly broke the alliance with England, banned the import and export of English goods ... "

Again, a mistake at the level of "rag bayonets" - and the whole picture of the war is heading towards complete nonsense. Suvorov really defeated the French on the rivers Adda, Trebia, and also at Novi, but after that he was NOT in the "actual environment", but - the complete master of Italy. There were practically no French left in Italy, because even Ushakov's small landing forces were enough to take Naples and Rome. With Italy as a strong base, Suvorov planned to advance further into southern France, but was ordered to go to Switzerland.

There, in Switzerland, stood the Russian corps of Rimsky-Korsakov and the Austrian army of Archduke Charles. Further - a separate intrigue: Charles, against the agreement to wait for the arrival of Suvorov, leaves for the Rhine. Left in Switzerland, Rimsky-Korsakov is defeated by the Frenchman Massena, and Suvorov, who crossed the Alps, really finds himself surrounded. But in Switzerland. We will not disclose the details of the Austrian intrigue, so that no one gets the impression that I am criticizing Anisimov from a "jingo-patriotic" position. But nevertheless ... Suvorov in 1799 in Northern Italy was not a "encirclement", but a complete master of the cleared country (with the exception of Genoa, where the French, who pressed close to the sea, were besieged and surrendered a little later). This is proved by another simple fact: the Austrians, who escorted Suvorov from Italy (the purpose of their intrigue), calmly owned this country for almost a year, until Napoleon, who returned from Egypt, brought a new army and defeated them on June 14

1800 at Marengo.

Outcome: Anisimov crosses out Suvorov's liberation of Italy. The phrase "surrounded in Italy ... the Russians hastily retreated through the Alps" insults the Russian army and distorts the meaning of military operations. Suvorov simply did not have anyone to hastily retreat.

The shelves of modern bookstores, in addition to such sluggish, optional historical books, are also filled with critical analyzes of them. And as you may have noticed, very often critics blame the author for not including this and that event in their story. The difficulty of the moment is that the criticized author can answer: "My book is not dimensionless, I must select only the most important (characteristic, important, interesting)".

To show the injustice of the selection, it is necessary to cite fragments of the text, compare the volumes allocated to this and that event. And still the author's objection remains, "his special vision."

Why am I now bringing the above quote from page 294 of Anisimov to a sentence: "After that, the emperor quite unexpectedly broke the alliance with England, forbade the import and export of English goods."

To fix that the story about the campaigns of Suvorov and Ushakov ended there, and then the conversation went on about something else, and the author never returned to the Italian campaign. These are all easily verifiable facts. One paragraph, eight lines is devoted to three most important and glorious events in Russian history: the Italian and Swiss campaigns of Suvorov, the Mediterranean - Ushakov ...

And now I will give the beginning of the fragment about Tsarevich Konstantin. Pages 320-321:

"Konstantin, appointed after the wars with Napoleon to command the Polish army, settled in Warsaw long ago. Here he began an affair with Countess Joanna Gruzdinskaya, whom Konstantin passionately fell in love with. After a divorce from his wife Anna Fedorovna (they lived separately for more than 20 years), he married Gruzdinskaya, who received the title of Princess Lovich from Alexander G. Konstantin sincerely fell in love with Poland, its culture and people, in a strange way combining love for the Poles with the repressive ideas of the Russian autocracy ... "

And so on, there are 37 more lines in the book, and only 45: about Konstantin, his Polish affairs and Princess Lovich. The grand finale of Anisimov's "History ..." will be the envy of any ladies' novel from pocket paperback series:

"Until the very end, Princess Lovich was by his side. On the eve of the burial, she cut off her luxurious hair and put it under

head of Constantine. Lovich was settled in Tsarskoye Selo and she survived her husband by only five months, dying in November 1831 ... "

In eleven of my historical and journalistic books, such a calculation was applied by me for the first time, why it is in the case of Anisimov - will be explained later. You feel like a petty nitpick, a literalist, while realizing that even the precisely "photographed" proportion (8 lines on Suvorov + Ushakov's campaigns and 45 lines on Konstantin and Princess Lovich's luxurious hair) is not yet evidence of the book's absurdity.

BUT if Anisimov had found a place for at least one more line about the capture of Naples and Rome (!) by Ushakov's landing forces, then maybe, suddenly, the situation with this, as you put it ... Suvorov would have accidentally cleared up. Allegedly "surrounded in Italy" and allegedly "hurriedly retreated to the Alps." And then after all, two factual errors in 8 lines ...

Maybe it's inappropriate to go to the connoisseur of beauty, the aesthete, the second Oscar Wilde with some pitiful army, martinet calculations? But the "military exam" is indicative of this, which highlights the entire author, entirely. And it is immediately clear that having confused Italy with Switzerland, having freed his professorial attention from Ushakov with his taking of all kinds of Romes ... - did he, in the time saved, somehow delve into the beauty of Princess Lovich?! Making inquiries, remodeling her hair?!

Why, the word "luxurious" is just the very first epithet that has turned up for the word "hair"! (There was such a school game "in the subconscious", instant answers. "Tree?" - "Birch!". "Poet?" - "Pushkin!")

And if I suggested that "military history is an excellent indicator," then I must, therefore, get here to the style ("Style - it's a man" , - says the French maxim), must show , completely closed the level of an esthete, a fan of the luxurious hair of the Suvorovs - Ushakovs:

"Konstantin, appointed after the wars with Napoleon to command the Polish army, settled in Warsaw long ago. Here he began an affair with Countess Joanna Gruzdzinskaya, whom Konstantin passionately fell in love with ...>

And to accompany the highlighted (examples were not collected throughout Anisimov's book, these are really two consecutive sentences!) stylistic pearls with a dry philological reference:

PLEONASM (Greek π / ϵ οπα \$ π 10 \$ - "excess") - duplication of some element of meaning; the presence of several language forms expressing the same meaning within a complete segment of speech or text; as well as the language expression itself, in which there is

similar duplication. Example: "Each customer receives a free gift ›...

Alas, this is not all. Further - on the uprising in Poland. Page 319:

"Meanwhile, the uprising began as a direct consequence of violations of the constitution of 1815, granted to the Poles by Alexander G. Field Marshal I. I. Dibich, sent to Poland, could not cope with the suppression of the rebellion. He was replaced by the more determined Field Marshal Paskevich, who had previously fought in the Caucasus. The bloody battles near Grokhov and Ostroleka ended with the victory of the Russian troops, and in August Paskevich took Warsaw ... "

And again the idea is confirmed: war is an exam (for the state and its historiographers)!

We can only suspect the quality of Anisimov's other works. Moreover, dissertations, as a rule, have several levels of "corporate" protection: they are presented in a specific "bird" language, often devoted to topics called "important, relevant" only in that specific "dissertation production". There, all the required reviews begin with the cliché phrase: "The dissertation of such and such is devoted to a topical topic ..." And finally, they are often simply unreadable.

But now the historian has ventured to write something accessible not only to intra-shop criticism - and he is pouring on military topics in such a way that the troika at the rate of "National History" is in question.

To call Field Marshal Dibich unsuccessful, not decisive enough (less decisive than Paskevich) - is this the author's vision? But there are simple facts! The battles indicated by Anisimov near Grochov, Ostrolenka were won by Dibich! True, on May 29, 1831, three days after the brilliant Ostrolensk victory on May 26, the last major battle, Dibich died of cholera. After that, Paskevich, who came to the army, took Warsaw ...

In fact, it's a little bit even disgusting: it's so careless, imposing to shuffle historical heroes like old greasy playing cards, dropping them, dirtying them, confusing them ...

Who is he - the "robbed" Field Marshal Dibich-Zabalkansky?

Historians count 12 wars between Russia and Turkey. Only in the 6th war, 1768-1774, did the Russians cross the Danube for the first time. Rumyantsev became Count Zadunaisky. The 7th and 8th heavy wars ended in victories, but at about the same turn. And only in the 9th war, 1828-1829, the Russian army under the command of Dibich for the first time decisively crossed the next frontier - the Balkans, took Adrianople, almost approached Istanbul!

It was that campaign that was valued above all others by such a military authority as Moltke. True, then the gigantic losses of the Russians from epidemics far exceeded the combat damage - again, retribution for a breakthrough to places where no commander had ever reached before! Dibich, Count Zabalkansky, concluded there one of the most triumphant treaties with defeated Turkey - Adrianople. His health was already undermined. Cholera in the Polish theater finished off Dibich-Zabalkansky. Anisimov also finished off (in the eyes of his readers) and his reputation as a commander. He threw 2 victories to Paskevich, and Dibich, who died three days after the victorious Ostrolenka, was recorded as a failed ...

Following to the surrounded and hastily retreated from Italy Suvorov.

But in general, Count Ivan Ivanovich Dibich-Zabalkansky (Johann Karl Friedrich Anton von Dibich) was an interesting person who, according to the memoirs of Faddey Bulgarin, combined his temper, for which he was nicknamed "samovar", with a good soul, quick-witted character. And simply touching attention to literature. Dibich read a lot, rushed about with every writer who fell into his circle ...

And if you look at random further (Anisimov's book: "The History of Russia from Rurik to Putin"), then in the 20th century ... there is a retelling of seemingly other facts, but on the whole the picture is just as bleak.

Page 449:

"On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, the Second World War began. On September 17, Soviet troops entered Polytspa and occupied the territories stipulated by the pact. Polysha, attacked from two sides, could not resist, and soon the winners staged a joint parade in Brest ... "

That the Polish government fled the country on September 16 (to Romania, then to England) BEFORE the entry of Soviet troops - Anisimov either does not know or is silent. Well, and the whole other set: "Nazism itself did not particularly bother Stalin, who created an even more severe totalitarian regime in his country" (p. 4477). - After all, this is also his, Anisimov's, feasible work to bring the cherished goal closer: the well-known PACE resolution, which equated Stalinism, the USSR with Nazism, Germany ...

In the book "World War II. Reboot", which has been repeatedly reprinted since 2006 (before Obama and Hillarilinton "reboots"), discussed in Pozner's "Times", where Yuri Polyakov quoted it, and in many other TV programs, I have already given arguments on this period.

What is the largest (in terms of total tonnage, number of

participating, the loss of battleships, cruisers ...) the naval battle of World War II in the European theater of operations is the Battle of Mers el-Kebira (Algerian coast), July 3, 1940, where the British fought against ... the French - to avoid even the theoretical possibility of their fleet hitting the Germans. That when Hitler attacked Denmark, the British, without declaring an ultimatum, without declaring even a line of anything at all, capture part of Denmark - Iceland, an important point in the North Atlantic. The whole difference between England and the USSR is textured. They were preparing for naval warfare and engaged in "questionable" fleets and islands. We - to the land and were engaged in "doubtful" republics, like that Lithuania that was peeling into the hands of Hitler (which gave Hitler Memel without objection, so the guarantor countries England and France could not find fault). The fact that a continental land war is hundreds of times more difficult than naval operations is, in general, obvious. But compare the severity after military claims!

But in order for the international situation itself to become "modern", "legal", politically correct, in general, the one that it is now, victory in the Great War is required! First, Strasbourg (the capital of PACE), Prague and Vilnius must be liberated so that those wise men who will tell HOW it was right to release them and what fines are due for violation of their rules can settle there again.

And here, foreign interested historical distortions coincide with the internal chorus. In Anisimov's book, 10 pages are devoted to how the situation in the world approached the outbreak of World War II, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its consequences, BUT there is not a single mention of the Munich Agreement, the answer to which was actually the Pact, which is recognized even by the majority anti-Russian historians ...

I conclude this "half-lyrical" digression, which began with a Lermontov quote. Of course, not only Anisimov's book - the entire body of such literature is responsible for the very "distortion of history to the detriment of Russia", against which a well-known commission was created. A vivid example of scooping up water with a sieve: the state seems to be fighting against falsifications of history and at the same time traditionally finances organizations and corporations where the authors of such things sit. Anisimov, describing the Pact in detail, without mentioning "Munich", although he seeks to play along (in his understanding) to Europe, it was in Europe that the descendants of Lermontov, Generalissimo Suvorov and Field Marshal Dibich could sue him based on the content of pages No. 294, 299, 319 of his book. Charge: "Defamation".

But it's not just about falsification, propaganda/counter-propaganda. About five years ago I started teaching national history at MIIT. Rector Boris Alekseevich Levin, in our very first conversation, said something like this: "Now there are no organizations, institutions involved in civil, patriotic education. But education without upbringing, as I understand it, is a dead end. And it remains for us to form specialists, citizens of our country through the teaching of history."

What to add here? Unless to report that Anisimov's book came across to me by chance - I saw it in the hands of a student. That's why it's for her attention.

Among other things, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, laureate, represents national history on federal television channels. I didn't watch his TV shows, but it says so on the cover of that book. Which, when planning to make a presentation at the seminar, my student acquired ... the poor fellow.

All this is the result of a brief application of the "military criterion" to the book, which, in general, is no worse or better than hundreds of similar ... products. Sluggishly indifferent tone, mediocre clerical language (however, for confirmation it is necessary to quote pages). But, I think, readers are already familiar with such "creativity" ... "Yuri Dolgoruky founded

Moscow, which is located on the Moskva River, which, as you know, flows into the Oka, which, in turn, flows into the Volga, which, I must emphasize, flows into the Caspian Sea ... ". But even in this book-filling system of facts-dates, invulnerable, like ... squares - holes, errors are revealed precisely in military fragments of history. We return to the 17th century.

Chapter 19

The regiments of the "foreign system" have become the object of desire for governments since the late Ivan the Terrible. Here is how Karamzin describes the results of the well-known victory of Boris Godunov's troops over the army of the Pretender at Dobrynichy:

"Boris trembled with joy; ordered to sing thanksgiving prayers, ring bells and present trophies to the people: banners, trumpets and tambourines of the Pretenders ... sent gold medals to the Governors, and the army

80,000 rubles and wrote to the first that he expected news from them of the end of the rebellion, being ready to give his faithful servants his last shirt; in particular he thanked the zealous foreigners and their two leaders, Walter Rosen, the Livonian Nobleman and the Frenchman Jacob Margeret; Finally, he expressed the liveliest pleasure that the victory cost us little: for we lost only five hundred Russians and twenty-five Germans in the battle ... "

About the Pretender:

"... The Manifesto, satisfying curiosity with fables hitherto unknown, multiplied the number of friends of the Pretender, although he was defeated. They said that the Russians went to him only under compulsion, with inexplicable fear, inspired by something supernatural, no doubt, Heaven; that they won by chance, and would not have survived without the blind frenzy of the Germans ... "

Foreign mercenaries at that time not only became a defense against external threats, but already a factor in domestic politics. The Rebellious Age was coming, the firmness, discipline and predominant combat capability of the "Germans" was obvious, recognized - not by today's Russophobes, but by the then Russian rulers.

An alarming trend was growing: Russia was forced to simply give away militarily strong states.

Karamzin, volume 10, chapter 3 ("Continuation of the reign of Fedor Ioanovich"):

"A few months later (in December 1594) the same Varkoch arrived in Moscow with a notification that the Turks were getting stronger and stronger in Hungary: he demanded immediate assistance from the treasury - and we surprised the Austrian court with generosity, sending the Emperor,

military expenses, 40,360 sables, 20,760 martens, 120 black foxes, 337,235 squirrels and 3,000 beavers, at a cost of 44,000 Moscow then rubles ...

In twenty rooms of the palace, having laid out the gifts of Fedorov before the eyes of the Emperor and his nobles, he satisfied their curiosity with a description of Siberia, rich in furs, but did not want to say what this sending of the Sovereign was worth, estimated by Bohemian Jews and merchants at eight barrels of gold. Velyaminov announced to the Austrian Ministry that such significant help proves the sincerity of Fedorov's friendship, despite the amazing slowness of the Emperor and his allies in concluding a solemn treaty with

us...

But pomp and caresses produced nothing important. When the Austrian nobleman, having started the main business, announced that Rudolph was still waiting for further services from us; that we must prevent the Khan from falling into Hungary and the Shah's peace with the Sultan; must continue to help the Emperor's treasury, in urgent time, in a certain amount, with gold or silver, and not with furs, which he cannot profitably sell in Europe ... "

Then it will come to demands for payment not only in gold, but also in pieces of Russian territory - to the Swedes for protection against the Poles.

And later, during the Thirty Years' War, when, according to Solonevich's calculation, we already had 89,000 soldiers of the "new order", Russia fed and financed the Swedish army in the hope that its attacks on Poland would help us return Smolensk. Our own attempt to return Smolensk in 1632-1634 turned into a victory for the Poles, the dissolution of our army and the execution of commander Shein.

Necessary note: often the dichotomy "old army - new army" was replaced by me for illustrations of some historical trends for: "European - Asian". For example, Poland's army remained predominantly old, it can be compared with the Asian one - precisely in terms of the final indicators of combat effectiveness: the post-Petrine Russian army smashed it in approximately the same proportions as the Turks. But then one expressive turn of the historical plot followed, confirming the declared trend. Let's follow the steps.

"For the defeat of the rebels near Orekhovo, Suvorov was awarded the rank of major general. The Poles were so demoralized that they could not stop in flight, although in the end they were pursued by only 10 cavalymen led by Suvorov himself. In 1770, Suvorov defeated the detachments of Dumouriez (a French military specialist among the Poles) near Landskrona. At the same time, only 10 people were injured from our side. Having defeated the last leader of the Confederates, Kazimir Pulavsky, Suvorov traveled 700 miles in 17 days among a hostile population, fighting almost daily. In 1771 the Lithuanian

Grand Hetman Count Oginsky. He had the best among the rebels three thousandth regiment of "black hussars". Suvorov with a detachment of 800 people passed 200 miles in 4 days, attacked Stolovichi, the enemy base at night and defeated the hetman. In 1772, Suvorov defeated a large detachment in Krakow - and the war actually ended ... "

And after 1794, the Poles showed a pan-Slavic excellent learning ability, the ability to "grasp on the fly." Volunteers moved en masse to Napoleon, and rather quickly the Polish legions in terms of specific combat capability caught up with the best French units, perhaps second only to the Old Guard. More than two hundred years later, this turn is sung in the famous hymn "Polska has not yet perished ...". Surprisingly, if you think about it, the mention in the national anthem (!) of the name of a foreigner and the process of military training with him:

We will cross the Vistula and the
Warta, We will be Poles.

Bonaparte gave us an example
How we must win...

Sorry, this translation is literal, clumsy, but the original with the music of the mazurka is very beautiful.

The "Polish theorem" says about the same thing as the "Crimean" one. In the 11th-18th centuries, the old Polish armies fought the Russians with varying degrees of success. In the 18th century, the new Russian (post-Petrine) army regularly defeated the old Polish one, like Europeans - Asians.

And at the beginning of the twentieth century, "learned from Bonaparte" new Polish units

fought the Russians much more stubbornly. In the same battles at Grokhov, Ostrolenka in 1831, Russia even fielded numerically superior armies - 35,000 against 30,000. The proportions of 1770, Suvorov's, were no longer even close.

History, elementary logic, arithmetic say: either the Russian-Polish Smolensk War of 1632-1634 did not exist in the nature, there was no capitulation and execution of Shein, Izmailov, or there should not be these senseless wagons of volumes of critics of the Petrine military reform. And not to whitewash the "damned emperor", but to return some sense of "Russian history", as a subject in particular.

I hope that the very fact of the presence of these lines about military training in the national anthem of our closest Slavic neighbors you will recognize as another argument in favor of my approach. The "military exam" is the main, sometimes the only objectively manifested role of the state.

I hope that the initial base for comparison and subsequent evaluation of the results of Peter's actions has been outlined. The level and condition of the armed forces, the state apparatus of Russia threatened our country with the loss of independence.

Fulfillment of expectations

Peter had a chance to fulfill more than a century-old dream of Russia. How did this happen during the 35 years of his reign, of which, as mentioned, only one year was peaceful? How and for what did he use almost all public funds, also mentioned 80% of the budget, which went to military needs? Above, I have already given a short review of criticism of Peter, fixing the coincidence of the assessments of the historians of the patriots and the "Pokrovsky school". Here is another short selection of the opinions of various scientists.

S. Solovyov: "The difference in views (on Peter's reforms. - I. Sh.) came from the enormity of the deed accomplished by Peter, the duration of the influence of this deed. The more significant a phenomenon is, the more divergent views and opinions it generates, and the more they talk about it, the more they feel it on themselves.

influence".

P. N. Milyukov: "The reforms were carried out by Peter spontaneously, from case to case, under the pressure of specific circumstances, without any logic and plan, they were "reforms without a reformer" ... At the cost of ruining the country, Russia was elevated to the rank of a European power. ... The population of Russia within the borders of 1695 was reduced due to incessant wars.

S. F. Platonov: "Peter was the most prominent and influential figure of his time, the leader of the entire people. No one considered him an insignificant person who unconsciously used power or walked blindly

along a random path.

N. I. Pavlenko and Soviet historians E. V. Tarle, N. N. Molchanov, V. I. Buganov: "Peter's transformations are progress, although within the framework of feudalism."

Pipes, Kamensky, Anisimov: "Peter's reforms were extremely controversial. Feudal methods, repressions led to an overstrain of the people's forces.

Anisimov: "Despite the introduction of a number of innovations in all spheres of society and the state, the reforms led to the conservation of the autocratic-serf system in Russia."

Petrine reform refracted in the eyes of Ivan Solonevich

The figure is powerful, colorful. Ivan Solonevich managed to escape from the Gulag. Lived in Germany, settled in Uruguay after the war.

His book "People's Monarchy" is very important for its title idea of "People's Monarchy", an exact choice from a huge array of historical events: "the project of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky", the role of "little people" in Muscovite Russia, the role of Zemsky Sobors ... Perhaps, having decided that Stalin "works under Peter", that in the USSR Peter's reforms are interpreted exclusively positively, he also considered Peter his (existential) enemy. And Solonevich felt it so much that he went to the absolutely wildest (almost record-breaking, as it will be presented) distortions of both the facts and the meaning of history.

First, his partly correct diagnosis. Book "People's Monarchy":

"Aleksey Tolstoy (Soviet) in his "Peter the Great" is trying to canonize Stalin, here the social order sticks out like an awl from a bag: psychologically, you see Stalin's Russia here, using Petrine methods, realizing the Petrine slogan "to catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries." Stalin rises continuer of the work of Peter, a sort of Joseph Petrovich, finishing the work of the great reformer. Official Soviet literature returns to the Pushkin giant, and "mutinies and executions" acquire, so to speak, a completely legitimate character: even Peter did this, and is he not a patriot of his fatherland! »

Further, Solonevich gave a very simplified interpretation of the opinion of his contemporaries. And then immediately jump to the state of pre-Petrine Rus':

"It is hardly worth talking about the assessment of Peter by his associates. And if

Neplyuev wrote that "Peter taught us to recognize that we are people," and Chancellor Golovin, that "we are made from non-existence into existence in such a way," then this is just court toadying, which is now very well known to us from modern Soviet writings about the father peoples. There was absolutely no need to produce the Muscovite state "from non-existence into existence" and convince Muscovites that they, too, were people: Moscow considered itself the Third Rome, "and there will be no fourth", and the Muscovite considered himself the last, the very last stronghold and guardian of true Christianity. Moscow did not suffer from an inferiority complex. And the Muscovite absolutely did not need Peter's chinoproizvodstvo "in people" ... "

"Moscow did not suffer from an inferiority complex" ... But in my opinion, a normal state that suddenly lost the ability to defend itself, giving part of itself to one neighbor, the Swedes, to protect itself from others, the Poles, dumping its budget (fur stock) at the feet of the Austrian emperor Rudolf, and should suffer from an inferiority complex, understand the intolerance of this situation (which became the key to correction). And the pre-Petrine tsars Alexei Mikhailovich, Fedor Alekseevich, fortunately, suffered from a "complex

inferiority", focusing their efforts on the introduction of "foreign regiments". The fact that these efforts turned into failure, window dressing, Solonevich's 89 thousand "new" soldiers is a common thing. With us, much is limited to window dressing, until the main examiner, the "fried rooster" ...

Solonevich on the influence of the Streltsy rebellion on the formation of Peter:

"This first fright can probably explain a lot in Peter's personal policy: the brutal suppression of the streltsy rebellion, and his own executions, and the Preobrazhensky order, and Peter's eternal panic fear of conspiracies. Ivan the Terrible, who, for all his ferocity, was still more honest than Peter, frankly admitted that after the uprising of 1547, which destroyed the Glinsky family, he was cowardly for life: "and from this came fear into my soul and trembling into my bones." The dungeons of Grozny were determined by fear to the same extent as the dungeons of Peter. But Petrovsky's fright also had some military consequences... Let's remember Narva. Peter, who was already 28 years old, led his thirty-five thousandth army to Narva. "There were no strategic routes, neither shells nor food could be brought along the dirty autumn roads ... The guns turned out to be unusable, and even those soon stopped firing due to a lack of shells ..." (Klyuchevsky).

<...> Russia defeated Sweden not thanks to Peter, but despite Peter, they were defeated in particular by that old Moscow cavalry, which Peter, thank God, did not manage to defeat himself to help Sweden. But historians have forgotten Sheremetev and Kelin and those unknown "armed inhabitants", all those people for whom Peter only spoiled everything that could only technically be spoiled. Both Russian official history, and pre-Soviet, and Soviet history put Peter along with Suvorov ...

Before Poltava, another story took place - the battle of Lesnaya. The Soviet history of the USSR writes about this battle as follows: "Shortly before this, Peter blocked the path of Levenhaupt, who was walking with a large convoy, and inflicted a decisive defeat on September 28, 1708 at the village of Lesnaya on the Sozha River. 5,000 wagons loaded with ammunition and food were captured."

This is not entirely true: "Levenhaupt blocked the road and his detachment was defeated not by Peter, but by Sheremetev." And not at all by Peter's troops, but by the old Moscow "noble cavalry", the very one that Karl was afraid of like fire even near Narva. Let us recall one more circumstance: the same old Moscow cavalry, under the command of the same Sheremetev, had already beaten the Swedish troops twice - once near Erestdorf in 1701 and the second time at Hummelsdorf in 1702. This happened immediately after Narva, when Erestdorf and Hummelsdorf, and even more Lesnaya, were battles in which: firstly, the noble cavalry, like Peter, Swedish invincibility, showed everyone, including Peter's army, that the Swedes can be beaten, and, secondly, deprived

not hypnotized at all

Charles of his convoys and, what is actually important, of all his gunpowder ... Let us recall one more circumstance: the same Sheremetev, and at the head of the same old Moscow cavalry, in the interval between Narva and Poltava, while Peter was engaged in his diplomatic and other enterprises, went along Livonia and Ingria, conquered Nyenschantz, Koporye, Yamburg, Wezenberg, Derpt - in a word, captured almost the entire Baltic ... "

Still, it is very unpleasant that, sorting through the materials of so many, even notorious Russophobes like Brzezinski and authors like Anisimov, it was the patriot Solonevich who happened to encounter such a nightmarish lie, when not something intermediate-gray, grayish, but absolutely black is passed off as white. And in addition to such a period as the Russian-Swedish Northern War, described exhaustively. Yes, Peter made a big mistake by driving his clumsy, not yet trained (not new, except for 2-3 regiments) army through the autumn mud. Then Peter fled, abandoned the army, but ... the Narva rout began precisely with the shameful flight of the old Moscow "noble cavalry" Sheremetev. Near Narva, the old Moscow "noble cavalry" was the unconditional weakest link!

There are also detailed descriptions of the Battle of Narva, for example...

Reference. Petrov Andrei Nikolaevich - Major General of the General Staff, military writer; born in 1837; studied at the Pavlovsk Cadet Corps and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. Author of fundamental works: "The War of Russia with Turkey and the Polish Confederates, 1769-1774", "Health of the Troops", "The Second Turkish War in the Reign of Catherine II, 1787-1791", "The War of Russia with Turkey 1806-1812", "The War of Russia with Turkey. Campaign 1853-1854".

The most authoritative Russian military historian, who does not care about any Peter-Anti-Petrine complexes. Here are a few extracts from the chapter "The Narva Operation" by A. Petrov of such a solid publication as the "Military Collection" (1872 No. 7, pp. 5-38):

"While the Swedish army was concentrating at Wesenberg, the siege of Narva continued. Sheremetev's 6,000 cavalry detachment was sent out on September 26 for observation along the Revel road and, having traveled about 100 miles to Wesenberg, occupied it on October 3, without meeting the enemy anywhere.

Meanwhile, Karl KhP, having left Revel on November 5 ... received on November 17 information about the presence of a Russian detachment ... Major General Maidel with 400 people. cavalry received an order to attack the Russian detachment, which had no information about the approach of the entire Swedish army ... Karl, who was personally present at this matter, ordered the Maidel cavalry to relentlessly pursue our foragers, and he himself, taking part of the infantry and several field guns from the vanguard, also quickly moved through a defile located on a high road; and on the road going to the right,

on Somnekyuli, sent another detachment. Sheremetev's detachment was so struck by this unexpectedness that without any resistance they took to flight. Part of his cavalry, standing in Somnekyuli, having learned that the Swedes had already appeared on our side of the defile at Povanda, fearing to be cut off, also rushed to run.

Sheremetev's manner of action aroused the tsar's strong anger: "Sheremetev was so careless and safe that he sent many of his people to forage, and with the rest he was very disorderly and left without defending the passage."

Indeed, Sheremetev's negligence cannot be justified by anything. He had known for a long time that Swedish troops were approaching Wesenberg from Pernava.

From this description it can be seen that if Sheremetev had taken measures to block the four-verst dam between Pehat and Povanda, on the high road, as well as the defile near Kokhtel and the 12-verst narrow road running through the swamp between Ieve and Pyhayogi, firing at them longitudinally and in the flank artillery, the Swedes could approach Pyhaiogi only along the road along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. But the exit from this side could be conveniently protected by the main forces of the detachment.

Even one detachment of Sheremetev could put up significant resistance and force the enemy to deploy their forces and suffer no small losses. But Sheremetev ran to Narva (32 versts), and Karl KhP moved without hindrance to Lagenä (11 versts from Narva), where he arrived on the 19th, on the eve of Peter's departure for Novgorod.

Sheremetev could only not know that he himself was attacking him.

Karl HP, i.e. the entire Swedish army. Behind the darkness it was impossible to see the forces of the enemy; not a single prisoner was captured, and preliminary reconnaissance was not done ...

... No one expected that Sheremetev would leave without a fight a position where he could, with small forces, detain the entire army of Karl KhP in defiles. In addition, Sheremetev, as everyone knew, was going to strengthen his position and defend it with full energy. The intelligence service of the cavalry was below all criticism. Not even sentries were posted, patrols were not sent out. The main goal was to produce forage in the area, devastated by us, for 10 miles around Narva. For this, the cavalry was divided into small detachments scattered throughout the villages. All attacks by the Swedes were sudden, and our troops were taken by surprise. So it was under Purts, Vargil, Rappil, while moving

Carla HP to Pühayogi...

Battle near Narva.

It was two o'clock in the afternoon. Crying "God is with us!" The Swedes went ahead. At that very moment, heavy snow began to fall with hail and strong winds,

blowing in the face of the Russians, so that it was difficult to keep your eyes open. The snow was so thick that the Russians only then noticed the moving

to storm the Swedes, when they had already approached the moat and the cannons of the attacked points.

Half an hour later, both attacking units broke into the fortifications, having managed to fill up the ditch with fascines, knock down the slingshots from the parapet and knock down the palisade.

At this critical moment, the Preobrazhensky and Semenovskiy regiments gave a strong rebuff to the enemy. On the left bank of the Narova, in the place where the extreme right flank of the fortified S-S line rested against it (the article in the "Military Bulletin" is accompanied by detailed maps, from where these designations come from. - I. Sh.) the army's artillery park was located, and there were several wooden buildings here. The Preobrazhenians and Semyonovskiy took advantage of these buildings and carts of the park and formed a barrier from them that covered the bridge E. In this triangle, on our right flank, both guards regiments stood, which were joined by all the troops of the right flank that did not have time to cross the bridge. A stubborn battle ensued. Hearing a strong firefight, Karl HIP, accompanied by only one Nord, galloped to the shots, and at the same time almost died along with the horse stuck in the swamp. With difficulty they pulled out the king, who had left his sword and one of the high boots in the swamp. Despite this incident, Karl arrived at the battlefield and, in one boot, several times led his infantry to attack. It was already 7 pm. Twilight came, the Russians stood steadfastly, which Karl did not expect at all. "What are the men!" - he said, and after several repulsed attacks, he ordered all five guard battalions located at Welling to be sent to the battlefield in the right attack of the Swedes, to the description of which we will now turn.

This was the situation on the right flank of the Swedes, when dusk came and all the attacks of the Swedes at the bridge E were repelled by the Preobrazhenians and Semyonovites. To intensify the attack, Karl KhP ordered 5 guard battalions, which were standing uselessly in the Welling detachment, to rush to his aid, to the bridge E. These 5 battalions (V.-V.) moved along the outside of the fortified line V.-V. to the place where it rests on the Narova, and from there they turned left, heading towards the bridge E. It was already completely dark. The regiment of Decarlians, who were already standing at the bridge E, hearing the noise from the Swedish guards approaching from the rear, mistook her for the Russians and opened rapid fire at her. The Guards stopped and also opened heavy fire on the Delicarlians. Both sides, at the closest distance from each other, mutually inflicted terrible losses on each other, and were already preparing to strike with hostility, when they began to distinguish voice commands given from both sides in Swedish. This explained the mutual error and the firing stopped ...

(Do you remember that expressive example from Peter the Great's combat Charter, borrowed in Europe? In which the officer had to stab his soldier, who shouted "Hurrah!" Without a command? Just for this occasion. . - I. Sh.)

Soon, General Buturlin arrived from the Russian right flank to Karl KhP, with the assumption of surrender on behalf of the Russian generals, since the Duke de Croaso surrendered to the Swedes at the beginning of the battle with his entire staff. Buturlin demanded a free retreat of the troops stationed near the E bridge, and permission to repair the broken bridge without hindrance. Having experienced repeated failure in attacking the position so stubbornly defended by the guards, Karl was very pleased with their readiness to capitulate and therefore agreed to fix the bridge, giving the troops of our right flank, who did not have time to go to the right bank of the Narova, to retreat unhindered along the bridge, keeping the banner and weapons, but having handed over the guns, since there was nothing to take them away. The actions stopped, and by 4 o'clock in the morning the bridge was already built ... "

Now notice how many interesting corollaries the Narva Theorem has.

"Peter is a needlessly cruel sadist"? And: "Sheremetev aroused the strong anger of the Tsar," the Narva rout began with the flight of his "old Moscow cavalry". What about Sheremetev - a rack, a scaffold? No, Peter nevertheless understood and took into account the main reason: the combat capability (almost zero against the Swedes) of this "old Moscow cavalry" is to blame. And from the next, 1701, Sheremetev is our commander in chief in Estonia. Sheremetev's victories near Erestdorf in 1701, at Hummelsdorf in 1702 - this is true. Only Solonevich has absolutely no idea what Peter was doing at that time, what the efforts of the whole country were aimed at! He believes that if this is Sheremetev, then it means that the absurd "old Moscow cavalry" is glued to him forever, like a theatrical remark from the "list of characters" for the entire duration of the play.

The fact of the matter is that Narva was the last shame of that cavalry, and the next year Sheremetev received another army. Yes, the reform of the army was carried out "on the go", and consisted in the fact that the old army: the local noble cavalry and infantry - archers from the time of the Azov campaigns were gradually replaced by new regiments. Narva decisively accelerated this process and by 1703-1705 only irregular units remained in service from the old army: Cossacks, Kalmyks, who were definitely needed as light cavalry and served for another two centuries.

And that "Levenhaupt's road was blocked and his detachment was defeated not by Peter, but by Sheremetev and not by Peter's troops, but by the old Moscow" noble cavalry", the very one that Charles was afraid of like fire even near Narvai ... - this is amazing! It's so outrageous to lie about the thoroughly studied battle at the village of Lesnaya in 1708, as if it were ... some kind of Atlantis, Hyperborea, the land of Thule ... They fought at Lesnaya recounted to a man: dragoons, Semyonovsky, Preobrazhensky and Astrakhan infantry

shelves. Under the leadership of: Alexander Menshikov, Mikhail Golitsyn and the tsar: Pyotr Alekseevich Romanov (1672-1725), and not Tsar Saltan, or Peas! And they fought with the 16,000th Swedish corps, and not with centaurs, Amazons, dog-headed giants. And under the command of General Lewenhaupt, not King Arthur.

Chapter 20

In general, the listed theses of some historians are somehow not particularly frightening. It seems to be formidable accusations that we have "damned emperors", that for 400 years (out of 1000) we didn't have the history of the country at all, but some kind of tear, a perversion. Did Peter ruin Solonevich's well-worn, beloved idea of "people's monarchy"? - "Cursed emperor"!

Apparently, the fact is that since the time of the great Karamzin, our historians have been, as it were, "in the same trade union with writers." They see the history of their country in images, in movement, in the struggle of ideas. In and denier naturally turns into admiration. And for some, the beauty of images and ideas overshadows the texture of history, the life of the country. For example, the solemn beauty of Zemsky cathedrals. By European standards, if the Council did not have rights fixed in law, for example, to accept / reject state budgets (the main right and the occupation of parliaments), then the Council is a fiction, an idle assembly. And the Slavophiles, Solonevich, Burovsky intuitively feel the truth of the Councils, their inaccessibility to the criteria of the work of European parliaments, they give a beautiful formula that describes our Zemsky Sobors: "The tsar has the power of power. The people have the power of opinion."

The symphony of the tsar and the Church is also a beautiful idea.

What does Peter have against these ideas, except for the lexicon of the Dutch

port taverns? (Although, if in more detail on ideas, then both the split and the streltsy riots were before him ...)

What is the power of influence of the incomparable "History of the Russian State from Gostomysl to Timashev" by the great Russian writer Alexei Konstantinovich Tolstoy, the author of historical dramas? It is possible to parody some ideas, images, commonplaces of many Russian historiographers in such a brilliant way only when you yourself are perfectly oriented in this sea. In this sense, Alexei Konstantinovich Tolstoy is also a Russian historian and an excellent example of an aesthetic, poetic perception of history, writing among other things: "When I remember the beauty of our history before the damned Mongols, I want to throw myself on the ground and roll from despair. Only yesterday there were Pushkins and Tolstoys in Russian literature, and now it's almost all damned Mongols." In Alexei Konstantinovich, both the Mongols of Batu and the vulgar materialists of Chernyshevsky are all "Mongols", enemies of the beauty of Russian history.

To overcome this tendency, to feel not only the beauty of ideas, but also the texture of Russian life and history - this requires such a genius as Pushkin. His absolutely accurate historical instinct was noted by both Prince Vyazemsky and ... Richard Pipes.

And those who did not overcome - just the list repeated many times here: Slavophiles, Solonevich, Burovsky ... (plus hundreds of followers).

And further - the promised example of "real" criticism of Peter, not as a tyrant who crushed beautiful ideas, but as a commander and statesman. Although, again, in a strange way, artistic, aesthetic principles are also present in this plot: for the first time, it was the artist, our famous sculptor Mikhail Shemyakin, who drew my attention to one important feature of Peter. Discussing the monument to Peter (not already erected by him in St. Petersburg, but the project of a new one: Peter against the background of the procession of the "most joking, most drunken cathedral"), Shemyakin told us (to the well-known publisher Alexander Nikishin and me) something like the following:

"Peter was sometimes irrational, on the verge of insanity. Imagine: the night after Poltava, he sits down, writes multi-page instructions on exactly how Prince-Papa Buturlin, Prince-Caesar Romodanovsky should celebrate this event in Moscow at the "most jesting and most drunken cathedral." In the smallest detail, who should wear what mask, what to carry in their hands, what design should be fireworks ... After all, a battle had just taken place, a day of the greatest physical and nervous tension, the risk of the death of one's own, one's dynasty, state ... And all night after - Peter writes "an order for masquerade and fiery fun"!

I remember the Shemyakin paradox, and when a few years later I wrote the history of the Golitsyn princes, I deliberately delved into one post-Poltava collision, where one of the heroes was the commander of the guard, the hero of Lesnaya and Poltava, the future field marshal Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn. True, in the book "Golitsyns and All Russia" I forgot to mention that it was Mikhail Shemyakin who first converted my

attention to this paradox of Peter, who on the night after Poltava wrote instructions to the "most drunken cathedral". With apologies, I return the debt.

What kind of "real compromising evidence on Peter" did I manage to find that his critics of the "ideal sense" did not find? This is a thing at the level of a historical anecdote, suitable for betting.

The fact is that from near Poltava the Swedes, "broken like a Swede near Poltava" All, in the They took 2900 (!) Russian prisoners with them ... This is a fact. slightest degree representing battle circumstances, admit that it is impossible

take the prisoners with you. "There was no Poltava victory?!" - I foresee and these headlines...

No, thank God it was...

Start, if you count from the exit of the Swedes from the camp - at midnight, the Poltava battle ended by 11 o'clock in the afternoon. Around noon a solemn service was held, and at 13.30 that famous feast began. And ... the road of our historiography at this point, as it were, bifurcates. All the details go to the general reader, Peter's famous toast to his teachers in military affairs ("Who is this?" asked the captive field marshal Renschild. "Yes, gentlemen, Swedes," answered Peter. "Well, you thanked your teachers!" etc.).

And scientists get controversy, attempts at rational interpretation, explanation. Why was the fight still over? The Swedes lost 3,000 killed and 7,000 captured, including the commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Rehnschild (the king, as you know, was wounded the day before). Indeed, the biggest victory (the next field marshal on the battlefield will be taken by us already in 233 years - Paulus), however, the rest of the Swedish army (20,000 according to Eglund's numbers) gathers and, having grabbed a stretcher with the king, slowly goes south. Plus, "broken like a Swede near Poltava", the Swedes took 2900 Russian prisoners with them from Poltava ...

This is what I call a historiographic split: feasts, toasts, famous historical phrases are launched into mass use. In narrow scientific polemics - polemics. On this second (narrow) path, success is still half-hearted: it is somehow possible to silence or, better, obscure some inconvenient facts with additional "historical details", but there is no way to explain it. Something like a sluggish shootout: Swedish historians (Liljegrand, Eglund) will give some interpretation - ours will object. Russian historians (Kostomarov, Klyuchevsky) explained that incredible pause in the battle by the fact that "success turned our heads" (inadvertently suggesting the formula for our other ruler - "dizziness from ..."). Soviet historians - summarized by Boris Grigoriev, author of the biography of Karl HIP - charged with a total refutation of "any fabrications of bourgeois Western propaganda", did not mention the prisoners taken away, but explained the difficulties of persecution

"objectively": a wooded and swampy area south of Poltava (it seems, it turns out, selectively acting on those who are running and catching up) ...

Only at seven o'clock in the evening the king sent troops in pursuit of the Swedish army. He entrusted the command of this detachment ...

Absolutely, you see, a unique case: this royal "order to pursue the departed Swedish army" gives, in addition to everything, the opportunity to guess about the drinking circumstances of our command. Roughly speaking: who drank how much and who held on. For example, documentary sources mention how one of our

of the best generals, Hallart, got drunk simply "in zyuzyu" and began to bully the Swedes: "Why are you honored here, and when, for example, I, Hallart, was captured by them, I was treated disgustingly." And Hallart was right here, and many of our people who were in captivity could confirm this, but at the Poltava feast the Russians repeated to the Swedes: "Excuse Hallart, he, poor fellow, is completely drunk."

So, only at seven o'clock in the evening, after the historic feast with the captured Swedes, the king sent troops in pursuit of the Swedish army. He entrusted the command of this detachment to General Mikhail Golitsyn. Which gives a unique indirect evidence: Golitsyn not only fought, but, it turns out, knew how to drink better than others! In the morning, the next day, Menshikov also set off. They acted superbly, harmoniously, and on the banks of the Dnieper, near Perevolochna, they captured the rest of the Swedish army (more than 16,000 people). Russian prisoners taken in this company were released right there, near Perevolochna.

After passing through this somewhat irrational section, the popular narrowly scientific historical roads close again.

And more about feasts and prisoners. The Danish envoy Yuel writes: "On February 27, 1710, Tsar Peter invited (it's already happening in Moscow. - Auth.) Field Marshal Renschild to the wedding, which he began to boast about very much ... And in the midst of the feast, Peter, pretending to be kind, as if half asleep asked him for what reason he and his Swedes, three days after the victory at Fraustadt, killed Russian prisoners in cold blood"? It must be recalled here that our auxiliary corps operated in Poland, and after the defeat at Fraustadt, 500 Russian prisoners were shot.

"In justification, Rehnschild said that immediately after the battle, he had to, by order of the king, go 12 miles from Fraustadt, and only when he returned did he find out about these executions, which he does not justify. To the question (of the king), why did he not punish the guilty then, the field marshal did not give an answer. Peter defiantly walked away from the Swede, after which Renschild left the wedding.

As you can see, our whole history is a phial of precious wine! And you need to drink it - savoring it in every detail. Everything is great here: and this "interrogation" - at a merchant's wedding, six months after the capture! And this is our wedding custom. This - you understand? - Peter wanted to please a familiar merchant! Spent, got him, for the wedding of his daughter, not a "wedding general" - already a field marshal! And take the meticulousness of the "writing" Swedes! Indeed, in many respects, from their memoirs, we became aware of unique facts - the "wrong side" of that war. Since then, a whole kind of department of literature has been compiled in Sweden, "memoirs of the Carolinians", captured officers and generals: excuses, mutual squabbles, but sometimes valuable little things. And under Fraustadt there was not cruelty, but simply

Swedish rationality: it was difficult to lead and feed prisoners then (here, for example, the Swedes saved the Narva prisoners) ...

And if that Poltava example falls into the "piggy bank of compromising evidence on Peter" too noisily (I won several bets on the post-Poltava Swedes, including historians), then this is because it, the piggy bank, is empty, poor in real facts. And she's rich...

Burovsky, book "The Cursed Emperor". Let us turn to the fragment - not only criticism of Peter, but also the whole criterion of the state. The moment, in my opinion, is amazing:

"... Everyone knows that Sofya and Golitsyn are reforms, this is a movement. And Peter is the Medvedikh standing behind him (Peter's mother. - I.Sh.), this clan of people who are not ideological, mentally not large, not at all eager to do something. There was absolutely nothing in Peter himself that made it possible to see the future reformer.

Yes, by this time Peter already had two or three thousand "amusing troops." But after all, the regiments of the "foreign system", foreign officers, commands in Dutch and German, the completely "foreign" type of army formations by that time were not at all something unusual in Russia, something that aroused surprise and interest.

In the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, there was nothing at all that set them off favorably, forcing them to stand out from all the other "foreign regiments", and after all, the entire Russian army since 1680 consisted of regular regiments with European training ...

Allegedly, Peter created a regular army in Muscovy. But this is completely untrue. The creation of a regular army in Muscovy began in the Time of Troubles and was completed in 1679-1681.

In 1621, just 8 years after the accession to the throne of Mikhail Fedorovich, Anisim Mikhailov, the son of Radishevsky, the clerk of the Pushkar order, wrote the "Charter of military, cannon and other matters relating to military science" - the first military charter in Muscovy. "Charter ..." Anisim Radishevsky began to be written back in 1607, he generalized

experience of the Time of Troubles, and contained translations of many foreign books.

The new Charter determined who they were, colonels and lieutenants, and what place they occupied in the hierarchy, and used foreign words only when it was difficult to do without them. The military hierarchy "in the regiments of the foreign system" could not be limited to two ranks - well, two more "foreign" ones were introduced - I mean "maeor" and captain.

In 1630, the army consisted of the following groups of troops: noble cavalry - 27,433, archers - 28,130, Cossacks - 11,192, gunners - 4136, Tatars - 10,208, Volga peoples - 8493, foreigners - 2783 ...

The government, preparing for the war for Smolensk, intends to change this tradition, and in April 1630, an order was sent to all counties on the recruitment of dispossessed nobles and boyar children, and then everyone else, into the soldier's service.

This gave an excellent result (*italics mine*. - I. Sh.), and soon 6 regiments of soldiers were created - 1600 privates and 176 commanders each. The regiment was divided into 8 companies. Average command staff:

1. Colonel 2.

Lieutenant Colonel (large regimental lieutenant) 3. Maeor (watchman, or roundabout)

4. 5 captains ... (I still cut one page of parallel terms. - I. Sh.).

I would like to note once again - the new names of the ranks are duplicated by the usual, old Moscow ones - probably in order to make them more familiar, to accustom people to new words. But, I believe, there is another reason - the Russian language is no worse than any other suitable for military commands or military ranks.

(It is clear that this is Burovsky's blow to all these Petrovsky "plutongs", "niderfalls", "articles", "baginettes", "muskets". And at the same time, on the same scale, and throughout the Russian, Soviet armies. Long, 400- summer mistake of history, of the Russian-language ranks only "private" and "colonel" - I. Sh.).

In December 1632, there was already a Reiter regiment of 2000 people, in which there were 12 companies of 176 people each under the command of captains, and there was a dragoon company of 400 people.

Peter allegedly destroyed a completely medieval noble militia and useless archers. But the noble militia has not been medieval for a long time, since 1676. Peter really began to disband the Streltsy troops after the Azov campaigns, but after Narva, having convinced himself of the qualities of the Streltsy troops, he interrupted

disbandment. Streltsy also participated in the Northern War, and in the Prut campaign of 1711. Until the 1720s, according to the authoritative reference book, "the gradual absorption of archers by regular troops" takes place.

Why is this piece amazing? After the italicized < This gave an excellent result ... "I conscientiously continued the quote, you saw ... It is impossible to reprint the entire book, but, believe me, further we are talking about the same pre-Peter's successful transformations and Peter's failures. The author does not even have a slight suspicion that in military reforms the assessment of "excellent result ..." should be at least somehow connected with the results of wars! Imagine...

... Preparing for the Smolensk war achieved excellent results:

They created ... regiments, gave ... ranks ... new names of ranks are duplicated, old Moscow ... Russian language ... suitable for military commands, ranks

History - from some parallel universe! Yes, perhaps the universe is more beautiful, more cultured than ours. There, the armies converge, find out the philological beauty of their military terminology, and, based on the results of comparisons, determine the winner in the war. Under such wars, history is ready, written. Read Burovsky's The Damned Emperor!

Actually, the outcome of that "Smolensk War", for which they were preparing, was not found among the descriptions of the invented bilingual ranks. (And if there was? A heavy Smolensk defeat from those Poles whom Suvorov drove throughout Poland with one or two Peter's regiments ...)

Solonevich: "... Having learned about the approach of the eighteen-year-old boy Karl with eight thousand, Peter repeats his already tested trick: he leaves the Narva army, as he left his amusing troops eleven years ago, and at that time he had up to thirty thousand amusing, Sophia concentrated three hundred archers against them >".

What's this? For his new compatriots, the Uruguayans, was he written? And they are unlikely to believe that in Russia 30 thousand could somehow contrive to play, to have fun. And these 300 archers ... Purely theoretically ... remembering mathematics and presenting a graph of the decrease in the number of supporters around Sophia ... Yes, indeed, at some point, a moment, this line, which began to fall from the level of "All the Armed Forces of Russia in at the disposal of Sophia" and up to the level "Sophia with one maid was planted in a monastery" due to the property of "continuous functions" should have somewhere crossed the level of "300 archers" ...

But why exactly 300? As I assumed, this is all written from the poetic subconscious - probably, so, unconsciously surfaced and ... 300 Spartans. After all, these historians associate everything beautiful, heroic with archers. Well, what about "30,000 amusing Peter", who fought with Sophia's 300 archers?

There were two of them, amusing, two regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovskiy, 4 battalions each, only 3-4 thousand people. I gave an indirect comparison of their combat capability with the Streltsy by means of the "Crimean" and "Polish" theorems: the "amusing" ones defeated those to whom the large Streltsy armies lost 5-7 times. But after all, direct, immediate

There was also a comparison - thank God! - only once. Battles between compatriots are not the kind of evidence that you want to multiply. Peter was in Holland. Sagittarius, as usual, rebelled ... Further - archival extracts from Pushkin, who was preparing a novel about Peter:

"Anxiety has increased. Finally, 4 regiments: Chubarov, Kolzakov, Gundemarev and Chernov (according to other reports, 12 regiments), who were stationed in Velikiye Luki and along the Lithuanian border, overthrowing the chiefs and electing new ones, went to Moscow, hoping to anger the archers there too ... The defeat of the archers took place on 18 June at the Resurrection Monastery. The rebels... not heeding the exhortations, went to the army, which consisted of 2000 infantry... The generals, thinking to intimidate them, ordered to shoot above their heads... They shouted that God himself does not allow heretical weapons to harm the Orthodox, and with loose banners rushed forward. They were met with buckshot, and they did not resist. 4000 put on the spot and in pursuit. Others threw down their weapons and asked for mercy ... "

Nevertheless, completing the plot, I will hypothesize how this insane figure could come - 30,000 funny ones. Already after the overthrow of Sophia, having received all the power in the country, Peter, preparing the army, carried out the so-called Kozhukhov maneuvers in 1694, in which, together with the Preobrazhensians and Semyonovites, both archers and "regiments of the new system" (Lefortovskiy, Butyrskiy ...), in fact, the entire army, which was at hand, was in the Moscow area. The commanders F. I. Romodanovskiy, I. I. Buturlin, their armies were given legends, fictitious titles, names of countries ... Maybe 18-20 thousand people gathered in Kozhukhovo, and theoretically Solonevich could write maneuvers, exercises into a "war game", "fun". Moreover, everything with Peter was stupid, false, "amusing" (the ridiculously conquered Baltic states, "amusing Petersburg"), and many contemporaries criticized Kozhukhov's maneuvers ...

More Burovskiy, "The Cursed Emperor":

"A no less striking sign of Peter's ill health is his inability to concentrate, stop, think in depth about something. When talking about Peter's incredible capacity for work, they often forget to clarify: no one has ever seen him reading a serious book (even on his favorite maritime business) or trying to delve into the intricacies

jurisprudence, theology or literature. Anything complicated simply did not attract his attention, and he did not spend time and energy on it. Peter never walked alone, he was never caught immersed in thought.

Peter issued 20,000 decrees alone, most of which are completely ridiculous or incomprehensible (including with an admixture of Dutch words or simply written illegibly). Moreover, he was almost never interested in their further fate; most of them were seen only by his inner circle, only

a small part of these decrees was sent out, and already quite a bit fell into the outback.

These 20 thousand decrees are a vivid example of Peter's mental illness. The king really wrote these decrees all the time, including in the least suitable places: for example, during trips, in a cart, in a chicken hut on a bench, or sitting right on a log or on a stump while the horses are harnessed.

Like, well, what dedication! What devotion to duty! But among the decrees of Peter there are many such, for example: "A subordinate in front of a superior must look dashing and foolish, so as not to embarrass the authorities with his understanding."

Well, what were "decrees that only the closest circle saw"? In fact, it is a kind of hobby of a mentally not always healthy person, legally it is not a fact of public law, in general it is not a political fact. Private life. Psychologically, it's very understandable. Hungry for activity, many pace the room aimlessly. Peter, and the very first thing, wants to meet any movement of thought in a psychologically close niche: the Publisher of Decrees. This is his connection with reality: yes, the wheels of the state machine are working, the strings of power are being pulled, decrees are being written.

And Stalin "pointlessly" broke cigarettes "Herzegovina-Flor", stuffing his pipe. Although he was given the same tobacco in boxes. The same can be built psychological studies! I am also surprised how they missed it: "... cigarettes broken by a tyrant - these are human destinies! ..".

But I repeat: this is private life.

And, by the way, this decree "A subordinate in front of his boss must look dashing and silly, so as not to embarrass his superiors with his understanding" is an example of normal army humor, hyperbole, which is also in Suvorov's Science of Victory. I often heard this decree, about 270 years later in the (Soviet) army. They pronounced it in different ways, completely not knowing whose it was. Getting into folklore is the dream of any author.

And due to the kind of coincidences that I have long defined to myself as indirect confirmation, it was at the time of writing this chapter that I accidentally came across an article by Konstantin Dushenov with a quote from another Petrovsky decree: "Prison is a cursed craft, and good people are needed before this mournful deed, hard and cheerful."

I repeat: I did not collect a special dossier on Petrovsky decrees, otherwise, I am sure, dozens of similar masterpieces could be found. The level of this, you see, is almost Leskovsky. And if for Burovsky this is ridiculous, incomprehensible, then either Russian is not his native language, or he

is under the enduring charm of the absurd and understandable Brezhnev-Suslov Decrees, where over the direct, verified twenty departments, committees, paragraphs and phrases, people dislocated their jaws from boredom, painfully asking each other again: "So what is it all about?"

Or just even writer's envy: one line above will outweigh a dozen books, like...

As for the "correct, strict decree", Peter was involved in the creation of the Charter of Veide (1698), writing "Institution for battle at the present time" (1708), "Instructions to Naryshkin", "Military regulations" (1716). Frederick the Great willingly admitted that Weide copied the rules for horse artillery from those of Peter the Great.

And also about Peter's "mania of meaningless innovations", fuss, haste. The war, the Northern War with the recent conquerors of Europe, the Swedes, proved: Peter built a new military machine to replace the thrown one, which simply did not function. But there is another example of sustainable nationwide construction. The famous Petrovsky "Table of Ranks" is an innovation that turned out to be effective, indispensable (and unreplaced) until 1917. Two hundred years is a worthy period, an absolute record of stability. But there is one more important detail that escaped the attention of critics, writers, whose "Tsar Peter", in truth, somehow reminds me of a monkey with a gun from the comedy film "Striped Flight" (runs, jumps, shoots, opens cages with tigers. ...).

So, Tsar Peter introduced the "Table of Ranks", but ... what did he do with all the old Moscow ranks - boyar, roundabout, steward, sleeping bag, kravchey, bed keeper ... He cut old caftans like beards? Rack? Scaffold? No, he didn't touch either the "carriers" or the ranks themselves. Just ... stopped assigning them. He stopped "to favor the name - boyar, kravchim", etc. e. And so with the death (from old age) of the last okolnichi in Russia, okolnichiye ended in Russia, with the death of the last boyar - the boyars. I did not conduct a special investigation, but there is one suspicion ...

Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, the tsar's educator, head of the "Peter's Party" during the period of the struggle with Sophia, after the victory stood up for his cousin Vasily (Sofya's "lover", overthrown by the Naryshkins), who waved his hand: "The Kazan order is enough for me!" - and left to rule the Volga region south of Nizhny Novgorod, "down" in the then designation. But he could not resist ... "because he was a funny man" wrote jokingly instructive letters to the king. Here

absolutely amazing:

"Mt Neg SarPapei\$ SarPapi\$, zasha\$ reg typo\$ appos.

I strike with my forehead a lot for your mercy, which I deigned to greet with the mercy of the captain. But from now on, write yourself, do not be lazy, and yourself ... You like it, what is the meaning of the case, what do you have, but we don't seem to have it. You amuse yourself in business, and I am in drinking. That's all one thing. From Kiril, sovereign, there is no statement (Moscow, April 24 days, Ishepape Boriska).

Agree, it is interesting to imagine Tsar Peter, rushing furiously between armies, fleets, capitals, and somewhere in the middle of his "glorious deeds", in the evening, leaning against a warm cannon barrel or against the freshly tarred side of a frigate reading such *cidula* ... Here is Prince Boris Golitsyn, complained of by the "room steward" in 1676, and by the "boyar hat" in 1690, having lived until 1714, most likely could be this "last boyar". THIS is - living Russian History. Interesting, genuine: the text and date of sending this letter, the dates of the life of a possible "last boyar", that's all, like the routes of the armies, taken / not taken cities - primary, self-contained facts. And not black generalizations, accusations, adjusted to the scheme of 2009.

Chapter 21

Thus, with the help of the Russian "Military Herald" of the twentieth century alone, one can consistently refute kilometers of logical constructions by Ivan Solonevich and all such "critics" of Peter from "patriotic positions". And, paradoxically, their picture turns into real Russophobia. That supposedly the Russians, having a normal army, just like dogs in a circus, at one click of the Peter's whip, changed into European uniforms, to a greater weakening of their combat capability, etc.

And most importantly, what should be said on these closely related topics - state reforms, old / new armies, Tsar Peter, the power of the Russian Empire: the same Russian people - and not only in the sense of "the same people", but also physically the same specific people who managed to serve in archers and noble cavalry, becoming dragoons, musketeers, grenadiers, fusiliers of new regiments - from helpless fugitives turned into worthy defenders of their country, Suvorov's "miracle heroes".

Be the "pre-Petrine" Muscovite Rus' the last in a series: Kievan,

Vladimirskaia ... maybe it should somehow justify, embellish in the end the exploits of the "Solonevichi (you can't call it anything else) cavalry", archers and archer riots. But this, in my opinion, would be reminiscent of the craft of writers of magnificent stilted epitaphs in butt yard granite workshops or the art of make-up artists in a mortuary.

Try to make up this decaying corpse - the archery army. In the Rebellious Age, they snatched mountains of privileges for themselves, overgrown

Moscow shops, other "small businesses", responded to orders to march to the border with streltsy riots. Here are excerpts from Kostomarov:

"May 15, Tuesday, at noon, when the boyars gathered for advice, a cry was heard among the archers:

- Ivan Naryshkin strangled Tsarevich Ivan Alekseevich!

The day was deliberately chosen to recall the murder of Tsarevich Dimitri, committed precisely on May 15th. An alarm arose; archers grabbed their weapons, sounded the alarm in many churches; a huge crowd with banners and drumming rushed to the Kremlin shouting. They didn't have time to close the gate. There were many boyar carriages in the Kremlin. The archers attacked the coachmen, beat them, cut off the legs of the horses and rushed to the palace. The boyars rushed about, not knowing what to do, few of them managed to jump out of the Kremlin; others hid in fear in the corners of the palace. The archers yelled:

- Let's bring the king's destroyers here. Naryshkins! They strangled Tsarevich Ivan Alekseevich! If you don't betray us, we'll put them all to death!

Then, on the advice of Matveyev and the patriarch, Tsarina Natalya, taking the hands of the princes, Peter and Ivan, accompanied by the patriarch and the boyars, went out onto the Red Porch. The archers, confident that Tsarevich Ivan was not in the world, were amazed at his appearance and asked:

- Are you really straight Tsarevich Ivan Alekseevich?

Ivan answered: that he was "alive, no one thought to harass him, he has no anger towards anyone and does not complain about anyone." But the archers, set up by rebels, shouted:

- Let the young king give the crown to his elder brother! Give us all the traitors! Hand over the Naryshkins; we will destroy their entire root! Let Tsarina Natalya go to the monastery!

The patriarch was about to come down the stairs and began to persuade the rebels, but

they shouted to him:

- We do not require advice from anyone; it's time for us to figure out who we need!

There were many schismatics among the archers, and therefore it is clear that the exhortations of the patriarch did not work. Archers past the patriarch broke into the porch. Most of the boyars fled in horror from the porch to the palace, but the head of the Streltsy Department, Mikhail Yuryevich Dolgoruky, Artamon Sergeevich Matveev, and Mikhail Alegukovich Cherkassky did not run away with them. Dolgoruky shouted at the archers, threatened them with a gallows and a stake. For this, the archers threw him from the porch onto spaced spears, chopped him into pieces; then the archers rushed at Matveev. Matveev moved away from them to the queen, took

Peter's hand. The archers dragged him away from the king. Prince Cherkassky began to beat off Matveev from the archers, threw him to the ground, lay down on him, covered him with himself. The archers beat Cherkassky, tore his dress, pulled Matveev out from under him and threw him on spears. The queen fled in horror with her son and prince to the Faceted Chamber.

Archers broke into the palace; they had a list of those doomed to death, compiled in advance by the rebels, up to forty people in number. Their first victim in the palace was the retired archery chief Goryushkin and Yurenev, who decided to defend the entrance to the palace. But the main goal of the search for the rebels was the Naryshkins. The archers ran around the royal chambers, looked into the closets, rummaged under the beds, turned over the beds, poked spears at the throne and altars in the court churches, looked everywhere for the Naryshkins and, mistaking the young stolnik Fyodor Saltykov for Athanasius Naryshkin, killed him, and having learned their mistake, they sent the body of the murdered man with an apology to his father. The дума clerk Larionov hid, according to some reports, in a pipe, according to others - in a chest; he was pulled out, thrown from the porch onto spears and cut into pieces.

_ You, - they shouted, - were in charge of the Streltsy order and hanged us! Here's to you for it!

Then they robbed his house and found a cuttlefish in his possession, which he kept as a rarity.

- This is a snake, - the archers shouted, - with this snake he poisoned Tsar Fedor.

Then they killed the son of Larionov Vasily because he knew about the snake from his father and did not report it. Finally, the archers reached Athanasius Naryshkin, the brother of Queen Natalia; they found it under the altar of the Church of the Resurrection in Senya: it was pointed out to them by the dwarf queen Khomyak. The archers dragged Athanasius out, dragged him onto the porch and threw him on spears ... Other archers caught in the Kremlin between the Chudov Monastery and the patriarchal court of Prince Grigory Romodanovsky with his son Andrei. They

tortured the old man, tore his hair and beard.

"Do you remember," they shouted, "what insults you did to us near Chigirin, how you starved us, you betrayed Chigirin to the Turks by treason.

Romodanovsky and his son suffered the same fate as the others.

- Do you like it? is it any? - the killers shouted, cracking down on their victims, while others, waving their hats, shouted in response:

- Love! Love!

The mutilated bodies of the dead were dragged by archers to the square; in front of them, in desecration, as if for honor, other archers walked and shouted:

- Boyarin Artamon Sergeevich Matveev is coming!

- Boyar Dolgoruky! Boyar Romodanovsky. Give way!

Coming out of the Kremlin, the archers rushed to the house of Prince Yuri Dolgoruky and began to apologize that they had killed his son Mikhail for threatening them. The old man ordered them to open their cellars. The archers drank ladles of boyar honey and wine and left the yard, when suddenly a servant of Prince Dolgoruky ran after them and informed them that the old one had said to his daughter-in-law, the wife of the murdered Mikhail:

- Do not cry, they ate the pike and the teeth remained; soon they will have to sit on the battlements of the White and Earthen City.

Hearing this, the archers returned to Dolgoruky's house, grabbed the sick old man, chopped him up, threw him out of the gate onto a dunghill, and put salted fish on top of the corpse and said:

- Eat, prince, delicious! This is for you for eating our good.

The day was then clear, but towards evening such a storm arose that it seemed to the Muscovites that the end of the world was coming. At night, the archers posted guards in the Kremlin and the White City, hoping to continue the massacre the next day.

The next day, at ten o'clock in the morning, again the alarm; archers with drumming and shouting came to the palace and demanded the extradition of Ivan Naryshkin. They broke into the palace again to look for their victim, killed the Duma clerk Averky Kirillov, killed their former colonel Dokhturov, demanded the extradition of a foreign doctor Daniel, who was accused of poisoning Fyodor, could not be found anywhere and in

in vexation they killed his assistant Gutmensh and his son Danielev; they also wanted to kill Daniel's wife, but Tsarina Marfa Matveevna begged for her life. Streltsy could not find Ivan Naryshkin ... a young man similar to him, Filimonov, was killed by mistake ...

Boyarin Yakov Odoevsky said to Tsarina Natalya:

- How much you, empress, do not feel sorry for your brother, but you will need to give him away; and you, Ivan, must go as soon as possible. Not everyone will die because of you.

The queen and princess with Naryshkin left the church and approached the golden lattice, behind which the archers were already waiting. Opened the grate; the archers, not respecting either the icon that Naryshkin was carrying, or the presence of royal women, rushed at Ivan with obscene abuse, grabbed him by the hair, dragged him down the stairs and dragged him through the entire Kremlin to the dungeon called Konstantinovsky. There they subjected him to cruel torture, from there they took him to Red Square, lifted him up on spears, then chopped him into small pieces and trampled them into the mud.

Streltsy indignation immediately led to other troubles, the boyar lackeys rebelled. The archers indulged them and, together with them, attacked the Kholopy order in a crowd, broke the chests, recaptured the locks,

tore up bonded books and various sovereign letters. Archers, arrogating to themselves the right to dispose of the legislation, shouted:

- We give full will on all four sides to all servants of the boyars. All the fortresses on them are torn apart and scattered.

But most of the freed serfs returned to their former masters, while others took advantage of their freedom to again enslave themselves to others.

Tsarevna Sofya, as if from a desire to stop the atrocities, called the elected archers to her and announced that she was appointing ten rubles for each archer. This amount, regardless of the usual salary that goes to the archers, will be collected from the peasants (*italics mine*. - I. Sh.), the estates of church and order people. In addition, the archers were given the opportunity to sell the property of those killed and exiled by them.

Finally, at the request of the archers, it was supposed to pay them, gunners and soldiers for several years ago a well-deserved salary, which amounted to 240,000 rubles. Sophia called the archers "outdoor infantry" and persuaded no one else to kill and remain calm ... "

Complete state collapse. Absolutely helpless in front of external opponents, archers nevertheless pull out

the military budget of Russia, having carried out this "Kremlin military operation of 1682" described above. Knocked out of the government "ten rubles on the snout" also needs to be properly assessed. 3-5 rubles was worth the annual content of the archer under Alexei Mikhailovich. True, it was always implied that they would get more with their "small business", for which they received solid preferences. Merchants always complained that it was difficult to compete with archer merchants because of the many benefits. This means that the ripped prize was equal to two years of content. That is ... they equated the above-described feats with two years of service!

And again, once again it must be emphasized: these same people, shaken out of beautiful old Moscow uniforms, really trained, fired upon, became the winners of the best army in the world - the Swedish one (which used to be hired to defend the country).

Noah and this picture of the Kremlin's streltsy exploits I do not want to completely give into the hands of a criminal psychologist, whose verdicts will probably be: "sadism, manic-depressive psychosis, pathological cruelty ...". After all, even in this spilled puddle of infamy, one can find the very elements of military-political realities, the objective details that the

hunting in "military chapters".

Before the murder of Prince Grigory Romodanovsky with his son Andrei, the archers "tortured the old man, tore his hair and beard. "Do you remember," they shouted, "what insults you did to us near Chigirin, how you starved us, you handed over Chigirin to the Turks. change."

This is about the Russian-Turkish war of 1672-1681, almost, one might say, successful against the backdrop of the military failures of that century. Its main facts:

Russian-Ukrainian troops - 120,000 people under the command of Romodanovsky and Hetman Samoylovich defeated the Ottoman barrier, but then acted slowly and indecisively ... The Russian army left Chigirin to its fate and retreated beyond the Dnieper, throwing back the Ottoman troops pursuing it ... in 1679 forcibly transferred to the left bank of the Dnieper the population that still remained in right-bank Ukraine ...

And this is not the Konotop defeat from the Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars. They did not run, but retreated across the Dnieper, evacuated the population. But there was still an understanding that hiding from the Turks beyond the Dnieper was a shame, a historical dead end. And the archers, who tortured the old man, the former "commander in chief", probably remembered their Chigirin impotence. And how could they "seek the culprit." That is, against the background of dozens of other murders committed for 10 bonus rubles and the right to sell the victim's property, the torture of Prince Romodanovsky is almost a statist act, this is a streltsy "analysis of the causes" of the unsuccessful Chigirinsky campaign. And what, earlier, Shein was executed for the Smolensk rout! .. It is precisely such

showdowns, clarifications under common popular slogans: "Who is to blame?", "You can't live like that!" ... And how is it possible? - It's not clear! From that and anger, cruelty.

In general, the famous "Morning of the Streltsy Execution" was preceded by the "Night of the Streltsy Revolt" and the night, to tell the truth, was pitch-black.

And about the second brainchild of the new Russia

In the system of values "real polit and k" ("real politics"), the first brainchild of Petrine Russia is the new army. The second is St. Petersburg.

And if we turn to the title of the book being analyzed above, "The Cursed Emperor" ... you know, strange things happen with these curses in general. The most famous of them, of course, "Petersburg to be empty!"

As is well known, this was said by the retired Empress Evdokia Lopukhina. Further, in the "original sources" of this "prophecy", as described by Alexei Tolstoy, there is a swarming of some "<... woman-witnesses, kikimor." But, as it is now interpreted by intellectuals, old Moscow priests,

it was a fair reaction of the Orthodox people to the victims of the Northern War, the construction of the capital. Surprisingly much has been written about this "prophecy", so that the most ordinary woman, an offended divorcee, later punished for fornication, was taken directly into the biblical prophetess. Evdokia's resentment can be understood, and even somehow linked with a nationwide resentment: the demolition of the way of life.

But to put Petersburg against holy Russia - no, it will not fit with you! After all, Blessed Xenia of Petersburg was also born in Orthodox St. Petersburg. The tradition of the old Moscow blessed ones has not been interrupted, and something written about blessed Xenia should have reconciled and even touched all those cursing Petersburg ... The builders of the church at the Smolensk cemetery noticed, returning to work in the morning, that at night someone was lifting them up to help them bricks to the upper floors. Once they followed, they found Blessed Xenia, who had been carrying bricks all night with prayers.

One of the most revered Russian saints - at the construction site of St. Petersburg, this is not muttering kikimor, navi charms, chicken paws, whispering into the water ...

And if you think about it more... that curse came true in one very unexpected sense: "Petersburg to be empty... from the invaders!"

After all, this is the only Russian capital that has remained impregnable! Not taken by the enemy. If we recall in the celebrated "year of the 1150th anniversary of the Russian state" the whole series of its incarnations: Ancient Rus',

Kiev, Vladimir-Suzdal, Moscow ... and, accordingly, the capitals, from Novgorod, Kyiv, Vladimir and up to ... Petersburg was the only empty one - from the enemy. In his Leningrad "blockade" period, he gave, probably, the highest example of heroism in world history.

True, he, being Petrograd, turned out to be firmly connected with another trend, which the time has come to recall in connection with the title of the book - "At the Bottom of the Dynasty". Tiredness (of part) of the people from the victims, maybe even from Civilization (Petersburg) in general, brought this city the heavy title of "cradle of the revolution".

The weariness and unbelief of the very top of the elite and at the same time the very bottom of the people converged in time and place precisely in Petrograd in 1917.

And here is another reference to my dear Melchior Age. Check: all the fuss with the prophecy "Petersburg to be empty!" , comments, savoring - 95% of references - his Merezhkovsky, Voloshin, Ustryalov (who is N.V.), Akhmatova, Bulgakov - this is all she, that "the most refined (according to Berdyaev) , culture in the history of Russia."

And cursed by Queen Avdotya,

Dostoevsky and the demoniac,

The fog was leaving the city...

Akhmatova. "Poem Without a Hero"

Thus, one of the previous themes inevitably returned: Melchior (aka Silver) Age, in live comparison with the Golden Age:

I love belligerent liveliness

Amusing Fields of Mars,

Infantry troops and horses

monotonous beauty,

In their harmoniously unsteady formation

Patchwork of these victorious banners,

The radiance of these copper caps,

Shot through in battle.

I love, military capital,

Your stronghold smoke and thunder,

When the midnight queen

Gives a son to the royal house,

Or victory over the enemy

Russia triumphs again...

Pushkin. "Bronze Horseman"

Assessment of Peter's reforms at the summit of emperors, "Erfurt-1808" Although I supported my point of view with objective figures, private evidence of the Russian "Military Bulletin" and such a specialist as a military historian, Major General of the General Staff Andrei Petrov, but still in our In the correspondence dispute with Solonevich, Burovsky and others like them, one important flaw is felt, common to all of us, free writers of the 20th-20th] centuries. Temporal remoteness, liberty, unconnectedness of our choice of "our monarch", "our

historical period" makes this choice... - More objective? - Well, if so! But certainly - more lightweight, similar to ...

popular division into fans of Lemeshev and Kozlovsky, or fans of Spartak and Dynamo...

To oppose such a free choice would be a good assessment of a person closer to that era, involved in the historical process. From my "historical storehouses" I can offer a rather significant figure who spoke out on this issue in circumstances that are certainly unique, unrepeatable in world history.

The head of the Holy Synod, a minister, a friend of Tsar Alexander's youth is Prince Alexander Nikolaevich Golitsyn, whose notes I happened to carefully reread while working on the mentioned book "Golitsyns and All Russia" (2008). It was Prince Golitsyn that Emperor Alexander took with him to the famous Erfurt meeting in September - October 1808.

Among other things, this was one of the most risky moments in the life and reign of Alexander. By this time, Napoleon had taken a position that had no precedent in history - the actual master of Europe. And in Russia then they seriously considered the likelihood that the tsar would be simply captured and arrested in Erfurt, because Napoleon's recent meeting with the Spanish Bourbons ended just like that. The sovereign was begged not to go, but the interests of Russia, the harsh compulsion of the Tilsit peace and the obligations arising from it, still required this visit. The huge difference and additional danger consisted in the fact that the previous, Tilsit meeting was nevertheless held on neutral territory, on that famous raft in the middle of the Neman River, which separated their armies.

And Erfurt ... Erfurt, even in Germany servile to Napoleon, occupied an exceptional position. This city,

"equipping" the captured Europe, Napoleon officially singled out as a special place - the place of gathering of obedient monarchs and their troops (it was from there that in 1812 they, the German troops and monarchs, obediently moved to Russia).

Those Russian and all-European suspicions, for example, are summed up in his well-known memoirs by Armand de Caulaincourt (for a long time, the French ambassador to Russia, accompanied Napoleon, who left the army in 1812, to Paris). Referring to the period of that Spanish arrest and the preparations for the "Erfurt Summit", he writes:

"I told the emperor (Napoleon) that the impression made in Europe by the kidnapping of Ferdinand (the Spanish Bourbon) might cause fear that the emperor would not play a bad trick with those sovereigns who would come to Erfurt.

- Ba! You think? - said the emperor ... "And besides the arrest, there was a risk of possible public humiliation. Prussians,

for example, at that Erfurt summit it was received in full. Napoleon, "entertaining" the monarchs (so to speak, within the framework of the "cultural program"

summit), ordered on the Jena field (the site of the Jena-Auerstedt battle, where he defeated the Prussian army two years ago) to hunt for ... hares! Plus, there are depictions, stories of Napoleon, also public, about the moment when he stayed face-to-face with the beautiful Prussian Queen Louise, and "if he had stayed there longer, he might have had to give the defeated Prussia a couple more pieces of land" .

But, thank God, Alexander's diplomatic and human qualities allowed him to endure this Erfurt month (from September 17 to October 14), without political losses and without damage to the honor of Russia. And, of course, his friends and, above all, Prince Golitsyn, "... one of Alexander's childhood friends, who remained his house attorney on the throne, a man who knew how to occupy and scatter his sovereign like no other, became important assistants to him in this." .

Although, of course, Golitsyn, who was part of a small retinue of the sovereign, had a lot of quite official work in Erfurt. At that time he was one of two Russian secretaries of state, privy councilor, chief prosecutor of the Holy Synod, chamberlain.

The book, which included the "Erfurt Notes" of Prince Golitsyn, was published only in Germany, but the historian Galina Gerasimova attached it to the Golitsyn Readings corpus.

According to the interlocutors of Alexander Nikolaevich, "the speech of the prince was simple, artless; he sacrificed everything

TO THE TRUTH ... it seemed that we were listening to a kind relative, who was telling us the past with enthusiasm and feeling.

At the meeting of the two emperors, which began on a warm, clear day on September 27, the director of the big Erfurt performance was Napoleon, whose flair for a great actor inspired ... for successful improvisations. At a strict dinner for sixteen people - only for sovereigns - he puzzled the monarchs with amazing knowledge in the field of German history.

However, Napoleon knew the past not only of Germany. After Prince A.N. Golitsyn was presented to him, the Emperor of France briskly specified: "The one in the Synod"? And he started talking about the destruction of the Russian patriarchate (Peter |:

"The approver of the Concordat (i.e., Napoleon) paid full tribute to the justice of the genius of Russia (Tsar Peter) in the consciousness of a great government overthrow, which the revolution with its storms could not achieve. But ... as Napoleon further said, all the storms were powerless to subordinate the clergy in France to government power. " ...

'That is, behind this compliment to Peter, one can discern an indirect reproach from the Russian church: "None managed to subdue the French clergy."

To this, Prince Golitsyn objected: "Saint in Russia was the confidence of the people - that the goal of all Peter's actions was the common good, which animated a strong will concentrated in one person and in a person of genius."

Napoleon (with a sigh): "History has lavished the name of the great on many, but Peter, despite the frequent distortion of the same history, belongs, in my opinion, to those few who are truly worthy of this name ..."

It seems to me that the meaning of Prince Golitsyn's objection is this: it was not out of indifference, not out of unbelief, that the people allowed Peter to abolish the patriarchate, to subjugate the Church. It was the vector of the faith of the people, as the compass needle at the end of the 17th century pointed to the king, and, for example, 90 years before that, the same arrow, turning away from Tsar Vasily Shuisky, pointed to the patriarchs, Hermogenes, then Filaret ...

At one of the subsequent dinners, Prince Alexander Nikolaevich's couvert... was appointed just opposite Napoleon's couvert... The dinner began in deep silence: Napoleon had a habit of starting a conversation at dinner only after eating a bowl of soup. Having quickly completed this operation, Napoleon turned (to Prince Golitsyn) with the question:

"Tell me, please, what does the Russian priest eat on the other

day after his consecration to this rank?

Golitsyn: "Probably what his wife cooks up for him."

Napoleon: "Yes, if only they have something left to eat..."

So judge for yourself whether it was easy for the prince in Erfurt! Researchers (Kicheev) wondered for a long time and eventually considered the last passage as Napoleon's allusion to "the high cost of priestly places." He probably mechanically transferred to Russia the well-known French practice of buying positions. Another good example of how attempts to transfer "objective criteria" across the Russian-European border lead to complete absurdity.

Much later, justifying himself for 1812, Napoleon said: "From the great to the ridiculous - one step" ... But it seems that he made a quarter of this step back in Erfurt with his constant desire to impress everyone, imitate almost divine omniscience and all-penetration. Memoirs of Prince Golitsyn is the most interesting portrait of Napoleon at this point in his career (plus the unique surrounding political landscape). And at the same time - the most valuable expert assessment of the Petrine reforms, their relationship with the popular faith ...

A heavier "curse" - from Kostomarov

Above, on a predominantly military texture, numerous theses of some historiographers were rechecked, in my opinion, tearing the fabric of Russian history. One half is folded near the heart, the second is trampled with inspiration, like Ivan Shkhanskaya basma. It seems that they are making formidable accusations that we had "Cursed Emperors", that for 400 years (out of 1000) we did not have the history of the country at all, but some kind of tear, a perversion.

And look closely - these authors (well, pure Hegelians!) Expressively draw their history of the struggle and development of ideas (not the country). The collapse of the idea of "people's monarchy"? - It seems to be terrible ... But what did the Russian government, the people, really do, for example, in 1700-1721? Was there some sort of war going on? But in their descriptions, it is as similar to the real Northern War between Russia and Sweden as it is to the Trojan War. You read 5-10 pages and you understand that the author really sees all these "alternative events" in front of him - today there are popular computer games in which, starting from real names, country names, you can build anything.

That's why ... as Leo Tolstoy from the heap of Leonid Andreevsky horror stories - "it's not scary." And the formidable ideas formulated by them cause irritation, laughter, annoyance, but in no way a desire to put forward counter-ideas. Against Solonevich and others like him, I have only descriptions of battles, figures from reports from the Russian "Military Bulletin" of the twentieth century.

In my opinion, a really difficult, maybe even terrible, completely different thesis. Here's something to think about...

The well-known historian Nikolai Kostomarov, summing up the era of Ivan PSH, involuntarily clings, raises this layer:

"Ivan in the field of mental needs did not become higher than his environment. He created a state, but without the makings of self-improvement, without means and a firm desire for lasting people's well-being; it stood for two centuries, faithful to the model created by Ivan, although supplemented by new forms in the same spirit, but frozen and petrified in its main foundations, which were a mixture of Asiatic despotism with Byzantine traditions that survived in their time ... until the mighty mind of Peter recreated it (Ivan's state) on other cultural principles..."

You just need to force yourself to realize a simple fact: we still live in a state created by Ivan Sh.

let the gaze deviate from the indelible main generic features of his country, accept the historical matrix of Ivan III, like his coat of arms, the double-headed eagle, giving imprints on new and new "historical materials". Generally speaking, the acceptance of fate is truly the greatest of all movements of the soul, of thought. (Nietzsche also speaks of "love of fate," atog an.)

But the point is not at all in another passing quote to the greater praise of Peter.

The matter is much more serious and tragic than even in Kostomarov's opinion. In his 1870, he could see the situation as follows: the stable, but immovable, without the makings of self-improvement, the state of Ivan III was finally corrected by Peter, and they lived happily ever after ... "

But we, in the 20th century, are deprived of this "comforting" picture. Knowing that even after Peter, in 1917, the state of Ivan III was once again recreated by Lenin, Stalin, on yet another ... different cultural basis. And at the end of the 20th century, the tragic tradition of re-creations was continued by another epoch, defined by a verb that became a term. This word is similar in meaning to Kostomarovsky and with the same ominous prefix "< pere ...".

And if you seriously look at the foundation that lies unshakably under the signs of these "tunings", "reforms", it becomes clear that all the quoted "Asian despotisms" and "Byzantine legends that survived in their time" are only biting epithets, propaganda rattles in comparison with deep noticed ... it is only necessary not to exchange this thought for nickels

momentary political slogans.

It is the expression "... a state without the makings of self-improvement" that is the key to understanding our reforms. Where is the fatal inevitability, and the painfulness of the "great deeds of Peter", revolutions, restructuring.

And somewhere nearby lies one particular consequence: sublimation. What exactly forces a smart person, for example, Ivan Solonevich, to pile up such absurd Everests with "old Moscow cavalry", "300 archers" and so on? His hatred for Peter is a sublimated hatred for other reformers, his contemporaries. And if you think further: hatred in general for the fact that these breaking reforms are constantly, with necessity, being dumped on his homeland. What the country can not do without these periodic operations. And we must UNDERSTAND this sorrow without any ridicule.

The absence of the makings of "self-improvement of the state" is not about the fact that our people themselves are inactive. It is impossible to call the people, having so many world-wide significant achievements, independent discoveries, successful works, without sliding into propaganda of the Goebelsian, Brzezinski level, not self-active. But, if we consider

it will turn out that the daily independent work of Russians is carried out by them in their spheres of arts, science, and industry. And almost never it is aimed at the very structure of the state, its improvement. Self-improved, self-improved Western states. They are familiar with this, which for us is almost a miracle: people gathered, adopted some kind of constructive plan for changing the state system and ... brought it to fruition!

Practically everyone traditionally writes off our NON-self-activity in state building on, of course, the strength, despotism of power. The power is strong, has no "balances", is not limited, suppresses civil liberties and this initiative.

In no way can I understand this blindness or some kind of optical focus, unwillingness to notice simple examples and facts. In 1917 or in 1991, Russian power was much weaker than power in any European state. His "pressure, suppression" and other indicators of existence were approaching zero, but the then amateur activity of the people in the state-building sphere seemed to set out to confirm Kostomarov's thesis again and again.

That's about it, folk amateur performances, and I had a chance to talk in a big interview with Moskovsky Komsomolets (October 1, 2012). The newspaper, which covered an almost year-long series of rallies and other protests (Bolotnaya, Chistye Prudy, etc.), decided to give more material about historical analogues, allusions of 1917.

In the comments, of course, I could not do without the military factor, but, alas,

could not resist, calling the First World War - an unwinnable (for Russia) war. Actually, I think so, but there was no place for any argumentation of this point of view. "MK" and so, thank you, gave, against the backdrop of a stream of loud events, sensations, a whole newspaper page to the conversation between Professor Rafael Arsanov and writer Igor Shumeiko about the events of 95 years ago.

But this "almost won" World War I added a loud note of indignation to the comments of readers. In the good tradition of Internet forums, I was advised to return to high school or to a lunatic asylum. After all, in "1917 the Germans stood near Riga, occupied Poland, Lithuania, most of Belarus, threatened St. Petersburg!"

My short answer:

- So the Germans capitulated in November 1918, standing in France occupied by them, not so far from Paris, owning Belgium ... Geopolitically, they, the German bloc, were sprinters. Entente - stayers. NON-defeat in the first year and a half already guaranteed them victory. Churchill said: "Russia in 1917 is a ship that passed through a stormy ocean and sank in the bay of destination."

And this answer did not fit because it was more important to draw attention to the following facts.

What, for example, was written down in textbooks as the "beginning of the Civil War" and completely forgotten? Spring 1918, the rebellion of the Czechoslovak corps. Here to think - and you will directly come to the problem: the authorities, the intelligentsia, the people, free elections up to Bolotnaya and Manezhnaya!

Captured Czechs known from school are one of their small chips, a microfragment of the battle of giants, number: 50,997 minus 14,000 managed to evacuate = 37,000. Unarmed. More precisely, sending to Vladivostok, the Czechs were left with 168 rifles per echelon for guard duty.

And 150 million Russians who felt not only liberated, but also "victors of tsarism." Organized in a new way: together they went to the elections to the Constituent Assembly, to the Soviets, earlier - to the State Duma. Just an orgy of free expression of the people's WILL! We stood together at hundreds of rallies, took part in hundreds of demonstrations: we rallied, united... Weapons (arsenals) are also in the hands of the people!

The example is truly beautiful also because - the Czechs! The most peaceful (proven in 1938!) people in Europe. The former prisoners were headed by the 30-year-old former official Syrový, the 26-year-old shopkeeper Gaida, the 35-year-old teacher Shvets (well, almost Shveik!). As for selection - all the terrible landsknechts, born thugs,

terminators, napoleons...

And these Czechs take the initiative, seize (from the free, volitionally expressed people, united by rallies, margts, new parties, thoughts, councils, constituents ...) arsenals and at the same time ... all of Russia, from the Volga to Vladivostok, gold reserves. The divisions of Vatsetis and Trotsky are crushing.

BUT... Who took them prisoner two years ago?! Valkyries? God Wotan with a magic spear? No, the same Russians, only at that moment united differently, carried out, among other things, the Lutsk operation (Brusilovsky breakthrough), incapacitating the German, Austro-Hungarian armies 1,325,000 people, taking more than half a million prisoners (including those Czechs)! Russian losses then - 498,867 (62,155 killed, 376,910 wounded).

Think about the scale: five million armies are fighting, half a million prisoners in one battle ... And 37,000 Czech prisoners. And these brave soldiers of Schweik are bringing half of Russia to their knees. Most of them fought on the Volga, and 4,000 soldiers of Captain Gaida were enough to subdue Siberia from the Urals to Irkutsk for several months!

The royal power, the "organization" that stood logically and chronologically between the Brusilov breakthrough and the conquest of Siberia by the former grocer Gaida, was deservedly criticized. How Putin's government and its "Caucasian policy" are criticized today. And the fact that in recent conflicts our participants called the Chechens "Czechs" is jargon that came from phonetic similarity, and in other areas there are big differences. Think.

Those Czech numbers have been lying on a forgotten shelf for almost a hundred years, but it is necessary that they sound above the ears of critics, like in the cult film the sibilance of Hunchback (performed by Dzhigarkhanyan): "Now I understand who you are in this world ?!" Or, as the incomparable head of Mkhedrioni, Jaba Iosseliani, said 75 years after the Czech events described, addressing the Georgian intelligentsia: "Democracy is not for you to eat lobio on the boulevard!"

This "Czech" example comes to mind when I remember the "Kostomarov curse": a state without the makings of self-improvement. That is, without daily political adjustment. And as a result - with mighty incredible "jerks", modernizations of Tsar Peter, Stalin.

The people who accuse the government of failing to improve themselves on a daily basis are wrong. It is terrible to say: "the people are wrong," but the common generic features of the Russian protest, the Russian Protestant, are indelible. That the protesters were 150 million, who elected the State Duma, the Soviets, the Constituent Assembly and surrendered to 37 thousand Czechs (whom the year before they easily took prisoner in 20-fold large numbers). That the protesters against the government of 2012, who will run tomorrow to demand protection from "other Czechs"

(you can hint which ones. Who were called Czechs in recent armed conflicts?) And the above-described colorful archers - the Protestants of 1682 and the Protestants of 1991, after the "August victory" staring in bewilderment, like through a spyglass, into the kaleidoscope of the "Yeltsin regime". ..

Everyone is equally helpless in organizing, in that day-to-day political adjustment. And the matter is much deeper than the lack of political experience. The point is in the very Russian "freedom from freedoms" discussed earlier.

"Preventing the people from political power" in the Russian case is a popular centuries-old misconception. In fact, the people defended, fought for their sacred right to be uninvolved in everyday politics. Realizing that this is the business of people like Boris Berezovsky. Evil, imperfection must be localized somewhere? Remember, on those icons where lives are depicted, in general, where there is a plot, a struggle, there are also demons, the devil, drawn for the plot. Struck, driven away by the holy heroes of the icons. Finally, most often in the lower

right corner (I think, probably because for the actors this corner is the left), but they are on the icons, like a dragon under the hooves of the horse of George the Victorious. The blow of the spear - to the lower right - for the worshiper or the spectator, to the left - for the saint's corner. And in the world they are localized - in the government, in politics. And non-involvement in politics, Lack of power becomes a suitable commodity for barter. For it, you can get the right to see Evil, Imperfection, and just your own Failures always outside. Feel free to curse and "cover another regime" (Yu. Shevchuk). Psychological comfort of "Nevina". "Freedom of choice", but also including "freedom of choice"! Freedom is to choose for yourself, or entrust it to someone else: the king, the leader. Freedom from constant efforts to ensure, maintain the "mechanism for maintaining freedom", the political machine. That to which, I confess, it was not without difficulty that I found the only similarity in the West, that very prayer of Thomas Aquinas: "Thanks to the Holy Spirit for deliverance from the need

have a political opinion.

Chapter 22

This transfer of freedom of (political) choice imposes a very special measure of responsibility on the king, the leader. Carrying on your shoulders the entrusted political freedoms of millions of compatriots is, of course, a difficult mission. Without contemplating the creation of a complete gallery of political portraits, the distribution of verdicts: who, how (in my opinion) bore this burden of responsibility, I still have to draw one dividing line. The subdivision criterion is roughly indicated in the title. And its (subdivisions, classifications of historical persons, periods, political lines) urgent need, in my opinion, is visible both from the consideration of the Russian crisis of the early twentieth century, and from direct observation of the crisis of the 1990s.

Here I will allow myself to act not as the author of 11 historical publicistic books (this, however, counting the reprints of the Second World Reset), but also as a kind of Customer, or as a representative of the Customer. As a teacher of many years, over the years I have summed up the intellectual, spiritual needs (and claims) of our students to national history. However, I don't know if you recognize my experience as sufficient - I have been teaching history for seven years, since the period when my essays, books, television programs began to appear, and precisely in connection with them (there was a desire to double-check my arguments in the audience). But even earlier, when I taught a journalism master class, conversations sometimes with the most modern topics, "journalistic investigations" regularly switched to our history ...

To the well-known popular definition "Russia is a literary-centric country", I would add: "And the Russian

literature is historically centric. (See "The Tale of the Shelf", Karamzin, Pushkin ...)

Classes and progress

What were and what are the criteria for evaluating historical figures (and after them, "their" periods, political lines)?

It has been 20 years since the "class approach" has died, and here I will allow one seditious thought. Considering history from the point of view of the interests of some class is not such a dead end idea. It's just that from the time of Marx, the word "class" automatically got up - "working class", and this is the whole trick. The "working class", as wild as it sounds, in my opinion, did not prove that it actually existed in Russia at all.

A vivid example: the return of workers to the villages in the 1920s, the rapid peasantization of the country. From 1917 to 1920, Moscow lost half of its inhabitants, Petrograd - two-thirds. "The revolution showed how fragile the urbanization of the country was. Almost immediately after it began, the urban population began to scatter to the villages. Paradoxically, although the revolution of 1917 was carried out in the name of creating an urban civilization and was directed against the "idiocy of village life", in fact it increased the influence of the village on Russian life.

It is clear that the famine of that time was an extraordinary case, but after all, even in the most extreme cases, a choice was realized that soon turned out to be very important: 9/10 of the hungry townspeople returned to peasant labor;

and 1/10 went to the "food detachments" - good "preparatory classes" for future NKVD officers in demand in 8-9 years, "authorized to dispossess kulaks."

This is not about some kind of technical incompetence of Russian workers,

no, this environment regularly supplied its Lomonosovs, Polzunovs, the Cherepanov brothers, "left-handers", but socially it continued to feel like villages that were once assigned to Demidov's Ural factories - yesterday's peasants. And some part - tomorrow's officials.

Hence the ease with which the "working class" gave all its "historical, guiding, organizing" functions entrusted by Marx to the bureaucracy. And it is significant that since the middle of the 20th century, all Western leftists (not only Trotskyists!) have relied on the intelligentsia, the lumpen, recognizing that there is simply no working class in real politics. In our country, I remember, this game dragged on for a long time in and who is just a "layer" ... terms: who is a "class" Careerists signed up for a year as How those machinations , workers in order to join the CPSU "by quota". ended is known ...

In general, it would be useful to consider history from the point of view of a real class, for example, the peasantry, or the nobility, but - alas ...

The "class approach" was overthrown under the slogan of the fight against ideologies in general, and "progress" was left the only criterion for evaluating the heroes of the "History", as well as the goal of the efforts of mankind.

And if the author of the concept of "progress" Hegel still had enough intellectual courage to declare that the pinnacle and goal of world progress is "the triumph of the constitutional kingdom of Prussia", then today it is necessary to unwind and trace many chains of financing, distribution of grants, in order to reach through a pile of books, textbooks final, implied: "What is useful for New York City Bank is progressive."

The well-known trend of total "denigration" of our history, efforts to just as total "whitewashing" are opposed badly, counteracted with little success. To declare the entire gallery, from Rurik to Nikolai II, to be saints... It just doesn't work, at least in a modern Russian university, with students of the 20th] century it doesn't work. Moral help from such "saints" is no more than from the well-known posters "Members and Candidates for Members of the Politburo".

It is just as bad with an approach that I silently call "counter-propaganda." According to which the "oil" is bottled in doses, strictly proportional to the negative ratings issued by the "opposite side". The main "object" of such concern, I think, is easily guessed - Ivan the Terrible.

A gigantic body of literature has accumulated here. The authors are like failed icon painters or compilers of "lives" who have forgotten the Russian proverb: "It's good - to pray, it's not good - to cover the pots!". "Miracles and Signs" were written by them ... That the number of victims of Ivan the Terrible over 40 years suddenly coincided exactly with the number personally entered by His Royal Majesty in the Synodikon of the Disgraced for remembrance - why not a miracle? Especially if you imagine the circumstances

his campaign against Novgorod. And the guardsmen are led out to the sacred detachment of the biblical king David, full of angels, with the archangel Malyuta at the head. Having dispersed, they "evangelize" with a large "flight", with a margin. The example of Nikolai Kozlov: "the sovereign, like the Tsar the prophet David, organized a secret service in the rank of spiritually military brotherhood with a cenobitic monastic charter," was especially impressive. An abyss - without irony, almost with envy I admit - erudition, quotations, analogies, and everything hits the mark: to prove that Ivan the Terrible was a righteous tsar and his oprichnina ... well, almost the second Sergius Lavra. The title of Kozlov's book ("The Last Tsar") was set aside for me as an instructive example for this whole class "Lives".

Throw everything and everything to the point, as if our story really ended in 1570 (and for the Solonevichi "Slavophiles" somewhere in 1680) ... and we must by all means prove that it ended with "saint

note." In rapture, forgetting that after the destruction of the Arbat "Oprichny Palace" and Ivan the Terrible himself for pronouncing the word "oprichnik" ordered to be punished with a whip, and he, to put it mildly, did not dismiss the Basmanovs and Afanasy Vyazemsky with an "honorary personal pension for oprichniki merits". A rough example: there was a toilet in the backyard, then they broke it or moved it to another place. And such authors, wandering with buckets of oil to pour into ... in general - there, one really wants to stop: "Honey, yes, this toilet has been gone for a long time."

For interested students, I usually recommend (or lend out for a while) the book by Sergei Perevezentsev "Ivan [" (series "Russian World in Faces" }) - a reliable guide in the sea of "Ivano-threat studies". But how many more areas of work for self-made "gunners" are there! Look at the shelves filled with books, on which the stamp already asks from the second page: "Intended: for pots", in the sense: "To cover the pots!" - not "Pray".

In my teaching opinion, such "inflation", book creation under the slogan: "Each Russian ruler has his own Lives!" is very dangerous. This has spread, already including both ministers and lower-ranking figures. Recently I came across a similar "Life" of Arakcheev, how he opposed the entire world anti-Russian conspiracy there, in his estate Gruzino. Well, then it's scary to imagine who his Nastenka Minkina, killed by serf masons, grows into. In general, when even a worthy official who had objective merits (maintenance of artillery parks), even an exemplary honest in money matters, even a victim of unfair reproaches of liberal writers ("Arakcheevshchina") ... they try to make a biography-life, it is worth remembering the saying about pots.

About our people and our saints

The best guide here, in the sea of Russian historical heroes, can be the holy righteous warrior Fedor (Ushakov). As the years pass, his canonization will be deeper and deeper, more expensive,

an important example. When you think about how many circumstances should have coincided - and coincided! - so that even his most brilliant, outstanding military victories are not belittled, but become in line, in harmony with other details, of little importance for a naval commander, but important for a true saint. Here is a real Life, and not a military form compiled for the next award. And the restoration of the Greek Orthodox state, and the rescue of captured French from the hands of dangerous Turkish allies, and everyday modesty, and even a long, celibate life in retirement, wholly devoted to caring for veterans, helping churches and monasteries.

I think that many compatriots since the 19th century placed the image of Admiral Ushakov among the most glorious military leaders on a "special

shelf." I remember that back at school, the image of Fyodor Ushakov (history lesson) somehow combined with Ammiral the widower from Nekrasov's poem "Who Lives Well in Rus'" (literature lesson):

The widower-ammiral walked the seas,
walked the seas, drove ships, fought with
the Turk near Achakov, defeated him,

And the empress gave him

Eight thousand souls as a reward.

Dying, Ammiral the widower bequeaths to release the donated serfs...

Many years later, having already received a fair amount of information, I was convinced of the fidelity of that childish combination of images. Under the empress (Catherine) in the Black Sea, almost only Ushakov drove ships to the Turks, who quickly replaced the unlucky Voinovich. And the widower of the poem, freeing the serfs, all this is very close ... it is almost a biography of Fedor Fedorovich, only stated a little differently: in Nekrasov's poem, an illiterate peasant retells it to his brothers - seven seekers of happiness and goodness in Rus' ...

And above all, the origin of Ushakov: from a family that had previously given the Monk Theodore of Sanaksar, glorified in the Cathedral of Rostov Saints, the uncle of the admiral, who had a great influence on him.

In such a "chord" (fortunately) even the important initial initiative of modern historians, writers who paid attention, wrote petitions, letters about Ushakov is lost. And rightly so, and it should be lost, so that it becomes clear: maybe by human initiative, but not by human arbitrariness, this matter is being decided.

In general, the glorification of the righteous warrior Fyodor Ushakov in the Cathedral of Saints is our common acquisition.

The famous traveler Fyodor Konyukhov, a man who certainly experienced and achieved what no one in the world has yet achieved or experienced (see the books "Guinness Records", etc.), told me how one day he, holding on to the wreckage of his yacht, dangled in the ocean water for several days, when the meat had already begun to move away from the bones, and how he then prayed to Nikolai Ugodnik and the holy warrior, sailor Fyodor Ushakov, and ... Here ... we are talking with the alive and healthy Fyodor Konyukhov in the spring of 2012 years in his cozy workshop on Paveletskaya... The room is littered with Alpine equipment: in a few days

Father Fyodor Konyukhov (who took the rank) went to the next conquest of Everest.

I stopped at the example of Ushakov also because of the recently spread initiative: to canonize the commander Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. I am very afraid of this very "inflation", so that they do not consider that the "Russian Orthodox saint" is just such another military rank following the field marshal and generalissimo.

I myself was fortunate enough to publish several articles, to mention in books the glorious name of Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. And once, in a conversation, or dispute, with one very talented and influential modern journalist, a Crimean Tatar, I told him about Suvorov's Kysmet. He, like many of his fellow tribesmen, ranked Suvorov among the cruel persecutors, the activities of Alexander Vasilyevich "of the times of the Ochakovskys and the conquest of the Crimea" called, well, almost genocide.

Of course, Suvorov had occasion to smash Turkish and Crimean Tatar armies of one hundred or more thousand, but his "Science of Victory" demanded the most philanthropic attitude towards prisoners. Suvorov was sincerely saddened by the high mortality among the captured Turks and Crimeans. It is clear that he was not able to "turn down" the heat, a factor in various southern fevers ... but he softened the effect of the moral factor as much as he could. Suvorov, often talking with the prisoners, trying on the well-known eastern fatalism, found comforting and at the same time truthful words. That they shouldn't be executed and tormented like that: that the battles that ended in this way, and their very capture, is "Kysmet" (Fate) ... One must not only be sincerely imbued with sympathy in order to find this great "key word", one must also partly become a fatalist yourself, so that your words of unfeigned sympathy would have an effect, as the words of Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov did then.

Approximately this, maybe a little more, I told Ayder, without expecting, of course, any special reactions, hoping only for "taking note". The story of the capture of Warsaw by Suvorov in 1794 is just as in need of a truthful, understandable presentation. He then negotiated surrender on the site, where he specifically ordered not

clean up the corpses. Calculation: the frightened Poles will surrender and there will be much fewer victims (mainly Polish ones!) The calculation was justified, but the Poles have been sublimating and painting the "beast of Suvorov" for two hundred years.

About the slap on the portrait of Suvorov from the influential modern historian Anisimov has already been said ("Rag bayonets"). And how many more examples of a seemingly arch-positive, but at the same time cold and also, in the end, incorrect biography of Generalissimo Suvorov!

In 2000, we republished his famous "The Science of Victory" with a detailed biography and comments by V. S. Lopatin. Well, the mention of Suvorov's own mother, an Armenian, in their opinion, probably somehow belittled the importance of Rymnik, Ishmael, the Italian campaign ... They kept silent. But how to get around another slippery moment? On the eve of his elevation to the dignity of a count in 1790, Alexander Vasilyevich wrote his autobiography: "In 1622, Naum and Suvor left Sweden, and by petition were accepted into Russian citizenship. The descendants went - the Suvorovs ... "

And then the commentator Lopatin, the publishers, those very guardians of "chemical national purity", help the field marshal cope with the "fifth point": "Suvorov is fighting back, his surname is much older ... in 1323 there was a mass migration from Karelia, but those were not Swedes, and the Novgorodians, who ended up on the occupied land ... and the Suvorovs from those ... ".

Hmmm ... It is necessary to at least slightly represent the mentality of a Russian nobleman in order to appreciate all the heavenly, galactic stupidity of this service. I, fortunately, know many of the glorious family of princes Golitsyn. Each of them will name all their ancestors for 100-200 years, as they say, "wake up at night." And looking into the family archives (it was in this mode that Suvorov wrote that document), he can easily draw a family tree for all 700 years.

And just ... just imagine that some nobleman in his right mind belittled the greatest value, the antiquity of his kind! More than three times, for three hundred years (!) In the opinion of these "historians", Suvorov cut off his genealogy ... Yes, from 1323 to 1622, by "comrades helped."

I don't even know what to compare it to. For those "historians", the analogy will be the only understandable one: as if suddenly the first secretary of the regional committee, somewhere in 1935, cut his party experience by three times and publicly burned his party card.

It is precisely such "scientists" with the outlook of the head of the personnel department or the head of the passport office of the police that today hinder the formation of the National Idea.

As for "canonization" under such conditions, by such means, "in

set for Ushakov"... she, "companionship" darling, in all its glory would only undermine confidence in the very idea of glorification in the Cathedral of Saints. Forced promotion to the saints of all the great commanders would indirectly undermine the arguments about the canonization of other heroes (not war, but history). Yermak, for example, is not just a brave warrior, and it is not for nothing that he is present in folk songs. The robbery past is a classic beginning, many saints, ours, Catholic ones are repentant robbers. (Again, Nekrasov's folklore-song generalization turned up: Kudeyar-Pitirim.)

This is what, approximately, the "representative of the Customer" had to say to our historiographers, bringing their works to the attention of the younger generation today. I myself in the book "World War II. Reboot", trying on the audience, introduced the chapter-supplement "History of the Second World War in 50 \$ t65s", bringing some thoughts to the format of short slogans, fitting into the size, well, maybe not in one, so 2-3 \$ 115- OK.

I remember that in France during the time of de Gaulle, such a strategy was developed: "Defense in all azimuths." So, for the fighters of the "ideological front": denial "in all azimuths", or "rejection in all azimuths" is just ... a wrong, non-working strategy. The current defenders of the ideals and history of Russia should be wary of "approaching reinforcements" - former professional "defenders of the ideals of socialism", who at one time chose a simple (for themselves) and losing (for the country) tactics of total monotonous denial.

But, it is true, it is difficult to draw a line of narration, preserving all the inspiring details of our history, and at the same time - its dialectics, its meaning. Do not use "oil" as a kind of "historiographic deodorant" against the stink of what Russia itself got rid of, like the Solonevich cavalry, guardsmen, archers. One respected editor-in-chief, under whose supervision I had a chance to work, would definitely have crossed out pictures like the above-mentioned "streltsy revolt" or the Narva rout. Yes, in general, I crossed it out ... without any "would" - it was with him, in Historical Newspaper, that I published the first excerpts of the future book "Golitsyns and All Russia". Fragments of the exploits and rise of the future Field Marshal Mikhail Golitsyn (the true hero of Lesnaya, Poltava, Perevolochna and Grengam) or the like, he directly savored, rereading. And about these, he was so sincerely sad, as if there was discord in his own house ... "Igor, you can't imagine with what gloating they will pick up, savor, exaggerate!" I myself, not wanting to break his heart, chose only "glorious deeds." But he included everything in the book.

Yes, and in this one, as you can see, I do not hide it, however, repeating my "spell". People, the same people, fleeing from the Turks on the Dnieper, in impotent rage adding to the all-Russian robbery the heinous murders covered by the "new Slavophiles", they then reached the Danube, the Balkans, Paris. Dilapidated, dying, stinking social institutions, organizations ... and Kostomarov's "state without the makings of self-improvement" - this is what we are talking about.

And now, focusing not only on all the chapters of this book, but also on the previous hundreds of his articles, eleven books (two, however, fiction), the entire experience of a person who has lived in his country for more than half a century, served in the army, changed several jobs and professions .. Regarding the factors that balance this deterioration, I affirm: only People are on the "positive" bowl. Breadth of nature, resourcefulness and,

on the contrary, with quickness, patience, and accommodatingness, they balanced the flaws, the defectiveness of ALL organizations that shone in the Russian land.

Broadcast retreat

For those who sincerely love their history, everything, as God gave it to us (according to the Pushkin formula), like, for example, my editor at the Historical Newspaper. In this book, you have already read a lot of unflattering characteristics given to people, organizations. And even more severe things will have to be said: it comes to the very "Day of the Dynasty", 1917.

In one of the editions of his book "World War II. Reloaded, I, one might say experimentally, included several instructive stories from the era of the Cold War. From the memorable "arms race" (conditionally won by us in the mid-1970s, but this is a separate topic), from the competition between the "sword" (means of attack) and "shield" (defense), from "asymmetric responses", when 50 billion dollar American threats our secret geniuses fended off with 5 million rubles answers, I turned to the propaganda struggle. And he cited one absolutely amazing, symbolic, if you think about it, fact, in my opinion, underestimated.

It turns out that sending a radio signal to a certain area cost three times cheaper than jamming it on it.

That is, it cost us three times more to silence "enemy voices" than it cost them to publish, broadcast ... to put a simple, in general, "sandwich" into our cage: half an hour of rock music, ten minutes of propaganda.

How inexorably fits into that "Equation with an unknown number with which I described unknown" , the Cold War, this iron coefficient: 3. Can't answer, don't know what? - pay three times!

It turns out - absolutely, absolutely "NOT geniuses", to put it mildly, were responsible for our ideological flank. And most importantly, they wanted to be responsible for this monopoly, with their own separate, committee member. Reminiscent of such football players defending the "honor of the country." They blow it chronically, but still: "Only we will continue to play. You just help us, shoot a little bit with rifles at the enemy goalkeeper and defense, and then we'll ... ".

Failed. Neither with rifles, nor with the same jammers. Maybe because they themselves did not believe in the depths of their souls? But, characteristically, they did not let those people who could believe in the "feeding trough" ("responsible ideological work"). And, most importantly, they could think. Kozhinov, Panarin, Likhachev, Zinoviev...

Those "ideologists" should send today an invoice for paying for the work of at least the mentioned jammers, just like in Germany the family of a hanged man was sent an invoice for a rope.

Especially today, building an ideology on concealment is an even more hopeless business. We need not just jammers, but some "washers", and even combined with a time machine. On the topic "The Personality of Nicholas II and the characteristics of his reign" alone, it is necessary to jump to 1918, to contrive to destroy the tsar's diary, his correspondence with his wife is a must. Destroy everything written, printed since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially where the name Bezobrazov or the term "Bezobrazovskaya gang" occurs. The very presence in nature of books, documents, letters with these "key words" makes the work of Bokhanov, Multatuli ... meaningless and harmful. All the same, after all, they will find it, read it, and in irritated denial go even further. Or quietly, they will lose faith in themselves, they will become like a human passive paste of the Perestroika era, squeezed out of a tube of "USSR".

And further about Atlantes and leaning

Since the tangle of plot has come almost to the very "Bottom of the Dynasty", the death of the dynasty, the Romanov Empire, and it will be impossible to avoid talking about historical figures not so chronologically distant, whose names come up today in the most heated political discussions, I must share my "method of approach".

1. "Black box"

The abundance of contradictory, mutually exclusive facts, equally walking on almost any figure, organization, inclines to apply the well-known cybernetic principle: "Black Box". Do not get into the subtleties, the circumstances of the System, but only measure the change in the parameters "at the Input" and "at the Output". "Before" and "After"... The results of wars, battles are those parameters where there is more objectivity, the possibility of quantitative comparisons.

And we will apply this approach not only to persons removed for a safe 200, 300 years, but even up to ... even President Putin, Patriarch Kirill. Let not this very second, but nevertheless in the foreseeable, real future, when some parameters, characteristics of their activity can be considered, measured: "At the Exit", "After", "Immediately After". And compare. This is, firstly,

more effective than trying to get into the System itself, to filter out megatons of biased (both signs) information. Secondly, it still creates a kind of ethically charged field in which some assessments are possible that are available to the persons being evaluated, or at least to their generation. Their "reference group" (sociologists call a group of people whose assessments are important to the assessed). And the argument that they allegedly

assessed, do not give a damn about the situation already "a day later" - in my opinion, simulated teenage cynicism, French bravado ("After us, **THOUGH THE FLOOD**").

For example, students often torture me on such a difficult topic as the Schism, the reforms of Patriarch Nikon. They are sincerely indignant: how could the correction of several books be turned into a Civil War? Yes, and in conversations with journalists, sometimes even on distant occasions, this stubborn spring jumped out: Nikon, Habakkuk, burning, self-immolation. Somehow, on the pages of The Russian Writer, I had a chance to enter into a dialogue with Vasily Dvortsov, who developed this topic in a very interesting way ...

It is easy to understand that today Patriarch Nikon is criticized, taught how he needed to, how it was possible to conduct a "book right", turn the "salting" move into "against ...", introduce three fingers, mainly those who do not care about two, and three fingers, "against ..." and "According to ...", to whom the general denigration of Orthodoxy is more important. And what can a person say about Patriarch Nikon, who represents both the complexity of this topic, and his incompetence, and, at the same time, where do publicists who easily deal with the "problem of the Schism" on an eighth sheet of a newspaper pull?

I answer something like this. Nikon's initial authority is by no means his personal, but "capital" gained by his great predecessors: the holy Patriarch Hermogenes, the savior of Russia in the Time of Troubles, and the great sufferer, ascetic Patriarch Filaret. It was they who gave the Patriarchate a reserve of authority, which was used up, exchanged by Nikon. And even without taking the liberty of making judgments about his reform, a quarrel with Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, one can, however, fix that Nikon's "Exit" Patriarchate is by no means what it was "at the Entrance" and a few years later (and four successors), it disappeared altogether. No one can reproach those four, it is well known how courageously Patriarch Joachim admonished the rebellious archers. But the resource was used up by Nikon ...

Germogen and Filaret were from among those who held the Patriarchate (and Russia), and Nikon was from among those who leaned against, leaned on their elbows, spent what they had accumulated by their predecessors - such a conclusion can be made even without any judgments about his reform, the Schism, the burned archpriest Avvakum, a quarrel with the king.

It is the same with the last two emperors, with Russia and the autocracy. Alexander III held what Nikolai P leaned on.

2. Preference for circumstantial evidence I formulate approximately. Considering the level of engagement of most historical works,

if, for example, you want to evaluate the Romanovs, Tsar Nicholas II, read, collect information NOT about the Romanovs, Nicholas II, but, say, about ... Sheremetevs, Bismarck, Theodore Roosevelt, Franz Joseph, Leo Tolstoy, the opium wars, the "Meiji revolution", the militaristic monster Wilhelm P ... In general, about important contemporaries or important events contemporary to what interests you. Let's say the authors of those studies are as engaged as ... Svanidze or Bokhanov with Multatuli. But the vector of their stretches will be aimed at exalting or humiliating, say, Bismarck, and you will get a certain set of interesting plots, in any case, without Romanov-anti-Romanov stretches. So, from Bismarck, you can go to the well-known "Tariff War" between Germany and Russia, to Minister Sergei Witte, who won this war, and then to two tsars, whom Minister Witte served. And then to draw conclusions on the monarchs themselves.

A good and unexpected example is Russian champagne. The case, again, known to me from my work on the "Golitsyn book".

As you know, the "father of Russian champagne", Prince Lev Sergeevich Golitsyn, gave our winemaking a scientific basis, increased its scale several times, brought it to the world level.

In 1899, the first edition of high-quality champagne of the Novy Svet brand was released, which received the Grand Prix Cup at the world exhibition and tasting of champagne wines in France. Having received three inheritances during his ascetic labor, Prince Golitsyn invested everything in the Novy Svet. In order to turn his compatriots away from the "liquor", he supplied his wines to central Russia almost at cost. He repeated: "We are rich; our south is made for viticulture. I want the worker, craftsman, small employee to drink good wine. He kept in Moscow on Tverskaya, next to the house of the Governor-General, a shop where his pure, natural wine was sold. V. A. Gilyarovsky wrote about him, the essay "Lions at the Gates". He created a huge system of mountain tunnels necessary for the three-year aging of champagne. There was not enough working capital, and in 1890, Prince Golitsyn, by special invitation, became the chief winemaker of the Specific Department, that is, he raised winemaking in all the personal possessions of the tsar and other members of the imperial family: Livadia, Massandra, Ai-Danil, Oreanda and Kuchuk-Lambate. Expanded the area of vineyards, selected varieties on a scientific basis. In 1894, he began construction of the Main Massandra cellar for aging wines from all five estates.

But ... in the Main Directorate of the Specific Department - hordes of officials, intrigues. This ministry was created to manage the hereditary possessions of the king and some of the great princes. Prince Golitsyn is being "hooked up". He demands payment, having received over 100,000 rubles due to him for 1898, Golitsyn contributes this money to

The Ministry of Agriculture as a fund for the issuance of annual awards from interest from this money for the best achievements in the field of winemaking and viticulture.

Here is the conclusion. All of a sudden, a world-renowned winemaker appeared in Russia. The largest specialist plus a non-mercantile person who spent three of his inheritances to make his dream come true: a bottle of natural wine in Moscow is no more than 25 kopecks.

And this person comes to work in the Ministry of Appanages. And the fact that this Specialist survived is...

The "owner of the Russian land" (as Nikolay P wrote down his position in the All-Russian census sheet) could not establish an administrative order not only in the country, but also on personal estates.

Nearby is another Golitsyn, private Moscow example. Prince Vladimir Mikhailovich Golitsyn. The most successful Moscow administrator, had an order for the successful coronation of Alexander Sh. He was expelled from his post by the intrigues of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich with his "fun company". Those have Khodynka. The group of Grand Dukes Vladimir and Pavel threatens the newly crowned Nikolai with a boycott if even one step in the Khodynka investigation affects the Moscow Governor-General Sergei Alexandrovich. Tsar Nicholas bypasses, interrogates all the relatives in a circle, what should he do, and on their advice "shows true firmness in the face of misfortune" - he goes to the ball to the French consul Montebello on the night of the catastrophe. Even in Bokhanov's lubok narration, this scene produces a strange and

painful impression.

The outrageously expanded (from 4 to 25 in 80 years) grand-ducal corporation is a separate issue, its relationship with Emperor Nicholas is a tragicomedy. The institute, once created to strengthen the dynasty, help the tsar, eventually helped Nicholas II in only one thing: part of the responsibility for the collapse of the Empire can really be decomposed into several grand princely groups.

And if that Russia happened to participate, for example, in the nuclear missile race, then with a 99% probability, Mr. Korolev would hear: "I'm sorry, Sergei Pavlovich, but ... My cousin's husband thinks that ... ". Or: "I'm sorry, Mr. Kurchatov, but at this difficult time ... I can only entrust the management of a nuclear reactor to Grand Duke M##...".

In one of my publications a few years ago, I called this "corporation" a herd of grand princes that had seized and trampled down all the fields of possible service. I confess. Firstly, a deeper acquaintance with the representatives revealed a whole gallery of personalities: there were many gifted people among them, and in addition to the memorable "poet

K. R. Secondly, in fairness it is possible to the great princes

apply the same approach as above - to the guardsmen and especially to the archers. The very social form "grand dukes", "royal family" has turned into a malignant tumor.

Just as the archers were turned by Peter from bloody and cowardly bandits into brave grenadiers, fusiliers, so the grand dukes individually, almost all were worthy of a better role than the one played in the end - "a weight on the leg of the last Russian emperor." And a better fate than the Alapaevskaya mine. All the same, after all, one of them who was worthy of such an end in the highest measure, Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich (Parisian playboy, tsushimostroitel), somehow escaped this mine.

Chapter 23

But we will not continue to criticize the behavior of Nikolai in the face of relatives. Let's say this is a private weakness (although many of his relatives were public figures). Wars, their results, were chosen as the criterion for evaluating reigns, and here, I sincerely hope, there were no discoveries. Only - the transfer of some facts from shelf A to shelf B. "A" - is the responsibility of specialists in military history or other specialists in particular topics. "B" - refers to politics, political science, "the search for a national idea", "the meaning of Russian history." I try not to touch on their theories, but when their conclusions are linked to specific results, wars, and suddenly you see how elves, dragons, unicorns, centaurs are walking around on the battlefields of Narva, Lesnaya, Poltava ... then you have to turn to the regiment "A".

But in reality, several more important events of the era of the last Romanovs are mythologized to the point of complete absurdity, one can also say: they were "settled" by dragons, elves.

Crimean War. Sale of Alaska. Wine monopoly by Sergei Witte. The Russo-Japanese War, the Peace of Portsmouth, the Revolution of 1905...

Eastern War in the Far East

The trigger of the Crimean ("Eastern") War, as you know, was the conflict between Nicholas [and Napoleon III, who came to power in France after the coup on December 2, 1851. Nicholas I agreed with the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria this form of "boycott": do not address the Frenchman according to the royal protocol "Mopseig top Egege" ("Sir, my brother") and in a telegram addressed Napoleon "Mopseig top at1" ("dear Friend"). And the Prussian and the Austrian, who promised their solidarity, deceived (remember how Koroviev deceived Ivan Bezdomny at the Patriarch's Ponds: "Let's shout 'Help!' together!"), And sent telegrams with the words: "Sir, my brother." So the "hoarse cry" of Nicholas sounded just as lonely, was regarded as a public insult to the French emperor. And, most importantly, all the French were shown an argument, a reminder: who overthrew Napoleon G, who dragged him to Paris in 1814 on his own,

then the most powerful neck of the rest of the "coalitionists"?..

"Revenge" is a great idea that suddenly rallied the nation with the newly reigned Louis Napoleon, who just yesterday was publicly (and in print!) Recalled his prison and pimping past. Mercy sideways, Nicolas!

It was France that forced the Turks to take the keys to the Bethlehem Church from the Orthodox priests, in response to which Nicholas "moved troops into the Danube principalities, etc." And the specific contribution of the French, the share of their troops near Sevastopol, was approximately equal to the contribution of the Russian army in the campaigns of 1813-1814.

And Pushkin found the origins of the conflict with the English Palmerston, an entry in his Diary on June 2, 1834: "The sovereign did not want to accept Canning ... (as the ambassador of Britain. - I. Sh.) because, being the Grand Duke, had some trouble with him." Palmerston did not wish to appoint anyone else as ambassador to Petersburg. In response, Nikolai recalled the Russian ambassador, Prince Lieven, from London, appointed a chargé d'affaires as well, and chose a completely insignificant bureaucratic figure, a certain Medem ...

The Penultimate War of the Romanov Dynasty - English

Japanese

The circumstances of its unleashing, the course and results were briefly considered by me earlier in connection with the fate of one of its famous participants - Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy.

In the recent book "Near Far. Premonition of Fate "(2012) I from the entire history of the Crimean War, about which, of course, a lot has been written, mainly considered plots related to the Far East. Reserving to myself the role of a supplier of some new comparisons of previously known historical facts, I will paint a picture of our readiness for the Crimean War through the still popular talk about Alaska. That it didn't seem to be sold to the Americans, but leased for 99 years. Probably even politicians have heard this "trump card": let's remember the Americans and demand the return of rented Alaska!

No, alas! - Alaska was sold, "outright", without any leases, about which the corresponding Treaty was signed on March 30, 1867 in Washington. BUT where did these long-term rumors of Ob rent come from ?! They, it turns out, are directly related to the Crimean War. In Alaska, you know, RAC (Russian-American Company) worked for half a century. Although it sounds like the current joint ventures, but it was certainly a Russian company, the creation of the great ascetic Shelekhov, the word "American" simply meant the place of activity, something like the "British East India Company".

And what was this "cash cow" left with by the beginning of the Crimean War? In terms of defense capabilities? The answer is entirely, entirely, and lies in these "rental" rumors! The RAC saw that the only chance to save Russian Alaska was this "fictitious lease" for three years. For Novoarkhangelsk (the capital of Russian America), the legal status - "private property" - gave a chance, if the Anglo-French fleet came, to show a piece of paper. They respected the right of private property, and the only defense would be a certificate: at the moment, property (villages, ships) is the property of the American-Russian Trading Company. The name is similar, but it was already a real American company, with an office in San Francisco, controlled by the US government. The contract was prepared, but they were not allowed to go into business, since it turned out that it was possible to sign such a fictitious lease even with the British Hudson's Bay Company - the war did not affect these transactions. Russian ships, as Otto Lindholm (a Russian citizen, captain of the Grand Duke Konstantin whaling brig) recalls, at that time had to raise the American flag for the sake of salvation.

Several times in the book "Near Far. Premonition of Fate" pointed out the falsity of the majestic "political map" of the Empire of Nicholas I. The East of the Empire - Chukotka, Kamchatka, Alaska hung all over the same 1260-kilometer mountain trail Yakutsk - Okhotsk. Can furs be taken out, but guns brought? Spare cores? For the ships assembled on the spot, in the Sea of Okhotsk, let me remind you: even the anchors had to be sawn in Yakutsk, the ropes were cut before they were loaded onto horses ... There, even carts were unrealistic.

So, for thirty years, Nikolai and Nesselrode were engaged in Poland, Hungary, the Holy Alliance, successfully gathering a pan-European coalition against Russia. Against the backdrop of this stormy diplomatic "work", the army, as already mentioned, is simply a unique case in history: 30 years - an absolute zero change!

I don't really want to stray into these "denunciations", but if you think about it, then any talk about the wars of those years (there is still a story about the Russian Japanese ahead), without mentioning the roles of the emperors, is self-deception, a game of spillikins or giveaways.

War in the Far East

On the Pacific Ocean (which was then also called the Eastern) you can find the only monarch who supported our Nicholas I with a deed (with a deed that was within his power!) I don't know whether you will laugh or cry, but this only monarch turned out to be ... King of the Hawaiian Islands Kamehameha III! But what a laugh. His, the king's, feasible deed was a friendly letter to the governor of Kamchatka, V. S. Zavoyko, delivered with an American whaling ship.

Yes, of course, the leaders of the island tribes, in Tahiti, Fiji, Papua, Hawaii, were called "kings" with some irony, but ... as one very well-known politician would say about a hundred years after the events described: "I have other kings for you

No!"

But then, I hope, even the shadow of possible snobbery will leave the reader: in that letter, March 1854, King Kamehameha III warned our governor that he had reliable information about a possible attack on Petropavlovsk by the British and French in the summer. At the then level of transport and communication, this was really very valuable, timely information!

Yes, the Hawaiian king did not have a formidable navy, but before throwing it off the balance of that war, it is still interesting to think or at least guess about the nature of that sympathy of the Hawaiian king! After all, Kamehameha Sh did not receive 250,000 "tin soldiers" as a gift from the Russian emperors. He could only see Russian travelers in his Hawaii, he could talk with Kruzenshtern, Lisiansky, Kotzebue ... Or rather, he didn't "could", but he definitely talked, for example, with our Otto Kotzebue. And some impression about Russia, it means, was left to him by Russian sailors ...

The military governor of Kamchatka, the commander of the Petropavlovsk military port, Major General V. S. Zavoiko began to prepare. A letter with a similar warning from the Russian Consul General to the United States arrived in Kamchatka later.

Zavoyko addressed the population of Kamchatka with an appeal: "We have received news that England and France have united with ... Turkey, with the oppressors of our co-religionists; their fleets are already fighting ours. War can flare up in these places too. The Petropavlovsk port should always be ready to meet the enemy, the inhabitants will not remain idle spectators of the battle and will be ready, with vigor, not sparing their lives, to resist the enemy and inflict possible harm on him ... "

Then in the Far East we almost had time. The feat of Gennady Nevelsky and the Siberian governor Muravyov, who opened the road to the East along the Amur, turned out to be decisive.

On July 24, 1854, the Dvina transport delivered from the mouth of the Amur to Petropavlovsk 350 soldiers of the Siberian linear battalion, 2 bomb cannons of a two-pound caliber and 14 cannons of a 36-pound caliber. The arrived military engineer lieutenant Mrovinsky led the construction of coastal batteries. By the end of July, the garrison of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka port, together with the crews of the ships, numbered 920 people (41 officers, 476 soldiers, 349 sailors, 18 Russian volunteers and 36 Kamchadals).

The entire population of the city and its environs, about 1,600 people, was involved in preparing for the defense. Work on the construction of seven

coastal batteries and the installation of guns were carried out for almost two months, day and night. Platforms for batteries were cut down in the rocks, impregnable for

amphibious assault, removed guns from ships, manually dragged them along the steep slopes of the hills and installed them on the shore. The frigate "Aurora" under the command of I. N. Izylmetyev and the military transport "Lvina" were anchored on the left sides to the exit from the harbor. The starboard guns were removed from the ships to reinforce the coastal batteries. The entrance to the harbor was blocked by a boom. Batteries covered Petropavlovsk with a horseshoe. At its right end, in the rocky tip of Cape Signalny, there was a battery that protected the entrance to the inner roadstead.

At noon on August 17, 1854, forward posts at the lighthouses discovered a squadron of six ships. On the morning of August 18, the squadron entered Avacha Bay: 3 English ships - the frigate "President" (52 guns), the frigate "Pike" (44 guns), the steamer "Virago" (10 guns) and 3 French - the frigate "La Fort" (60 guns), corvette "Eurydice" (32 guns), brig "Obligado" (18 guns). Total: 216 guns, 2600 men. The commander is the Englishman Rear Admiral David Price (he will still give out a surprise).

The chief fortifier of Petropavlovsk, Mrovinsky, describes the battle as follows:

"The enemy divided the squadron into two halves and, placing one half against one battery, and the other against the other, opened fire on them simultaneously. Batteries bombarded with cannonballs and bombs, having only 10 guns, could not resist 113 guns, most of which were bombing (cannonballs weighing 85 English pounds were found on the shore), and after three hours of resistance, almost all of the guns were knocked out, and servants with batteries were forced to retreat ...

After the third and seventh batteries were destroyed, on September 4, the enemy landed a landing force in the amount of about 700 people, who, divided into three detachments, launched an attack on Nikolskaya Sopka. One of the detachments tried to penetrate the city, bypassing the mountain from the north, but here the sixth battery opened fire on it with shrapnel ... "

Having gathered 300 people, the Russians decided to counterattack and recapture Nikolskaya Sopka! The battle went on for more than two hours and ended in the defeat of the Anglo-French landing. Having lost 50 people killed, 4 prisoners, 150 wounded, the enemy retreated, then fled, and only the complete dominance of ship artillery saved the landing. As trophies, the Russians got a banner, 7 officer's sabers and 56 guns.

And now about the announced "surprise" of the British commander. Indeed, Rear Admiral David Price on the morning of August 18, on the very eve of the assault, made a rather unusual military maneuver. Just imagine: the landing party checks the equipment, the boats are launched, and then the French Admiral De Pointe is informed that the commander, Admiral David Price ... shot himself.

Some of our historians insert "clarification": English

the admiral committed suicide, having lost hope of capturing Petropavlovsk ... preferred death to disgrace ... But, believe me, our story is interesting even without these jugglings: the suicide of the English admiral was still before the assault ... One way or another, but the command the whole squadron had to take De Pointe, the attack was postponed until the next morning ...

Later, the Frenchman had to drink his cup. Public opinion, the press, influential both in England and in France, summed up the Kamchatka campaign:

"... A black spot that can never be washed away by any ocean waters."

"The board of one Russian frigate and several coastal batteries proved invincible before the combined forces of England and France, and the two greatest powers of the world were defeated and ridiculed by a small Russian settlement."

Pay attention to how a talented journalist snatches out this detail: "The board of one Russian frigate ...", emphasizing that our Aurora operated only on the left side, giving the right side guns to coastal batteries, that is, "half a frigate" fought with the allied squadron.

Admiral De Pointe "from exhaustion of physical and mental strength" died a few months after the English colleague shot himself.

Genius story.

In the Far East, we almost made it. Almost ... The Amur expedition of Governor Muravyov sent 16 guns and 350 soldiers was enough to win one battle (it turned out to be enough for the unfortunate Admiral Price), but still not enough to save the city of Petropavlovsk.

In May 1855, the Anglo-French fleet came again, now consisting of 12 ships, 5,000 sailors and soldiers (everything was doubled) ... But Petropavlovsk was empty. All the property, the remaining guns, people were loaded onto ships and taken out ... Where to? And once again I ask the reader to look at the map.

The Pacific Ocean is great, but there is nowhere to retreat! Russian Alaska is covered with one piece of paper, a pseudo-lease agreement, the entire Asian coast is an icy desert. Evacuated people will die there even without any English landings. Is it really - to the Hawaiian Islands ... to Pearl Harbor ... to the only "ally" Kamehameha III ?! But no, of course, the Russians will not set up their friend! So where then?

And here again the discovery of Gennady Nevelsky had an effect: the mouth of the Amur! Denied by scientists as a fact a few years ago, it accepted ships with the evacuated garrison of Petropavlovsk.

Smooth transition from the post-war years to the pre-war years

The next war in the Far East was the Russo-Japanese one, and the plot about the sale of Alaska is just placed before it. The story about her pseudo-lease, as the only way to hide from the Anglo-French fleet, opened a brief history of the Crimean War.

A. Zinukhov, the author of a good and angry article "Criminal Deal", denounces a whole conspiracy to sell Alaska:

"... An initiative group of supporters of the sale was formed: Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, Minister of Finance M. Kh. Reiter and Baron E. A. Stekl, envoy to the United States of North America ..."

Zinukhov told how the conspirators put pressure on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Prince A. M. Gorchakov:

"This sale would be very timely," the Grand Duke wrote to Gorchakov, "for one should not deceive oneself and one must foresee that the United States ... wishing to dominate indivisibly in North America, will take the aforementioned colonies from us, and we will not be able to return them. Meanwhile, these colonies bring us very little use, and losing them would not be too sensitive ... "

Reproaches gradually ascend to Emperor Alexander II, who: "... unexpectedly reacted to the proposal of his younger brother with interest, inscribed on a letter with his own hand: "This thought is worth considering. It is quite possible that the royal family had been "thinking" about this for a long time. The whole deal was carried out as a conspiracy. Only a narrow circle of participants knew about it, and the only opponent of the sale of Russian possessions was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Gorchakov, but it is impossible to do without him, so a scene was played out: the Grand Duke, who is resting in Nice, addresses the minister in writing, putting him before the need to report on the content letters to the emperor. Thus, Gorchakov moves from the position of a determined opponent of the sale to the position of loyalty and non-resistance. The emperor pretends that the idea of selling him was very interested, and offers this idea to "figure out" ... "

On March 30, 1867 in Washington, the Treaty was signed in English and French (the "diplomatic" languages), the official text of the treaty in Russian does not exist. The value of the deal was \$7.2 million in gold. The USA passed all

the Alaska peninsula, a coastline 10 miles south of Alaska along the west coast of British Columbia, the Aleutian Islands...

One "Alaskan" phenomenon of public consciousness - a hypothetical "rent for 99 years" - we have considered. What's the next "Alaskan" item? Of course: "selling for nothing", "for nothing" ... Compare all the immense treasures of Alaska and - 7.2 million dollars, even if translated by helpful guides at the rate of 2007 at 104 million dollars!

A. Zinukhov in the article "Criminal Deal" also analyzes how the Russian representative was "cheated":

"7,200,000 dollars were to be paid in cash, moreover, in "gold coins" ... Immediately after the ratification of the agreement, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gorchakov transferred all powers to complete this matter to the Ministry of Finance, whose representative was obliged, having received cash "gold coins", deliver them to a Russian warship and, upon arrival in St. Petersburg, transfer them to the state treasury. Instead, Baron Steckl, without even trying to protest, received a check for 7,200,000 greenbacks, which were quoted well below gold dollars. In fact, the "oversight" of the baron was worth \$1,800,000. In terms of gold cash, he received 5,400,000 gold dollars ... "

Our "geopolitical indignation" can be strengthened, for example, by another fact: at the time of its sale, the treasures of Alaska were not only known, but coal and gold were already being mined there.

But how many more "points of criminal sale" do not add, they will all be crossed out with one simple statement: it was not a "sale"! In the sense, in my opinion, that the "sale of territories" by states, even if it is called that in the treaties, is still NOT a sale, in a certain sense it is "losing the war". For centuries, territories moved back and forth as a result of wars. But sometimes the state (government) mentally lost, scrolled in the imagination (or even in the general staffs) the future war and ... having lost it, tried to value its foresight in money.

The "virtual winner" also estimated its losses associated with the conquest, and "peace negotiations" began. That is, in terms that I propose to arrange: in 1867, it was sold / evaluated - NOT Alaska with all its gold, furs. The war for Alaska was sold/estimated.

For confirmation of this thought, perhaps resembling a paradox, a joke, one does not have to go far. Not far away (geographically and chronologically) similar events took place.

In 1803, Napoleon "sold" Louisiana. Imagine this vast area (2,100,000 km², a quarter of the current STA area) in the Mississippi River basin, the very middle, the core of the country,

in places cultivated at that time for more than 100 years! With a big city and the port of New Orleans. And it was sold for a sum comparable to Alaska - \$ 15 million.

The total size of the sold territory of Alaska is 1519 thousand square meters. km, therefore, the selling price per square kilometer = 4.73 dollars, or 1.9 cents per 1 acre.

And the price of a Louisiana acre is 3 cents/acre.

BUT, let's show the meticulousness that is probably necessary in such trade matters and find out: it turns out that several years before that, the Americans tried to buy only one city, the most important port of New Orleans in the region, for ... 10 million dollars.

So that leaves 5 million for Louisiana itself, minus New Orleans. This means that the arable lands, meadows and steppes of Louisiana went at 1 cent / acre - cheaper than a hectare of Alaskan ice.

But Napoleon was not crazy (it was still 1803, and not ... 1812-1)! That is, he, too, it turns out, was not selling Louisiana, but the "war for Louisiana." He saw his strategic vacuum between France and that province: Oceanus. And on it - the British fleet.

As Aristotle said: "Nature abhors emptiness"... Let's add: "and Great Britain too".

Exactly the same strategic vacuum existed between Russia and Alaska. Yes, Nevelskoy and Muravyov broke through the Amur route from Transbaikalia to the Pacific Ocean, and this had a little effect on the course (but not on the outcome!) of the Crimean War: they repulsed the first attack on Kamchatka and escaped from the second at the mouth of the Amur. But the Crimean War was (in the terms I proposed): "The first logistical war", and by no means the "Last ...". The levels of competition between powers in ton-kilometers continued to rise, and our railways at that time were only approaching the Volga.

Thinking about the sale of Alaska, the main question of Tsar Alexander II was not: "How much?", But: "How to defend, save?" Leaving territories in general is humiliating, undermines the very philosophy of the state, much like losing a war is humiliating (once again to the "paradox of selling" two pages above). It is the question "How to save?" the tsar also asked his ministers, military leaders, and, having received answers that boiled down to ... in fact: "No way!", He gave the go-ahead to the waiting company of Grand Duke Konstantin and Baron Stekl.

That is why, agreeing with the pathos, for example, of the author of that article "Criminal Deal" - yes, it would be nice to save Alaska! - I will never agree with his assessment of the role of our great emperor Alexander P. This is an example of the approach I have declared with an emphasis on

indirect evidence and facts from "adjacent shelves". The sale of Louisiana and the determination of the "price of New Orleans" - a story that happened half a century before the Alaskan one. The Yankees traded with Napoleon, in the information about this there is not even a theoretical place for any pro and anti Russian distortions. And the involvement of the Louisiana file makes it possible to evaluate the Alaskan sale in a new and more objective way. Otherwise, dozens of articles, and counting reprints, hundreds are sharpened according to the simplest principle: "Ah,

7,200,000 (this figure alone has been memorized and repeated) dollars! Ah betrayal! Oh, this Alexander P /!

Chapter 24

What is the great difference between the reigns and wars of "Nicholas of Crimea" and "Nicholas of Russia and Japan"? "Crimean" was already the third in a series of our geopolitical squanderers and Don Quixotes! Let our Great Creditor be patient, but the very logic of his deceit, foolishness, led the state to a complete dead end, giving the "reins of government" to such persons as Neselrode ...

But unlike Nikolai [1, Nikolai II inherited both a strong power, which was restored during the "Two Alexandria" period, and people like Dragomirov, Mendeleev, Chikhachev, Pobedonostsev and Witte.

Further, we are talking about the chaos of events, historical figures, their actions, their current assessments, which we call the "era of Nicholas II."

There are works of an encyclopedic nature: "The Reign of Emperor Nicholas II" by Professor S. S. Oldenburg, republished in the 1990s, "Essays on the Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War (1895-1907)" by B. A. Romanov. I do not even pretend to have the shortest list of all conscientious publications, but the problem is in the corpus of books and articles that create the aforementioned chaos, blur the very basic criteria in the history of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century: success / failure, work / whim.

The initial understanding of the fate and tasks of Russia seemed to be present.

Emperor Nicholas II, during his meeting in Reval with Kaiser Wilhelm II, said that ... he considers the strengthening and strengthening of Russia's influence in East Asia as the main task of His reign.

This, of course, is the line of Alexander PT, who sent the young Tsarevich on a famous business trip to the countries of the Far East. And at the beginning of the main Russian business, the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Nikolai was present as a student. On May 19, 1891, in Kuperovskaya Pad, near Vladivostok, Tsarevich Nikolai solemnly drove the first wheelbarrow of earth into the embankment of the future Trans-Siberian Railway. And this is a huge plus for him, as a person and as a politician: he did not invent something

"one's own". Already advisers, "shadow", "alternative" in this case would be found instantly. They were found later, but at first Nikolai fully accepted the program of his great father.

In October 1901, the sovereign said to Prince Heinrich of Prussia: "I do not want to take Korea for myself, but in no way can I allow the Japanese to firmly settle there. That would be ~~sazi~~ BeSh. A collision is imminent; but I hope that it will happen not earlier than in four years - then we will have predominance at sea. This is our main interest. The Siberian railway will be completed in 5-6 years."

Here it is - the main Equation that determined the fate of the Russian Empire.

Set aside two dates on the chronological ray (time axis) from the point "October 1901":

October 1905 (the beginning of the Japanese War, according to the calculations of the sovereign), October 1906 (the readiness of the Trans-Siberian Railway, at best, after 5 years).

These were approximate calculations. It turned out like this: the war began - January 1904. The Trans-Siberian was ready - July 1903.

'That is, Witte built the road 32 months earlier.

But Bezobrazov and Plehve and Nikolai provoked the war 21 months earlier. Earlier than the date by which the sovereign planned, among other things, to achieve "predominance at sea".

But who is this "rider on a pale horse"?

Bezobrazov Alexander Mikhailovich (1855-1931), statesman, secretary of state (1903). He graduated from the cavalry school, served in the Life Guards Hussars. In the 1890s he served in the Irkutsk branch of the Main Directorate of State Horse Breeding. Returning to St. Petersburg, in 1896 he wrote a note in which he pointed out the inevitability of war with Japan and proposed, under the guise of commercial enterprises, to carry out a peaceful conquest of Korea. The project, despite the opposition of S. Yu. Witte, received support

Emperor Nicholas II and attracted the necessary private funds. He achieved the establishment of the governorship in the Far East, and in St. Petersburg - the Special Committee for the Far East, to which he was appointed a member. The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 led to his resignation, although he continued to enjoy the confidence of Nicholas II. After the October Revolution, he was in exile.

Like the story of the stolen diamonds, in which Queen Marie Antoinette later got involved, which became one of the triggers of the French Revolution, the tangle of bezobrazovskaya plot has also come to us from afar.

Vladivostok merchant Julius Briner received a forest concession from the Korean government - the right to cut down forests in the upper reaches of the Tumangan River, in the Yalu River basin, for a period of 20 years. The results were rather bad, but he managed (probably not without skillful embellishment) to resell the whole business to a very interesting company of retired and not quite retired military men. In their "Russian Timber Association", registered in the name of the former representative of Russia in Seoul N. Matyunin, the lieutenant colonel of the General Staff of Madrid became the manager, who attracted the leader of the hunghuzes Linchi (Jan-jin-yuan) to protect the concession plots.

The contribution of the retired captain Bezobrazov consisted in the promised "outreach to the tsar" through an influential acquaintance...

And Bezobrazov earned his share by portraying in St. Petersburg from a bunch of dilettantes a company "of the English East Indian type", which would control not only the economy, but also the politics of Korea.

On February 26, 1898, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Muravyov saw through these "concessionaires", but the Minister of the Tsar's court I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, secretly from the Minister of Finance Witte, handed over to Nikolai P a memorandum: "The East Asian Company is not created to enrich individuals. But for the very planting of Russian ideas. All influence on the overall course of affairs in Korea should be concentrated in the hands of the company ... " - and so on. Those who are familiar with the "Projects ..." of our dashing 1990s (also submitted to the "highest consideration" through security guards, tennis coaches), with all these "Societies", where the "contribution of such and such" is "reaching such and such then", can easily imagine that bezobrazovskaya "office". The money for the Vladivostok "office" was given by Rear Admiral A. M. Abaza, Bezobrazov's cousin, who was also taken "in business". This one had at least something to do with "business", taking bribes for orders for the construction of ships, playing on the ruble exchange rate (knowing in advance the plans of the Ministry of Finance).

Few? The "former envoy" Matyunin attracted another old classmate Vonyarlyarsky, who had previously been stealing on the Chukotka concession ...

But the main impulse of the whole scam was the boredom of Nikolai P. Bequeathed

his father, Minister Witte puts into practice the wine monopoly, with money snatched from the tavern-keepers, tavern-keepers (24% of the budget), carries out financial reform, builds the Trans-Siberian Railway, negotiates with the Chinese, builds the CER, determines the entire Far Eastern policy, "important" in his reign. Mother, Dowager Empress, not sparing her son's vanity, all the time puts in

example of Alexander III and orders to obey his beloved father's minister - Witte ... In general, boredom. And the result is a willingness to peck at any "note" from alternative comrades.

The tsar agrees with the creators of the new campaign "... like the British East India", contributes 200,000 pounds of personal currency, allocates his adviser Neporozhny, for whom the concession can be re-registered, offers to put Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich at the head of the "firm". (Having become better acquainted with the affairs of the "firm", he escapes, but Bezobrazov continues to use his name.)

For great deeds, Bezobrazov demands another 2 million rubles from the treasury, and here he meets Witte's stiff resistance for two reasons. As a financier, he, of course, sees a hole in this campaign of dilettantes, embezzlers, and retirees. But as a man who holds the political threads of the Far East in his hands, he tells the tsar, first of all, about the danger of the open participation of the treasury, that is, the Russian Empire, in Korean affairs. Witte, getting the consent of the Chinese for the Chinese Eastern Railway, knew exactly the limit of the patience of the Japanese and chose it to the bottom. His railway, the axis connecting Russia with the Far East, is being built, the Japanese tolerate it, but an awkward entry into Korea will also break the balance.

Foreign Minister Lamzendorf supports Witte. Bezobrazov warms up the campaign in the press, openly declaring that he is being hindered by the "despicable Witte" and the "Jewish Kahal" - that's how he calls Witte and Lamzendorf for some reason.

We will touch on the biographies of Witte, a descendant of the Dutch settlers of the 17th century. Sergei Yulievich won the most brutal customs war against Germany, earning the following assessment from Bismarck: "In recent decades, for the first time I met a man who has strength of character and will and knowledge of what he wants."

Lamzendorf is also, most likely, an Baltic Nemchura. Or maybe in that Bezobrazovskaya swearing, the long-standing Bezobrazovskaya resentment towards the merchant Yuliy Briner, who "raised steeply" on the Far Eastern lead and zinc and famously "pushed" the forest project to the Bezobrazovtsy, was so bizarrely affected? I'm not going to play with the "family aspect", especially since there is a well-known family of Chernyshovs - Bezobrazovs, who gave Russia the most worthy people, but it is highly characteristic of that company to work with Briner and ... Vonlyarlyarsky (God rewarded!), And criticize your opponents for being Witte and Lamzendorf.

But the main thing is not in this, but in the whole mechanics of that "business". Compare, for example, how some Rockefeller, Manesmann, Krup turn to the head of their state: "I have a huge business there and there, I pay taxes - so many millions, I keep so many thousands of jobs. And now I need strong support

states! Or Bezobrazov with Vonlyarlyarsky - to the king: "Arrange a war with the Japanese for us! And ... (after a pause) give me a million "...

Both received what they asked for.

In January 1903, on the personal and already very strict instructions of Tsar Witte, he opens a loan of 2 million rubles to Bezobrazov. In the places of deforestation for the purpose of "protection", the Russian military began to settle. And indeed, the retired captain, appointed, in spite of Witte, as secretary of state (a unique case), raised a fair amount of noise, as if an entire army had entered Korea. They cut down some sacred grove. The "pro-Russian group" in the Korean government is removed from power. "Korean expansion" caused protests, in addition to the Korean government, and also Japan and England.

These are the facts so far. The culprits of the war, most historians recognize the "bezobrazovskaya gang" and the Minister of the Interior Plehve, who joined it, a supporter of the "small victorious war" as a means against the revolution.

And here's one of my guesses. Of course, I have not seen the results of inspections of the work of the Bezobrazovskaya timber company. (I suspect that they didn't exist at all, like Vonlyarlyarsky had with the Chukotka concession.) But most of all, I suspect that the very appearance of the military on the territory of his Korean "timber enterprise" was associated with a desire to drown any thought of the possibility of checking his work from the financial side. After all, from the very beginning he declared the dual nature of the company, that the territories of his forest concession would become a "barrier against the Japanese"!

You now recall Tolstoy's "magnifying glass" through which he discerned "Rostopchin's double task": 1) calm in Moscow; 2) evacuation... Exactly the same now.

- Where are the results of public financial investments? - Yes, our business is semi-military!

- And why did the Japanese pass in 1904 without even noticing your "barriers against them"?

- So we're still lumberjacks! They won and defeated Kuropatkin's real army.

Good and "their" Minister Plehve! Actually a worthy career, martyrdom at the hands of terrorists and one stain: support for the "Gang of Bezobrazov"! Probably, Plehve's initial motive was still dislike for Witte, but ... Here is a small intermediate "moral" for statesmen: when building your career, beware of alliances with scum, with "ugly people"! Of course, in my Far Eastern book I could not give all the evidence

detailed quotes, but those with interest and opportunities can collect them. The term "bezobrazovskaya gang", by the way, is not mine, it has been in use since the beginning of the 20th century.

And in order to imagine the growing chaos of the Nikolaev government, against which Witte had to work, one can again, with a fresh look, consider Plehve's well-known idea about the need for a "small victorious war to avoid revolution", known to many since school. Look through the same "magnifying bureaucratic glass" more closely. Think about it. The minister of the interior is talking about the war, about the case of the minister of war. That is, he shifts his own, "internal affairs" problem, translates it into an external, military one. And what came out NOT "small" and very "victorious", this, excuse me, is already a question for the army team. And this, I repeat, Plehve is not the worst of the ministers.

But back to the main "worms". The surname Bezobrazov sounds, of course, much more in Russian than Witte, and even patronymics ... just compare: Mikhailovich and Yulievich! And although you can also remember the Bezobrazovskiy: Briner - it just so happened! - Yulia, and about the bezobrazovsky companion - the thief Vonlyarlyarsky, the difference is still different: the Witte Trans-Siberian Railway and the CER worked, and its "Korean forest barriers" dissolved ... like royal money.

I will repeat the last paragraph of the biographical information about Bezobrazov:

"The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 led to his resignation, although he continued to enjoy the confidence of Nicholas II. After the October Revolution, he was in exile."

But the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, as we remember, in addition to the resignation of the already retired captain, royal secretary of state, commissioner and businessman, caused some other events, such as the First Revolution, the fall of the autocracy and DE

Bezobrazov found the Russian-Japanese war provoked by him in ... Switzerland. One, only one revenge ... about which I would very much like to know that it has come true. So that Bezobrazov, dying in his 1931, in his already ... Belgium, would accidentally suddenly realize that it was he, HE (!) ruined the Russian Empire!

But, alas, most likely, the general stupidity of a retired captain,

providing him with contact and mutual understanding with Nicholas II, saved him from this punishment.

Data. Chronology

In the sea of events of those years, there are irrevocable, irremovable facts.

On July 1, 1903, traffic was opened along the Trans-Siberian Railway. The "bottleneck" was the area around Lake Baikal. While the Circum-Baikal was being built, the trains were transported across Lake Baikal on special ferries - up to 3-4 pairs of trains per day, and in winter the rails were laid directly on the Baikal ice. The capacity of other sections was 2-3 times higher.

Near Chita, the road forked: the future Priamursky section went to Vladivostok through the terrain, often mountainous, bending around Manchuria in a giant arc, and in addition, it required the construction of the largest bridge in Russia across the Amur near Khabarovsk. They finished it only in 1915. Another branch, the CER, 1389 versts, went through Manchuria to Vladivostok in a straight chord, and in addition to being 514 versts shorter, it passed mainly through the steppes and was ready already in 1901. The only mountain system here was the Great Khingan, which required breaking through 9 tunnels.

Now mark in the middle of this "chord" the city of Harbin, the capital of Zheltorossia (the irony of the then newspapers), from it restore the perpendicular to the south: Harbin - Dalniy - Port Arthur, 957 miles - this was called the Southern CER. Under the pretext of checking the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the transfer of Russian troops to the Far East immediately began. Transfer of one army corps (about

30,000 people) took approximately 1 month.

I am sure that the understanding people of Russia only then, after July 1, 1903, were able to take a breath. Prior to this, all the conversations, the salutes of Wilhelm P "to the Admiral of the Eastern Seas (Nikolai)", everything was kept on parole. If Japan had attacked then, both Vladivostok and Port Arthur would have been in the position of Sevastopol half a century ago (Crimean War). A ten-month, or maybe even an annual "march" of reinforcements with "ammunition" - with those in knapsacks and pockets, would be late.

Witte again guessed and managed. (His last foreign policy success was the victory in the tariff war with Germany, which for some time even stopped the trade of the two countries, but did not develop into a real war.) From the chronicle of those years (countless notes, memorandums, negotiations), I consider the following event to be the most underestimated in its chronological relationship.

On August 12, 1903, the Japanese government presented to the Russian

Draft bilateral treaty recognizing "the predominance of Japanese interests in Korea and the special interests of Russia in railway enterprises in Manchuria."

This is a mitigation a month after the launch of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which had previously been a formidable position for Japan. The Japanese realized that Russia had moved from the "class of invertebrates" (I still like this comparison of the Trans-Siberian Railway with the spine) to the next class. And keep in mind that the "Draft Treaty" with those conditions was the initial, first word of the Japanese (they had already "swallowed" the CER, agreed with its

existence and Russian-Chinese status), and, naturally, some concessions, "backlashes" for the proposed negotiations were laid.

downhill

On July 30, 1903, the Viceroyalty of the Far East was formed, uniting the Amur Governorate General and the Kwantung Region. The purpose of the formation of the governorship was to unite all the organs of Russian power in the Far East to counter the expected Japanese attack. Admiral E. I. Alekseev was appointed viceroy, to whom the troops, fleet and administration (including the strip of the Chinese Eastern Road) were placed under his command.

Previously, it was written as a 100% fact: Alekseev is the illegitimate son of Alexander P. Now they write about this as a "version", however, without this version it is still difficult to somehow tie such a career into a single whole. Mediocrity, blatant even for the level of Nikolaev's favorites. If Bezobrazov shook the war, then Alekseev practically handed over our fleet to the Japanese for reprisal.

About the fleet itself - extremely briefly. Russia sent huge funds for its construction, Russian engineers, inventors, developed many useful innovations for the fleet. The general idea expressed at the Special Conference in 1897 - to confine ourselves to the defensive fleet in the Baltic and direct all efforts to the Pacific theater - was also absolutely correct. This decision, in fact, was a naval implementation, bequeathed by Alexander III of orientation to the Far East (Trans-Siberian Railway, sending Tsarevich Nicholas on a trip to the Far East).

But the general management of naval construction both undermined that correct decision and devalued those allocated resources. "Chief Commander of the Fleet and the Naval Department", Admiral-General was Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich (nicknamed "seven pounds of august meat")...

I have one version of why in the well-known range of modern popular models for gluing warships, where there is the Bismarck battleship, the Aurora cruiser, and the Potemkin battleship, and

much more, there is no cruiser "Varyag". And why shouldn't it even be done? After all, even a child who has assembled and looked around this model may have questions that will be very difficult to answer. For example: "Why do all the ships have guns in the towers, while the Varyag are naked, even without shields?"

I once read a lot of articles about the "best cruiser in the world" .R. M. Melnikov, the author of the most detailed history, in the preface to the second, 1983, edition of his book "The Cruiser Varyag", also mentions

our embellishers of history, "attributing armored towers to the Varyag."

The idea was this in St. Petersburg - to make a super-fast cruiser. The order was placed in Philadelphia (USA). Our hard workers and patriots who were engaged in "state acceptance", like the later famous Admiral E. N. Shchensovich, were knocked down, demanding quality from the shipbuilder Krump and receiving hack work in return. Supervision of the construction of the ship is a long process, once they even managed to fine Krump, but he finds a "weak link" in the Grand Duke, or rather, a corrupt link, General Williams. Schensovich argued that this businessman was not a general ... but Williams still had "access to the Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich", and he eventually issued an order: "... to give possible satisfaction to the petition of the company (Krump), considering thorough construction in general. In short, pay. Of course, a toy - a glued model of a cruiser will not give out a defective filling (Nikloss boilers), because of which the Varyag spent most of its service in repairs, and, having arrived in Port Arthur, did not give out its "passport" speed on any tests - 23 knots. For the sake of which they "forgot" about the armor. Only 16 knots and for the shortest time - 20. And the armored cruiser "Buenos Aires" gave out more than 23 knots! We will also mention the interesting role of the Argentines in that Russo-Japanese War.

The general strategic miscalculation was that they made scout cruisers, single hunters, not suitable for squadron combat. Unlike Japanese armored cruisers. True, a couple of times luck fell out to our hunters who attacked enemy transports. Pikul, in his amazing novel The Cruisers, brings those successful sea hunts of the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment almost to the level of poetry. But those were still only auxiliary actions, small episodes ...

But why all these elementary oppositions for specialists between linear combat of squadrons and single raiding? So that you appreciate all the tragedy and paradox of what happened next.

In general, the history of the Philadelphia construction of the Varyag, our attempts to control, protests, replacements of pipes sent with an opportunity, steam lines of water gauge glasses, tests in Port Arthur, which showed simply terrible seaworthiness, are whole volumes of scandalous correspondence. But ... two years before the Russo-Japanese War, a rather unique opportunity flashed up to buy two whole fleets! Argentina and Chile successfully resolved the conflict, avoided their own war

and under the contract reduced the Navy. Their armored cruisers, suitable not only for free hunting, but also for squadron combat (all of British, American, Italian construction) were in perfect readiness. Ours and the Japanese sent secret missions, built secret schemes with front companies. The Japanese succeeded, and the ships they purchased played a significant role at Port Arthur and Tsushima.

A completely unclassified (if it came to devastating articles in Sankt Petersburgskie Vedomosti!) scandal flared up in our analogous "secret" Argentine mission. The chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, M.A. Danilevsky, who was supposed to bring teams to Argentina and Chile and receive cruisers, called our buyers swindlers, adventurers. Their head, or rather, the leader, was ... Rear Admiral A. M. Abaza, cousin of Bezobrazov. From the same company that famously "divorced" the sovereign, including with personal royal money. And actually provoked Japan.

From the point of view of literature, the "bezobrazovtsy", of course, greatly adorned the history of the Russo-Japanese War: after all, in a good detective story, the characters do not come from nowhere and do not disappear into nowhere. And the meeting of the hero of the Vladivostok forest concession in Argentina, who is entangled in bribes and "kickbacks" and who also lost the "cruising purchase" mission to the Japanese, gives the whole plot a certain perfection.

Countdown

On the very eve of the war, Alekseev chats in a circle of subordinates (the fleets have not yet been destroyed), pushing glasses on military maps ... (I confess, this image: glasses moving on the maps of the tsar's governor, I have completed), but Alekseev's words are strictly documented: " Let's go with the whole fleet to Sasebo (the main naval base of Japan. - I. Sh.). And we will arrange a second Sinop for the Japanese! - He said this at a meeting in December 1903, but it was recorded in the "Work of the historical commission on describing the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff "(book 1. St. Petersburg. 1912).

Did the Japanese have "Pearl Harbor surprise"? Judge for yourself. On January 22, 1904, they recall their envoy from St. Petersburg. And on January 24, they hand our Minister of Foreign Affairs a "Note on the severance of diplomatic relations" and withdraw the fleet from the Sasebo base. It takes him 3.5 and 4 days to go to Chemulpo and Port Arthur, respectively. The tsar's governor in the Far East, Alekseev, was immediately warned by telegraph. On January 25 (!!!) he forwards the received warnings to Vladivostok, Hong Kong, Singapore (warns our single ships stationed there). BUT - to this day the mystery of history! - at the same time, he DOES NOT transmit this warning to the port of the Arthurian squadron and the Varyag, which is closest to Japan, in the Korean Chemulpo.

Vice-Admiral O. V. Stark, chief of the Port Arthur squadron, who feared that the Japanese might suddenly clog the only way out of the harbor, suggested that the governor lower them on battleships

mine nets, he replied: "We have never been so far from war as we are today," and on Stark's report he wrote in green pencil: "Untimely and unpolitical!"

Stark was reproached a lot for the lack of independence, but one must still accurately weigh that hanging weight, the royal governor, plus the royal bastard (illegitimate son, or literally translated from delicate French: "bastard"). The ships were on the outer roadstead. Admiral Makarov telegraphs from St. Petersburg from the road (he has been appointed and "flies" to Port Arthur), begging to take the fleet to the inner roadstead, or at least set up guards. Alekseev's contemptuous silence.

The Japanese fired the first mine on Russian ships stationed on the outer roadstead of Arthur: on January 26 at 23:35. Our light cruisers, simply designed for patrol service (and, unfortunately, only for it), were covered by the Japanese in the harbors. The brightly illuminated "Retvisan" with the battleship "Tsesarevich" of the same type and the armored cruiser "Pallada" were shot at close range by Japanese destroyers from the darkness and were out of action. Alekseev's telegram about this caught the tsar at the opera.

And if you add up all their correspondence, the picture will turn out to be a little absurd. 3 days before the attack, there is a warning in Port Arthur. The governor's answer: "The fleet is in full combat readiness and will boldly repulse any attempt by a daring enemy."

But there is no redirection of the warning to "a fleet in full...". But there is the next one, to the father-king, "about an insidious attack" and losses.

And back in 1903, a headquarters game was held with a "surprise attack by the Japanese" and our cruiser, left precisely in Chemulpo. In the headquarters game, our patrol destroyers managed to notify and withdraw the then nameless cruiser from the trap.

But after all, Alekseev "showed vigilance." At least three of his proposals to the tsar were recorded and filed: to announce mobilization in Siberia and the Far East. Tsa and his formidable: "Let's arrange a second Sinop for the Japanese!", growled at the Military Council, can also be counted in terms of "combat training".

And how to combine all this? And you remember about that "magnifying glass" and the double assignments obtained by Rostopchin. And here, too, it was: 1) to keep combat readiness; 2) do not provoke the Japanese.

According to point 1), you can issue a couple of formidable projects: "arrange a second Sinop for the _____, proposal to the king to introduce mobilization. Japanese" Wait in response from the sovereign for an additional reminder about point 2) and go to bed calmly ...

After one of the most humiliating defeats in Russian history, Tsar Nicholas released the illegitimate uncle Alekseev with "George" of the 4th degree. And at the main "Tsushimostroitel" - "Chief Chief of the Fleet and the Maritime Department", Admiral General

Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich (nickname "seven pounds of august meat") - the only trouble was the obstruction arranged in St. Petersburg for his mistress. In the foyer of the theater they shouted to her: "Diamonds on you are our armadillos!" The Grand Duke lived out his century in Paris.

And one more thing: upon the departure of Alexei Alexandrovich, the position of Admiral General itself, which had been held since the time of Peter 1, was liquidated in the Russian fleet.

The retired captain Bezobrazov, made secretary of state in defiance of Witte and Lamzdorf, met the war already in Switzerland, was there at least until September 1904. After the war, he was dismissed again, but ... "continued to enjoy the confidence of Nicholas II."

It is also known about Rear Admiral Abaza that after the war the sovereign gave him money to liquidate their East Asian Company (also, by the way, a costly operation: debts, obligations, lawsuits ...). But the company was legally properly liquidated and was never ...

At the Commission of 1906, created to clarify the involvement of the Korean activities of the "East Asiatic Company" in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Abaza answered. He said that the partnership was "a legal fiction created to disguise a state affair under the guise of a private enterprise" - he refused to answer some of the questions, referring to the fact that they affect "the interests of third parties." That is, the bezobrazovtsy, speaking in the current "purely concrete" terms, but also smeared the king. Nobody was punished. not only divorced

The loss of the war, the revolution are not all the consequences of this clouding of the public mind, which has been reverberating for decades. Even the prominent military theorist General Svechin (author of The Evolution of Military Art) in one of his works mentions the Bezobrazovskaya concession as a military element, an "additional barrier", an additional communication line between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. That is, like Lieutenant Kizhe, a fiction, a corruption hole, a "cutting scheme" (as they say in today's newspapers), which played no role other than provoking the Japanese, falls on a par with the forts and batteries of Port Arthur.

And yet I cannot evade the final, "loopback" thought experiment. Imagine Rear Admiral Abaza, or

Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich, or even Bezobrazov - not in Argentina, Paris and Switzerland, respectively, but on the bridge of the Varyag, on his "last parade" that had come ...

And the whole Russian emotional history, and even dry statistics suggest that, most likely, they would have turned out to be heroes among other heroes. Yes, that's how it is with us: now - "grab Fomka, that's what the fair is for!", Then - "... we will drink, we will walk, and death will come - we will die!".

Our people "direction" must be given.

".. ,the last parade is coming"

So the Varyag was not the "best", but the bravest cruiser in the world. R. M. Melnikov in the book "Cruiser" Varyag "" fixes more than 50-fold superiority in guns of the Japanese squadron: 8 destroyers, 2 armored and 3 armored cruisers. There was no such battle in world history.

"We saluted the heroes who so proudly marched to certain death" - a report from the captain of the French cruiser. On the ships of all the astonished neutrals, teams were formed and during the passage of the Varyag they played the Russian anthem ...

Not counting on a happy ending to the battle, they burned all the ciphers, secret orders and maps on the cruiser. They decided to keep the logbook until the last moment.

In the already mentioned preface (1983 edition - not yet "black" times!) Melnikov also exposes historians who write about "skillful maneuvers of the Varyag". At the exit from the "bottleneck" of Chemulpo, the Varyag had no option but to become under fire from the Japanese squadron. And the gunners on the bare deck - only fall under a hail of fragments, but still fire. Today's stories - I looked through - say nothing about Japanese losses. Melnikov and Soviet historians testify: a Japanese destroyer was sunk, but ... sunk by the fire of the old gunboat "Koreets"! Its 203 mm guns were more powerful than the Varangian 152 mm ones. Plus, new items: there were no optical sights on the Varyag and cruisers of that period, aiming followed the instructions of rangefinder stations, both of which were destroyed at the beginning of the battle. In Melnikov's book, in addition to detailed diagrams, diagrams, drawings of the cruiser, there is also a brief honest comment: "The optical tubes of sights depicted in the famous painting by P. Maltsev "Cruiser Varyag" are the result of the artist's delusion."

The German military historian Count Reventlov wrote about the Varyag and the battle: "The most disastrous consequences come from the complete insecurity of artillery and personnel."

Our participant in the battle stated: "It was especially bitter to look at the broken gear sectors of the lifting mechanisms 152-

mm guns. As follows from the description, they also broke from fragments on a bare deck, but also on their own due to St. Petersburg design errors.

Only people survived. Senior gunner Kuzma Khvatkov left the infirmary on the eve of the battle. Freelancers - musicians Ernest Tseikh and Vladimir Antonov, bartender Fyodor Plakhotin, cook Akim Krishtofenko - did not want to stay on the shore. In battle, they became orderlies. On the burning wooden deck, the wounded gunners refused to leave for dressing...

It is extremely fair: of all the possible kinds of art, the Song became the best monument to the Varyag! The ideal image, corresponding to their pure, "pure" heroism.

And the texture of a painting, for example, a sculpture or - with which this plot began - glued models, perhaps, will divert thoughts in the direction of all of the above ... "disgrace". But let's think about it: if giving the cruiser a "decent look" in pictures and stories, that very drawing of armored towers is the result of the careful instructions of new generations of "educators and organizers", then this deed of them will be akin to the deeds of those who deprived them of the Varyag for real.

All the costs of the Petrine reforms (see the obsessive disputes between the "Westerners" and the "Slavophiles") - this, in fact, was the payment for the "European army".

That is why, before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Commander-in-Chief Kuropatkin believed that in Manchuria it would be necessary to put up about 100 Russian soldiers against 150 Japanese (1: 1.5). Vannovsky argued with him, arguing that a ratio of 1: 2 was completely sufficient for victory. (Vannovsky is just one of the heroes of that newspaper memoir war that Count Witte prevented from taking Tokyo.)

That is why, in the end, the battle of Liaoyang (170 thousand Russians lost to 130 thousand Japanese), the battle on the Shah River (approximately a draw, Russians 270 thousand, Japanese 170 thousand!) And, finally, the largest battle at Mukden (350 thousand Russians lost to 300 thousand Japanese) were perceived by us and the whole world as a blow to the position that Russia had occupied for 200 years as a loss of advantage against, as our ambassador Spafari wrote, "Asian peoples."

It is interesting to think about such a "coincidence". Nicholas II, as you know, was very fond of the era of Alexei Mikhailovich, he himself dressed up with the queen, and forced his ministers to wear costumes from the era of the first Romanovs. I am sure: the name given to the Tsarevich is from the same historical series. Probably, he sincerely dreamed of being "The Quietest" ... And,

it turns out that he returned the army in the Russo-Japanese War to the pre-Petrine era! That is, he made senseless including all Peter's and subsequent victims.

The awareness (for the majority, perhaps intuitively) of this fact was the deepest cause of the subsequent First Russian Revolution,

the write-off of which only on the dissatisfaction of the workers with their rations, on the omnipotence of the Jewish-banking Masonic conspirators - is also a humiliation of the nation, already "from the other side."

And only Khalkhin Gol returned to Russia - for the first time after Mukden! - its "European position", when Georgy Zhukov with 57,000 attacked and defeated the Japanese Ryuhei Ogisa with 76,000 soldiers. (I calculated on the calculator, it turns out the aspect ratio is 1: 1.33.)

Chapter 25

The end of the Russo-Japanese War is somewhat similar to its beginning - the same "ugliness on the march." There is a simple chain of facts

Extract from the journal of the military meeting under the personal chairmanship of His Imperial Majesty on May 24, 1905 in Tsarskoye Selo:

"The Sovereign Emperor opened the meeting and informed the members of the meeting that he had made a request to the commander-in-chief about how the loss of our fleet (Tsushima. - I. Sh.) affected the mood of the army and what changes it should cause in the further actions of the army. On this occasion, two telegrams were received from the Commander-in-Chief, which were sent to the members of the meeting the day before. His Majesty proposed the following four questions for discussion:

1. Is it possible to satisfy, given the current internal situation in Russia, the requirements that the commander-in-chief sets for the success of our army's operations against the Japanese?
2. Does the available combat means make it possible to prevent the Japanese from occupying Sakhalin, the mouth of the Amur and Kamchatka in the near future?
3. What result can the success of our army in northern Manchuria give when making peace if Sakhalin, the mouth of the Amur and Kamchatka are occupied by the Japanese?
4. Should an immediate attempt be made to conclude peace?

... Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich (Commander-in-Chief of the St. Petersburg Military District and the Guards): "... One cannot be sure of unconditional success on our part. If we are destined to endure another blow, then the conditions of peace may then turn out to be so difficult that not a single Russian will want to accept them ... Vladivostok is provided with food for 15 months; in all likelihood, he can hold out for a long time, as the governor said, about 3 months ... We do not know what conditions can be set for us for peace; perhaps the most difficult ones, on which it will not be possible to agree. But Russia cannot disappear, wipe it off the face

land is not allowed; it will always remain unshakable; Russia will always be Russia, I believe in it, I deeply believe that it will come out of this difficult situation in which it finds itself, perhaps with a new victim, but this should not frighten us. Russia will always remain a great power."

Minister of War (General Sakharov) (quoting intelligence received through a military agent about Tokyo's intentions): "... It goes without saying that Japan's claims increased greatly after the Mukden battle. Here is what one might think of these claims:

1. The cession to Japan of the entire Russian region on the Liaodong Peninsula, and, however, they are very afraid of the protest of the powers on this matter.
2. The establishment of the Chinese administration in the rest of Manchuria, which is opened for world trade, on the condition of: a) leaving the Japanese garrison at some points, content at the expense of China, 6) transferring all the mineral wealth of the region to Japan for use, and c) granting Japan the right to continue in Manchuria railroad from Korea.
3. Payment of monetary indemnity equal to the sum of all external and internal loans concluded during the war, which will amount to about 600-700 million yen by May of this year.

In the spring, the Japanese will probably undertake an expedition against Sakhalin, since public opinion and the deputies demand the return of this island to Japan ... With regard to Vladivostok, the Japanese will probably demand that it be turned into a commercial port, with the demolition of the fortifications, with the closure of the military admiralty and with the transfer of all military courts of Japan. It must be assumed, however, that this demand is unlikely to be made by Japan if the peace talks begin before the actions against Vladivostok yield any tangible results.

Finally, Japan may agree to a truce, but, for this, it will probably require the return of the 2nd squadron to Europe and the withdrawal of the ground army beyond Harbin, perhaps even in Transbaikalia ...

(After finishing quoting intelligence, the Minister of War gives his assessment.)
Much of what was stated in this letter from Tokyo has now lost its meaning; nevertheless, some considerations, it seems to me, are not without interest ... "

General Grodekov: "We could deliver four corps by October 1, but the Japanese will not expect this. General Linevich and the army, as is clear from the telegram of the commander-in-chief, are in a depressed mood; after the loss of the fleet, the situation is difficult for them. I agree with the opinion of Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich that as long as the army is intact, we must hurry to find out the conditions for peace. We must not forget that there is very little food on Sakhalin and Nikolaevsk,

and with the supposed strengthening of local units (Sakhalin by 6,000 and Nikolaevsk by 5,000), the food problem will become even more difficult.

Sakhalin is in a critical situation, the sea is in the power of Japan ... Now, while we have the strength in our fist, we should take advantage of this and start probing peaceful conditions."

Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich (Admiral General): "I will not allow myself to enter into considerations regarding the ground forces, but I must say that if the war continues, the situation in Vladivostok, the mouth of the Amur and Kamchatka will be very dangerous; there is no doubt that the Japanese will turn all their attention there, and the position of the army will be difficult, since it will not be able to help. Minko cannot be taken into account. Until a decisive blow is dealt to us, we must probe the ground regarding the conditions of peace. The southern part of Sakhalin with fisheries could be ceded if necessary.

Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich: "Of course, the conditions of peace can be too difficult, unacceptable; therefore, without wasting time, we must now begin to test the ground for negotiations."

Adjutant General Baron Fredericks (Minister of the Imperial Court): "The immediate start of peace negotiations should have a favorable effect on the internal situation of the country and will certainly facilitate mobilization ..."

Adjutant General Admiral Dubasov (member of the State Council): "Despite heavy defeats on land and especially at sea, Russia is not defeated ... As for Vladivostok, it is not difficult to take it from the sea, and it is probably not more than three months will last; but despite this, the war must be continued, since in the end we can and must return everything taken by the enemy ... To ensure the success of our army, we must immediately begin laying the second track and streamline our water communications. (Important recognition of the logistical war. - I. Sh.) I am sure that after the last defeats, the peace conditions proposed by Japan will be extremely painful, and therefore, in my deep conviction, in order to change these conditions in our favor,

it is necessary to continue the fight until the enemy is completely defeated.”

Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich: “With all my heart I share the innermost feelings expressed by Admiral Dubasov, but I believe that we are in such a position that we are all confused; we cannot continue to live like this. We will all die willingly and with joy, but it is necessary that this be useful for Russia. We must confess that we went too far in our rush to Port Arthur and Kwantung; we hurried; not knowing the ford, we plunged into the water ... now we are in such, if not desperate, then a difficult situation, that internal well-being is more important to us than victories. An immediate attempt must be made to ascertain the terms of peace. WITH

With deep conviction, with all my heart devoted to Your Majesty and Russia, I repeat that we must immediately begin negotiations on peace, and if the conditions are unacceptable, then we will all go to the ranks of the troops to die for Your Majesty and Russia. Of the two troubles, you must choose the lesser. We live in an abnormal state, it is necessary to return the inner peace of Russia.”

The Sovereign Emperor expressed his full agreement with what was said

grand duke opinion.

General Roop (member of the State Council, commander of the troops of the Odessa military district): “I cannot agree to immediately ask for peace. An attempt to propose peaceful conditions is already a consciousness of impotence. The answer will be too painful. The conclusion of peace would be a great happiness for Russia, it is necessary, but one cannot ask for it. We must show the enemy our readiness to continue the war, and when the Japanese see this, peace conditions will be easier.”

Sovereign Emperor: “Until now, the Japanese fought not on our territory. Not a single Japanese has yet set foot on Russian soil, and not one inch of Russian land has yet been ceded to the enemy. But tomorrow this may change, because, in the absence of a fleet, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Vladivostok can be taken, and then it will be much more difficult and harder to start peace negotiations.

Adjutant General Alekseev (deputy in the Far East): “.... To inquire about the ground for peace negotiations and find out possible conditions does not mean asking for peace. Japan understands that she must reckon with Russia in the future, and she herself will meet halfway; The Sipingai positions do not provide us, and if another test is destined, if we do not hold them, then what will happen?

Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich: “I can offer to go not to shame, not to insult or humiliation, but to an attempt to find out under what conditions we could talk about ending the bloody war. If they prove unacceptable, we will continue to fight, and not continue the attempt we started.”

General Roop: "In the question of peace and war, the opinion of the people must be taken into account. A war can only be successful when there is national unanimity, as in this case now among the Japanese ... If Japan knows that Russia is looking for peace, then, of course, its conditions will be so painful for Russia that they will be unacceptable, and we will only suffer humiliation."

War Minister Sakharov: "Under the current conditions, it is impossible to end the war. With our complete defeat, not having a single victory or even a successful business, this is a shame. This will drop the prestige of Russia and remove it from the great powers for a long time. It is necessary to continue the war not because of material benefits, but in order to wash away this stain, which

will remain if we do not have the slightest success, as it has been until now."

Adjutant General Baron Fredericks: "... With all my heart I share the opinion of the Minister of War that it is now impossible to conclude peace, but to find out on what terms the Japanese would now be ready to end the war, in my deep conviction, should be."

Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich: "I quite - like any military man, I am sure of this - understand the Minister of War. We need success. But until now we have been mistaken in our calculations and hopes, and at the most critical moments these hopes were torn, and we did not have a single success.

Adjutant General Gripenberg (former commander of the 2nd Manchurian Army): "Your Imperial Majesty, there was success under Sandepa, but we were ordered to retreat, and the Japanese were in a critical situation: they considered the battle lost and were extremely surprised that we retreated."

Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich: "We have not yet given the enemy a single inch of Russian land. We must continue to send troops. Peace talks do not oblige us to anything, and we have quite enough forces for a defensive war."

Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich: "Negotiations on the possibility of peace must be conducted in secret."

Adjutant General Dubasov: "Whatever the terms of the peace, they will still be too difficult for the prestige of Russia. It will be a defeat that will reverberate on the future of Russia like a serious illness..."

This Tsarskoye Selo meeting is a fact, although not very advertised in history. More information about the text can be found in the book "Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905" by V. and L. Shatsillo (M., 2004). Or in a more accessible book "Russia and Japan. Knots of contradictions»

A. Koshkina (series "Natalia Narochinskaya presents ..." M.: Veche, 2010).

But that's not all. On June 24, just on the day of that "talk show" in Tsarskoye Selo, the Japanese landed troops in southern Sakhalin, and on July 11 - in the north (near the Aleksandrovsky post). The Haraguchi division is active: 14,000 soldiers and officers. Soon ours did not have ammunition, food, the Sakhalin garrison surrendered. Japanese losses: 70 people. Separate battles and skirmishes between Russian detachments and partisans continued until July 16. Imagine all the tragedy: in Tsarskoye Selo, the emperor and the participants in the meeting several times conjure each other: "For now, the war is not on Russian territory, in Manchuria.

already on Not an inch and it is precisely at these hours that the fighting begins yet ... , Russian Sakhalin. Three weeks later - capitulation.

A. Koshkin "Russia and Japan. Knots of Contradictions, p. 117:

"Having received the American ambassador on August 23, Nikolai finally agreed to take into account Roosevelt's proposal and, for the sake of establishing peace, sacrifice half of Sakhalin Island, which belonged to Russia. In a telegram sent to Witte on August 12, it was reported: "... the Sovereign Emperor ... is ready to cede the southern half of Sakhalin, but in no case agrees to redeem the northern half, because, according to him, every good fellow will understand that this is an indemnity" »

The fears of the king "every fellow will understand" are very characteristic. How is Famusov, in the final exclaimed: "Ah! My God! what will Princess Marya Aleksevna say!

That's why I compared that Tsarskoye Selo Council with a talk show. Other decisions were made in much the same way. Sending a squadron to Tsushima is completely a vaudeville with dressing up, Niki changed his mind three times, almost wrapping and turning Admiral Rozhdestvensky almost on the roadstead, and as a result, all arguments about the unpreparedness and hopelessness of the expedition were outweighed by "public opinion". Not without symbols: Tsushima took place on May 14 on the day of Khodynka, the squadron died, but it was the battleship Emperor Nicholas 1 (the role of its namesake in the Crimean War has already been mentioned) that was among those who surrendered, served under the Japanese flag, was subsequently used and died like a target.

So, the leading Russian diplomats, at various times the Foreign Ministers Muravyov, Izvolsky and Nelidov, refuse to go to Portsmouth. But Izvolsky at least decided to convey to the sovereign an unpleasant fact: "the only one who could be given such a difficult assignment is Witte."

1) The king understands the humiliation of this personally for himself. Reject all demands, warnings of Witte, dismiss him, choose Bezobrazov as a guide, get a war and lose. And now ask Witte

eliminate the consequences. The Tsar is probing the soil through Count Lamsdorf as a person close to Sergei Witte: will he refuse to go to Portsmouth?

2) Witte agreed. The king thanks, setting difficult conditions: "he cannot allow even one penny of indemnity, nor the concession of a single inch of land."

3) Witte carries out the most difficult mission. There are no contributions. He, Witte, does not cede land, however, from what the military has already conceded, he does not return everything. For which he receives the nickname "Count Semi-Sakhalinsky."

4) And after all, there are generals, specialists in fist-post-flailing, and they claim that they could have won ... if not for Witte and his world.

And even today, some stubbornly voice this ungrateful and ignoble position, believing that by doing so they somehow "serve the king." For illustration, one can take from dozens of possible articles by S. Brezkun "Shame on Portsmouth and Sakhalin - Karafuto". A big burden - such disputes. The dismissed Witte was not even close when the tsar and the military decided to end the war. Or would they like: "no peace, no war, but disband the army"? By the way, this will also happen, but later, in 13 years, in Brest-Litovsk, it seems. When their work with the empire reached its logical end.

There is a description of the Portsmouth negotiations in the memoirs of Admiral Rusin, who was appointed by the emperor to Portsmouth as a naval delegate. And also: a little bit "looking after Witte", a little bit, maybe even "in contrast to Witte", those familiar with the true "personnel policy" of Nikolai will no longer laugh. One way or another, Rusin, then only a captain of the 2nd rank (lieutenant colonel), had a long audience with the emperor. He recalls:

"To the Sovereign ... I expressed my personal opinion: 1. The army does not count on peace. 2. The mood in the army is cheerful. 3. Replenishment, which followed from Russia to Manchuria and which I met along the way, went to war with a light heart, with songs, cheerfully. This reminded me of 1870, when I was traveling from Warsaw to St. Petersburg and met trains with German reserve ranks (Landwehr), who lived in Russia and went to Germany, to the war, with noisy fun and songs ...

At my last phrase, the Sovereign smiled and said: "Well, it's unlikely that you remember this very well." I objected that I was then in my ninth year ... "

Do you understand the tragedy of history? The boy is also comforted. I didn't obey my uncle, I went to play with hooligans, now I have to pay and ask to "make amends" for the same uncle. The commander and the General Staff - those who lead the warrior, ask to make peace, but through the tears a ray of hope flashed, the captain arrived 2

rank (there is no longer a fleet) and says that he heard peppy songs on the Trans-Siberian Railway ... And the Japanese (supported by the USA, Britain and world banking) demand for peace - the Far East ... And in the Far East, in the Ussuri Cossack army, has been living for 20 years the family of my great-great-grandfather Nikolai Shumeyko, my great-grandfather Timofey Shumeyko has already turned 20 years old ...

However, captain of the 2nd rank Rusin, sent by Nikolai to look after Witte, is an honest and sincere man, here are his testimonies:

"The first commissioner was S. Yu. Witte, the second was our ambassador to America, Baron Rosen, who had previously been envoy to Japan for two years ... Baron Rosen himself came to find out about our army in

Manchuria. I repeated what I reported on my presentation to the Sovereign. Baron Rosen stood up, hugged me and said: Well, thank God, even though you are not in a panic and do not want "peace at any cost, at any cost!" Colonel of the General Staff Samoilov was a supporter of peace at any cost, who was our military agent in Tokyo before the war. He was with Gen. Yermolov, our military agent in London, a representative at the conference of the Ministry of War ... S. Yu. Witte was inclined, apparently, to the views of the regiment. Samoilova. On the evening of my arrival in Portsmouth, he gathered all the members of our delegation at his place and asked me to express my opinion on our military situation in Manchuria ... I gave my opinion, based on my three points mentioned When I finished,

S. Yu. Witte said: All this is very interesting, but this is only your personal opinion, and not the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, on which we could be based in our debate with the Japanese.

S. Yu. Witte, noticeable to me, stayed closer to Samoilov than to me, sometimes inviting him for an intimate walk with him, but never me. Nevertheless ... I have the impression that S.Yu. kept himself and conducted the whole matter of negotiations with surprising talent: it is unlikely that anyone else in his place could have better negotiated peace. When we arrived in America, American public opinion and the press were entirely on the side of the Japanese, praising them and defending their interests. Therefore, perhaps, fearing to lose their privileged position, the Japanese asked, at the beginning of negotiations, not to inform the press of any information about the progress of the negotiations. It was impossible to completely isolate yourself from the press, especially in a country like the United States.

Thank you, Captain Rusin, for your honesty. Now a word to Witte, the creator of the great diplomatic victory:

"From the very beginning, I suggested that all negotiations be available to the press ... Everything that I will say, I am ready to shout to the whole world, I, as an authorized Russian tsar, have no ulterior motives and secrets. Of course, I understood that the Japanese would not agree to this, nevertheless, my offer and the refusal of the Japanese immediately became known to the press ...

During the journey across the ocean, having thought over a lot, I settled on the following behavior: 1) not to show in any way that we want peace, to behave in such a way as to give the impression that if the sovereign agreed to negotiations, it was only because of the general desire of almost all countries, that the war be stopped; 2) to behave as befits a representative of Russia, i.e., a representative of the greatest empire, which has had a little trouble; 3) bearing in mind the enormous role of the press in America, to behave in a particularly considerate and accessible manner to all its representatives; 4) to attract the population in America, which is extremely democratic,

to behave with him quite simply, without any swagger and completely democratic; 5) in view of the significant influence of the Jews, especially in New York and in the American press in general, not to treat them with hostility, which, however, was completely consistent with my views on the Jewish question in general.

Well, we have reached the main point. Indeed, there was so much criticism of the emperor, Bezobrazov, and not a word about the world Jewish-banking conspiracy. Here is the testimony of the Russian ambassador to the United States, Cassini:

"By a secret telegram dated March 17 (1905), I notified the imperial ministry of the enormous success of the last Japanese loan of \$150 million, placed ... equally in England and the United States. A group of New York bankers headed by the Jewish house Kuhn, Loeb & Co., who undertook the issuance of 775 million, spared no effort to attract the local public to the widest possible participation in the subscription ... The result exceeded the wildest expectations of the Japanese and their friends, and the subscription in the United States alone reached 500 million dollars, that is, almost a billion rubles.

Aya would also remind the bankers Schiff and Zhivotovsky, and the fact that their money for the Russian Revolution gave even more returns than money for the Japanese army. The solidarity and power of the American Jewish, British Jewish bankers is an established fact, as are their anti-Russian views. But Witte ousted about 140 Jewish families from Russia in a way in which the Jews themselves, in general, had no complaints against him. He took from them tavern, Shinkar, vodka money. State income from the "state sale of drinks" after Witte's great reform - 285 million rubles (24% of the country's budget).

And some fool who threw a stone at the watchmaker Abrashka or the junk dealer Izya ... - "<... just because ... you can get to Rothschild!", and dragged with his stupid smile through all the newspapers (and actually multiplied that Jewish solidarity), it turns out that he is "a real fighter against the Schiffs and Kuns", a living example and reproach to Yulievich Witte ...

Bezobrazov, the offended child Nikolai, the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Japanese War, the revolution, the collapse of the Russian Empire - all this breathes in one ball to this day. As, for example, he writes about the then problems of Russia, possible victories in Manchuria and the Portsmouth world

S. Brezkun (multiply by 100 or more similar articles): "Alas, Tsar Nicholas listened not to Russia, but to advisers like Roosevelt and Witte ..."

The author of the book "Nikolai P", more precisely, the historical popular print A. Bokhanov writes that only the firm position of the tsar, having overpowered Witte's pliability, made it possible to conclude peace with minimal losses.

The complete incompatibility with reality of the version ("the firmness of the king") of the authors Bokhanov, Multatuli and others is clearly visible even from a simple fact. The tsar, who had already asked Nelidov, Izvolsky, Muravyov to go to Portsmouth, those with whom he was more comfortable talking, giving instructions, while others were discussing the real Portsmouth candidacy ... writes in his diary: "If only not Witte!" Well, just a naughty child, quietly praying: "Just don't whip!"

According to Nikolaev's logic, the maid of honor Vyubova would probably be an ideal candidate for Portsmouth: she would not stand before Nikolai as a living reproach for his Bezobrazov, for his admiral Abaza, for his unleashed Japanese war, for the bastard uncle Alekseev, for the capitulator Stessel, for Kuropatkin, who lost his headquarters at Mukden, for Admiral Nebogatov, who lowered the flag in Tsushima, for ...

But the king was nevertheless told that, from the point of view of the interests of the Empire, a real negotiator was needed ... Let's quote Tarle again:

"Witte agreed, the tsar thanked him in a short conversation and said that he wants to conclude peace, but "cannot allow even a single penny of indemnity, not a single inch of land to be ceded." Witte, however, did not need any guidance; and when Count Lamzdorf asked him if he wanted to keep the "instruction" that was made for Muravyov (who refused to go), Witte gave a curious answer in his own way that it didn't matter to him, since he would not reckon with the instruction anyway, but will use it "insofar as it sees fit." The instruction was drawn up with the participation of Nikolai, who, of course, not only could, but even had to inform about Witte's words. This episode gives us some idea of what, undoubtedly, Nicholas had to endure in general in these days, before Witte's departure for Portsmouth. Generosity, forgiveness and gentleness were not among the virtues of the newly appointed head of the Russian peace delegation... Impatient, easily irritated, poorly educated, self-confident, daring, despising everyone, Witte suddenly again became needed and even inevitable, and again I had to bow to him, then paying for it with him with even greater hatred than before.

In Tarle's work there are also harsher reproaches to Count Witte than "self-confident, not generous", but these reproaches are from

the real world: yes, in a tough form he removed the restless king, went and made peace. The future coryphaeus of Soviet history, Stalin Prize laureate E. Tarle was still an eyewitness of those events, and he remembers well...

"...the colossal impression that this statement of the head of the Russian delegation, amazing in its broadest, unheard-of liberalism, made on the whole world. The casket was opened after the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace, when the results were summed up ... voices were heard that Witte in this case played without any risk: after all, he firmly knew that the Japanese would never agree to negotiate in the presence of the press, and even react to this

as a ridiculous and impossible harassment. After all, Witte himself would never have negotiated under such amazing conditions... The growing sympathy for Russia here can be judged by the newspapers. Many of them, such as, for example, TVE Europe Po3{ and TVEMem/VorkSun, who were considered Japanophiles, completely went over to the side of Russia. It somehow happened by itself... The Americans were also amazed at this. Their conference participant Thomson: It's amazing how Witte managed to change the general situation in three weeks. Now the Japanese are getting along with you, it's obvious, but it was the other way around, and the public opinion of the States is going over to the side of Russia"...

At the very first meeting with the President, Witte announced what concessions he would not make in any case. Roosevelt then wished to frighten Witte in order to persuade him to acquiesce, and declared that with such views of Witte, an agreement with Japan would be impossible ... Witte responded with such a subtle simulation of readiness to actually break off negotiations that Roosevelt was really worried (in this case, threatened was the prestige of the United States as the organizer of the talks, approximately as many years later at Camp David or Dayton. - I. Sh.). Witte played a dangerous game all the time in Portsmouth: he knew that the continuation of the war for Russia was fraught with new and grave catastrophes (he did not at all believe in the boast of some of the military). Thus, it was necessary to pretend that Russia was not at all interested in concluding peace, and at the same time not to pull this string too hard and in no case allow the negotiations to be interrupted in fact.

And another "peace treaty"

Returning from Portsmouth, Witte played a huge role in the adoption of the first Russian Constitution, the Manifesto on October 17, 1905. Here is another reason (not a patronymic, I hope!) of our monarchists' dislike for him. After all, with all the above flashed critical remarks against Tsar Nicholas, we must not forget that the state of Russia created autocracy. This is the respectable reason for the appearance on the walls of today's offices of portraits of that sad man in colonel's uniform.

But what happened to autocracy? For example, I am sure that

destroyed the last king, but I agree that there can be many opinions here. There is one exact similitude on which all must agree: the Treaty of Portsmouth is the Tsar's Constitution Manifesto.

The first to end the Japanese war, the second - the revolution. Even if we ignore the question "Who provoked?", in the end, both there and there - the sole final decision of the sovereign, autocratic at that time. A decision that depended on his assessment of the possibilities of continuing the struggle - with the Japanese, with the revolutionaries. In the first case, Witte was called to help implement the decision of the tsar and the military, during

the second - his, Witte, role, perhaps more: Witte himself offered the tsar this "inner peace of Portsmouth" ... By the way, in the above-cited Meeting in Tsarskoye Selo on May 24, 1905, as can be understood from the dispute between General Roop and the Grand Dukes, the "Zemsky Sobor" was already mentioned with might and main ... However, there is a remarkable correspondence: it is precisely those who shout that Witte prevented the army and the tsar ... from seizing Tokyo, they also believe that the revolution could have been suppressed without losing autocracy.

Chapter 26 Difficulties of transportation

Before a story about the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Russian "geopolitical" structure, the largest railway in the world, one involuntarily feels the need to concentrate, take heart, as at the end of the 20th century Russia itself "concentrated", gathered before one of the most important breakthroughs in its history.

In the text of the book, however, this "gathering" will first look like a five-page digression into a sphere that looks, perhaps, very far away: the Wine Monopoly. The connection between state-owned vodka, "monopolka", and the railway is not only in the fact that one provided financial resources for the other, it is also in a special internal purification, entering into some ... new seriousness of the country and society, without which the great undertakings.

And for today's country, tired and annoyed by the unsuccessful reforms of 1980-1990, this is an opportunity to see what State Success looks like in general. View Successful Reforms in Sectional View. In the book "Russian vodka. 500 years of undiluted history", I, of course, spoke about it in more detail. Here are the most important points.

One of the most significant and successful reforms in the history of Russia took place under Tsar Nicholas II for 8 years. Starting in 1894, in the year of the death of Tsar Alexander III, the reform was carried out as his testament, but Sergei Yulievich Witte began to think about it, to plan it many years before. Tsar Alexander III proposed to Witte's two predecessors as Minister of Finance, well-known, worthy statesmen I. A. Vyshnegradsky and N. Kh.

On June 6, 1894, it was published: "The highest approved regulation on the state sale of drinks."

The whole complexity of the issue

The historical phrase of Tsar Alexander III sounded like this: "I am extremely tormented and embarrassed that a Russian person drinks like that.

Some drastic action must be taken against this drunkenness."

How exactly did a Russian person get drunk?

A tavern, in the western provinces - a tavern. Circle yard, circle... Snacks are prohibited. "Vodka" is made in the backyard of the tavern (raw materials and technology - according to the taste and generosity of the tavern), disgusting quality. To beat off the smell of fuselage - intoxicating herbs, an additional, by the way, "damaging factor" of intoxication. The shag in that bouquet was still an exquisite "flower". For softness, or, as they said then, "drinkability", the main additive was used - sweat, which is very harmful to the heart, and then they got it ...

View of a contemporary: "The dishes are like in a pig sty, the drink is disgusting, the price is demonic." It was called: "Drinking". But there was also a second form of vacation: "Takeaway". Remember? Nikolai Alekseevich Nekrasov, poem "Who should live well in Rus":

On all of you, Mother Rus',

Like a brand on a criminal

Like a brand on a horse,

Two words are scrawled:

"Takeaway and drink."

In the same place, let's see what was behind this "Takeaway":

Did you visit the villages?

Take a bucket of vodka

Let's go to the huts ...

I could cite dozens of special studies, but even more significant is this passing detail, already ingrained in "culture", in poems, highlighted in bold type only in my quotation. Yes, vodka was taken out in pots, ladles, buckets. Can you imagine the pace, way and culture of consuming swill brought in a bucket? Old bottles, "damasks" adorn vodka museums to this day.

BUT ... there was NO mass production of glass bottles in Russia. There is a most expressive, pre-Witte fact: in Russia, at the end of the 20th century, bottles from various Madeiras, Rhine wines,

champagne delivered to Russia under Nicholas!!

Process economics. In the village it is: "Drink in debt." Drink for the next harvest, drink away a cow, horse, harness, scythe, ax ... Taverns,

more than 140,000 families, by the time of the reform, Witte appropriated a significant part of the income. Such part-time workers: "bartender", he is also a buyer of stolen goods, a racketeer, a debt bailer, etc.

The tavern keeper drinks, pours in debt, then exacts - he takes a cow, a horse out of the yard. One can imagine what this means for a peasant family... Peasants periodically set fire to taverns, kill tavern-keepers - social clusters of anger. But there was another legacy: the innkeeper and the client often belonged to different nations.

The results of the study of the Palen Commission:

"Jews maintained 27% of all distilleries in European Russia, and 53% in the Pale of Settlement. Including: in the Podolsk province
— 83%, in Grodno - 76%, in Kherson - 72%.

There are 41% of breweries in European Russia, and 71% in the Pale of Settlement. Including: in Minsk province - 94%, in Vilna
— 91%, in Grodno - 85%.

The share of the Jewish drinking trade, that is, "points for the preparation and sale of drinks" maintained by Jews: in European Russia - 29%, in the Pale of Settlement - 61%. Including: in Grodno province - 95%, in Mogilev - 93%, in Minsk - 91% ">.

There is absolutely no place for lengthy self-justifications by the authors, but believe me, the books where I considered this issue in much more detail were read, reviewed, including by critics of Jewish nationality, their verdict: there is no anti-Semitism in those statements. Not only churches, but also taverns and taverns were rented out to Jews. So put the "national question" on the balance sheet of the Reform as well...

The income of the drinking industry, which until 1896 paid an excise tax of "4 kopecks per degree of alcohol smoked," significantly exceeded the income of the Empire.

With all this, Russia was by no means the leader in alcohol, respectfully skipping ahead in terms of average per capita consumption of eight

countries of the world, including France, Germany, Italy, Sweden. But not the quantity, but the quality of consumption made "vodka" one of the main state problems. The reforms began with the involvement of the best scientific forces in Russia. Within the framework of the "Great Reform", the first scientists of the country were engaged in the physiological side of the matter. The commission included: V. M. Bekhterev, Erisman, N. E. Vvedensky, A. Ya. Danilevsky. Their analysis "sentenced" not alcohol, but a tavern. The physiologists have already taken over the baton of Mendeleev, whose work on mixing and purifying alcohols created that famous Russian standard, on the basis of which state vodka began to be produced.

"monopoly".

The country was divided into 4 large parts - 4 stages of the introduction of the "Treasury sale of drinks" - depending on the historical, national characteristics of the region. Moscow's turn, by the way, was almost the last.

Across the country, "State-owned wine warehouses" (as the current distilleries were called then) were created, about 150 in total, all according to a single plan, in the same style. And despite even the blows of war times - for example, the Moscow plant, the current Kristall, St. Petersburg Liviz were subjected to heavy bombing - these plants still operate to this day.

Do not forget the "allied companies" - Russia has rapidly developed the production of glass containers almost from scratch. And again, the Great Reformation provided an example of inspiring cooperation between representatives of many professions and creative "castes". The design of the bottles was developed by Fedor Shekhtel himself! The labels were drawn by Bilibin, Lansere, Benois, Korovin, Vrubel, Apsid.

The reform "Treasury sale of drinks" replaced the "monopoly", abolished the same "production" in the backyards of taverns. BUT ... real, solid private producers: Smirnov, Beckman, Shustov - received state licenses. And as the state "monopoly" improved quality, logistics, increased volumes (and therefore reduced overhead costs), these firms began to slowly close. Healthy, legal process, competition - no "attacks", "masks-shows".

And as part of this titanic production work, a state program was launched to curb the extremes of drunkenness. In taverns - a decent appearance, dishes, a mandatory assortment of snacks and hot dishes, brochures of the All-Russian Society of Sobriety were laid out, a gramophone was required. I even saw the "Minimum List of Gramophone Records" in some document attached to the Regulations that introduced a new order in Russia.

Echoes of that storm were noticed even in America. Deprived of income and their only craft, the shinkars of the Western Territory gave such a surge in emigration against the average levels of previous years that articles and letters rained down from the United States: "Judging by the surge in emigration, there must be a wild outbreak of anti-Semitism in Russia. Accept

measures".

Of course, it is not an easy task to remove 140-150 thousand families from the feeder. But... NO, there is absolutely NO limit to the cynicism of the Russian demagogue! Pulling their pockets to the knee with figs to the state (plus bribes in various forms), they rushed to denounce "... the state that solders its people", "... drunken budgets" ... And when this money went to the tavern keeper for sivukha, vinegar, it was ok. But all the same, such evidence also made its way: "Thank you, Tsar, that having All invented Tsyumarnopolty, through it I

20 karboventsiv left for the winter" ("Life and Art" magazine, Kyiv).

And finally, the phenomenal financial success of the state. Vodka began to give 24% of the country's budget.

The income from the "Treasury sale of drinks" amounted to 285 million rubles, while direct taxes from the population - 98 million rubles ...

This is how Russia "concentrated" at the end of the 20th century, clearing itself, becoming more serious, and raising funds for its greatest construction project.

Witte wrote in his memoirs, and Russia knew it: Tsar Alexander S. bequeathed to him to carry out these Great deeds. And we can say: Alexander S. backfired" with a whole series of 100th anniversaries. Railway workers celebrated the centenary of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway, financiers celebrated the "Golden Ruble", Witte's financial reform, which created one of the hardest currencies of that time. Commercial schools, border guards in Russia also did not exist "before Count Witte."

Difficulties of transportation

Of course, it is naive to hope to introduce in Russia the Cult of the Cause, the Cult of the Fact with one book, but it is also impossible to evade this mission. Siberia and the Far East have become the best training ground for Russian activists and ascetics. Along with Poyarkov, Khabarov, Nevelsky, Muravyov-Amursky, Chikhachev, the figure of the creator of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Count Witte, will help to discern something in the objects of his work - the country, society.

It seems that our perception of the results of his great work was also influenced by ... the figure of Stolypin. Moreover, Pyotr Arkadyevich himself is not in the least to blame for this, you will hardly find criticism of the Witte reforms in him (and he carried out the peasant, the abolition of the community, on a turn-key basis). My hypothesis is as follows: a certain pairwise nature of our perception is to blame. An educational stamp, sort of. Pairs are thrown in: Pushkin - Lermontov, Tolstoy - Dostoevsky,

Suvorov - Kutuzov... Witte - Stolypin. And in this stable pareu of the martyr Stolypin there will always be an advantage. Plus the sound of the name...

It turns out interesting: evil tongues whispered to the unfortunate son of Alexander III that "Stolyshin obscures him", but in fact, on the field of Russian history, Pyotr Arkadyevich obscured his predecessor, Count Witte. But here already without any irony: the human appearance of Stolypin is much more solid, more attractive. And Count Witte had a complex character, sometimes defiant behavior ... One canonical phrase accompanies the count

for almost 120 years: "He was bad for everyone. Good only for the dear fatherland and the women whom he loved ... "

What can we understand in ourselves by looking at it? Here is an example of humor at the turn of the 20th century: the border guards established by Count Witte were for a long time called the "Matilda Rifles". No, Matilda Lisanevich, Witte's second wife, did not interfere in his affairs, it was just that the then society lived from scandal to scandal. The story, when Witte redeemed Matilda Ivanovna, paid her husband 10,000 rubles for permission to divorce, so impressed the "high society and circles around the world" that Witte began to be perceived and discussed mainly as "Matilda's husband."

To think about it is a nightmarish, but also a symbolic picture: a man drags Russia into the 20th century "by the ears", fulfills great plans

Alexandra PT, introduces a new tariff that protects Russian industry ... A side effect of the tariff: smuggling has intensified - it introduces border protection ... But society, the flat-bottomed press, is all the same: "Matildine arrows ...". In general, after all this, it's somehow easy for me to imagine those "high society ladies ... thinkers of the Silver Age" reading, say, "Megapolis Express" or watching the TV show "Scandals. Intrigue. Investigations".

As Schopenhauer remarked, "For a lackey there is no Hero."

Brief biography

Sergei Yulievich was born in 1849. The Dutch Witte family moved to the Baltic states during the reign of the Swedes. That is, Witte, being, as already noted, "bequeathed" by Alexander III to his son Nikolai, it turns out that he was also in some way "conquered by Peter 1". Witte is a rather popular surname in Germany and Holland, which was worn by famous sailors, lawyers, painters, and scientists. It comes from witte (otherwise witten) and from the Lower Saxon and - white - a small copper, originally silver coin that was in circulation until the end of the 18th century in Northern Germany, Denmark and Sweden.

It is a pity that researchers have not yet paid attention to this small, but resonant fact of history - what would be the aphorism: "The Russian gold ruble is made from a Dutch silver coin."

Witte received hereditary nobility in 1856. Orthodox. Father, Julius Fedorovich Witte, a member of the council of the Caucasian governor, is married to Ekaterina Andreevna Fadeeva, daughter of the Saratov governor, sister of the famous writer, Major General R. A. Fadeev. Witte's cousins are the founder of the Theosophical Society, Helena Blavatsky, and the writer Vera Petrovna Zhelikhovskaya.

Sergei studied at the First Chisinau Russian Gymnasium. In 1870 he graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the Novorossiysk University (Odessa) with a PhD in Physics and Mathematics. Due to financial difficulties in the family, he abandoned his scientific career and went to work in the office of the Odessa governor. Further service in the Office of the Odessa Railway. Witte, the head of the road operation, was noted for the effective organization of the transportation of Russian troops during the Russian-Turkish war. He paid great attention to the development and technical equipment of the Odessa port.

In 1879 he married N. A. Spiridonova (nee Ivanenko), the daughter of the Chernigov marshal of the nobility. Before that, in his own words, "knew all the more or less outstanding actresses in Odessa."

His work "Principles of Railway Tariffs for the Transport of Goods" (1883) brought him fame, and is still used to this day. In its second edition, he also touched upon political issues, speaking in favor of a "social" and "classless" monarchy, believing that otherwise "it would cease to exist."

Since 1886, he was the manager of the private "Society of South-Western Railways" (Kyiv). Achieved increased efficiency and profitability. Reorganized rates. His practice of issuing loans against grain cargoes became widespread all over Russia and promoted economic growth.

Acquaintance with the emperor. Sergei Yulievich in the presence

Alexandra III entered into an argument and refused the tsar's adjutants, who demanded that two powerful steam locomotives be sent to disperse the tsar's train. Soon, after the collapse of the royal train in 1888, Alexander III was convinced not only of the correctness, competence, but also of Witte's civil courage - the head of the other railway was afraid to refuse, and the royal family almost died.

On March 10, 1889, Witte was appointed head of the Department of Railway Affairs under the Ministry of Finance. The loss in salary after the transition to the civil service was reimbursed to him personally by the emperor from his own money.

In 1891, a new customs tariff for Russia was adopted, which played a big role in the developing industry. Becoming Minister of Railways in 1892, Witte eliminated chronic accumulations of untransported goods. Carried out reform of railway tariffs.

He accelerated the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In 1896, he held successful negotiations with the Chinese representative Li Hongzhang, at the right time strengthening Russian arguments with a bribe to the mandarin - 500,000 rubles (the amount varies in different sources).

He secured China's consent to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in Manchuria.

The most general, historical result of this: our Far East escaped the fate of cut off Alaska. At the same time, an allied defensive treaty was concluded with China.

Witte carried out the most important monetary reform, providing Russia with a stable currency, the Golden Ruble, from 1897 to 1914. Witte is also Russian commercial educational institutions.

With the active participation of S. Witte, labor legislation was developed, in particular, the law on the limitation of working hours at enterprises (1897).

In October 1898, he turned to Nicholas II with a note in which he called on the tsar to "complete the liberation of the peasants", to make a "person" out of the peasant. He achieved the abolition of mutual responsibility in the community, the corporal punishment of peasants by the verdict of the volost courts, and the simplification of the passport regime for peasants.

Witte is considered "their" by railway workers, financiers, and border guards. I would suggest thinking about "paternity" and ... Russian PR people - I recall his campaign in Portsmouth.

In 1906, in a similar way, with the involvement of public opinion and the press, he successfully negotiated with France, obtaining a much-needed loan in connection with the revolution of 1905-1907.

His great work in the field of Russian drinks was mentioned earlier...

And generally speaking, the lack of a monument to Sergei Yulievich Witte in Russia so far is a kind of social symptom. Inability in the flow of events to separate Cases / Gossip, Accomplishments / Good Wishes. In one generally worthy edition, they somehow refuted me: "Just here they published memoirs ... of such and such. He testifies

what Witte ... and what Witte ... and more about Witte ... "

Yes, and the emperor himself, according to the memoirs of the French ambassador to St. Petersburg, J. M. Paleolog, with whom the ambassador spoke on March 3 (O.S.), agreed that "a large center of intrigue went out with him" (words from Paleolog's telegram to his to the government about Witte's death), and added: "The death of Count Witte was a deep relief for me. I also saw a sign of God in her."

But this is how it turns out: for Nikolai, who was languidly trudging towards the abdication and death, this was exactly a relief. And in general, forgive me for such a comparison, but all 23 years of that reign can be compared with ... such step-by-step relief, sort of like an officer (a colonel, to be precise) unfastens his saber, removes his belt, rips off

epaulettes, pulls off his uniform, and here he stands, already completely lightened, prepared for ...

The steps of his relief, release from the burden of government and life were approximately the following:

1. At the very beginning of the reign. Khodynka. We have already mentioned it.

A great relief, maybe even managed to forget ... This was the first point of parting of Nicholas with Russia. (Plus, of course, the anger of society, the incitement of agitators.)

2. They reported: the workers are going to go to the Winter Palace, with some kind of Gapon and a letter, you see: "personally to the king"! Sit in Tsarskoye Selo, leave the commandant, let him figure it out.

3. Witte's resignation. This is a great relief! Witte, together with the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, too often set him an example of the reign of his father. Maria Feodorovna understood the significance of Witte and therefore was always his supporter.

4. Sending Witte to make amends for the results of the Russo-Japanese War. Witte was preemptively against that war. (See "Ugly".)

According to the results of Mukdenov-Tsushima, the Japanese claim the entire Far East. Witte in Portsmouth showed miracles of resourcefulness. But the nickname "Semi-Sakhalin" received something - Sergei Yulievich. More relief.

5. Stolypin, who "shielded" the monarch, was killed.
b. Count Witte is dead. "...deep relief."

7. Nui - railway station Bottom of the Pskov province. Renunciation. Almost

complete relief.

8. Yekaterinburg...

In general, we are talking here not only about black historical and human ingratitude, but also in general about the ability to single out deeds, results from heaps of historical, memoir waste paper. Witte, by the way, also wrote "Memoirs", the story is well known how Nikolai P on the day of the death of Sergei Yulievich drove the gendarmes: to find, seize, prevent publication! Probably for his very deep relief.

But Sergey Yulievich also had other "Memories" - recorded with the steel of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the CER, the gold of the ruble ... and "monopoly VODKA".

This relevance requires dotting all the 1s - in the case of the man who built the Trans-Siberian Railway and the CER, who stubbornly averted the royal

The Russo-Japanese War, which was Bezobrazovskaya in origin, and then in Portsmouth, who minimized its losses. And on this occasion, a huge number of memoirs have already been published, such as those where the sleepers and rails of the Trans-Siberian are refuted with paper lines. This is the "Arias of the Generals": - Ah, Witte with his "Portsmouth Peace" prevented us ... from capturing Tokyo. That's right, they would have taken ... however, if they had kept Mukden ... The moment of starting that "small victorious war" is generally one of the most nightmarish in Russian history. It is considered in more detail in the chapter "Wars" "in the context" and "step by step" to see: how? by whom? Why? the state machinery breaks down.

Some worthy people, patriots, however, accepted the rules of some game: "To the monarchy", or "To Nicholas II". It seems that for the good of the country, the correct type of its history, the facts should look like this ... But this is how it works in Russia: neither Siberia, nor the Far East, nor anything else - will not stand on untruth for a long time. The history of Witte must be completed, even through the thorns of our days. Next, I will comment a little on the text summarizing many dozens of similar articles and books, for example, Bokhanov. And this one is just taken from the nearest

shelves.

"The Great Encyclopedia of the Russian People" (Vlr: // mii'.gi \$ t5 \$ T.gi)

"Usually, Witte is credited with all the merits in stabilizing the ruble and providing the country with a hard currency by introducing gold circulation, as well as establishing a state monopoly on the sale of alcohol, wine and vodka products. His priority in these matters and merits in their implementation are far from indisputable. Firstly, the introduction of gold money circulation was not the initiative of Witte himself. The monetary reform was secretly prepared by his predecessor I. A. Vyshnegradsky.

As for the state monopoly on the sale of alcohol, the idea of this event did not belong to Witte, but to M. N. Katkov, Witte became only its executor. For 1893-1903 under the leadership of Witte, thousands of state-owned wine warehouses, shops, factories, and special administrative buildings were built.

- Bravo, "Great Encyclopedists"! The idea of monopoly - Katkova! Yes, you should know that "monopoly" is not an "idea" at all, but simply one of the three positions of the toggle switch: "State monopoly - Excise system - Farming system". And the "monopoly-1894", even if, in your opinion, Katkov's, turned out to be the fourth in the history of Russia!

In general, there are many paradoxes here: in the 10th-17th centuries, a wine monopoly was introduced in Russia several times, and it was never canceled during this period! Troubles and crises in themselves knocked this powerful weapon out of the hands of the state. That is, "Tushinsky Thief", Ivan Bolotnikov, Stepan Razin de facto did what the other

a major statesman, Yegor Gaidar, also did de jure (he abolished the state monopoly in 1992).

For various reasons, the toggle switch was flipped 4 times. BUT ... at the end of the 19th century, it turned out to be a thousand times more difficult to do: the increased volume of the economy, the receipt of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus on the balance sheet, where the alcohol issue has been intertwined with the Polish, Jewish for 400 years ...

The following mistake of the "Great Encyclopedists" is also characteristic: "thousands of state-owned wine warehouses, shops ... factories have been built." It was believed, probably, that along with warehouses, shops, there should also be distilleries. But "State-owned wine warehouses" are already on the line - just like I said, then they called the factories. Distillery "Crystal", for example, was then called "Treasury wine warehouse No. 1". And the "Great Encyclopedists", having taken, without knowledge of the matter, "thousands of state-owned wine warehouses, shops ...", they probably thought that there should also be production, and attributed "factories".

17 years of research into Witte's monopoly allow me to assert that his reform is comparable (and akin to) winning a big war.

According to your "encyclopedist" logic, you can similarly "omit" the space contribution of Korolev - Gagarin: After all, Jules Verne also wrote about space flight! (Idea!) Moreover, the next priority will be Mary, the acrobat from the movie "Circus", she also spoke (even sang): about the idea of flying from a cannon to the moon! ..

And the "golden ruble, secretly prepared by Vyshnegradsky" - from the same opera. But 24% of the state budget, wrested from the tavern-keepers and tavern-keepers by the Wittew monopoly, the "tariff war" he won with

Germany, without which the gold ruble would have remained the same "idea" - this is a completely different matter.

Oh, gentlemen "encyclopedists"! However, let's continue reading their article "Witte":

"Witte was a staunch opponent of the community. In 1899, he promoted the adoption of a law on the abolition of mutual responsibility in the community ... Witte is trying to create a mechanism for the "voluntary" transition of peasants from communal to private property ... community. The indignant Sovereign, unexpectedly for Witte, on March 30, 1905, closes the Special Meeting, "the Encyclopedia continues to sneak.

Here, if only to remind the "encyclopedists": who carried out this "anti-communal program"? Tell me, what's his name? - Hundred-ly-pin! The comic effect is that such "private" accusations of Sergei Yulievich are based on a general, "conceptual" opposition:

Witte - Stolypin! As in detective stories: "Evil investigator - good investigator." Further:

"Witte was a talented finance minister. We can agree with the assessment of the book. Meshchersky that to strengthen state power, not a single Russian finance minister did as much as Witte did with his "economic system based on the idea of concentrating all the country's resources in one hand." Under him, the financial system of Russia has become a well-coordinated mechanism."

Here you are right, but who broke this mechanism? Playing the game "Great Tsar Nicholas 11", this question cannot be answered.

"Witte considered himself a follower of F. List, who attracted him with his doctrine of the national economy and protectionism. Witte criticized the economic theory of K. Marx."

Well, this sneak was 25 years late. In 1985, it was still possible to pin it to the "Note to the Central Committee of the CPSU."

Transsib

But turning to the real Affairs of Witte - the Trans-Siberian Railway and the CER, I find that, it turns out, I have almost nothing to add about them.

The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed on October 5, 1916 with the launch of the bridge over the Amur near Khabarovsk and the start of train traffic along

this bridge. Its cost from 1891 to 1913 was 1,455,413,000 rubles.

The length of the highway from Moscow to Vladivostok is 9288.2 km (the longest railway in the world). A regular service was established on July 14, 1903 (using a section of the CER).

In 2002, full electrification was completed. Today, the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway (potential) is 100 million tons of cargo per year. On January 11, 2008, China, Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany signed an agreement on a project to optimize the Beijing-Hamburg freight traffic. As calculated, the main world freight traffic in terms of the cost of transported goods is the line East Asia (Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China) - Europe. And this project, in fact, opens an era when the Trans-Siberian Railway can become the main world road from the main Russian one.

But the nature of my book (conditionally "History" - in a popular presentation) requires such a presentation of the facts of construction ... which I stumbled upon in an absolutely "finished form" when I read a documentary essay by the writer Valentin Grigoryevich Rasputin "Transsib". This part, unfortunately, is not from the first edition of his book.

"Siberia, Siberia..."? awarded the State Prize, and, characteristically, this "Trans-Siberian" essay was published separately in journals, and is included in separate editions of the author

"The beginning of work, the first steps in the construction of the Siberian road, Emperor Alexander III wished to give meaning and a halo to an extraordinary event. Never before in the history of Russia have they undertaken such a cumbersome, expensive and great undertaking, which included both the laying of a path and the resettlement of millions of people from the western regions to the east to fresh lands. Never before has Russia entered into an enthusiastic movement that promised both benefits and an uplifting of the national spirit. If this did not happen, at least there was no rise in the national spirit, then only because both internal and external forces soon pushed Russia into a period of historical misfortunes, which then either could not be expected, or they did not seem inevitable.

On March 17, 1891, followed ... a rescript addressed to the Crown Tsarevich Nikolai Alexandrovich, who arrived in Vladivostok after a sea voyage to Eastern countries:

"I order now to start building a continuous railway through the whole of Siberia, which has (the goal) to connect the abundant gifts of nature in the Siberian regions with a network of internal rail communications. I instruct you to declare such my will, upon entering the Russian land again, after reviewing the foreign countries of the East. At the same time, I entrust you with laying the groundwork in Vladivostok for construction, at the expense of the treasury and by direct order of the government, of the Ussuri section of the Great

Siberian Railroad"...

In 1892, another important event for the Siberian road took place: S. Yu. Witte, a man of enormous, sometimes excessive activity, an ardent supporter of the speedy construction of the highway, was appointed Minister of Finance. Without hesitation, he drew up a construction plan. Even before him, the entire route was divided into six sections, and Witte suggested the sequence of their penetration. The first stage is the design and construction of the West Siberian section from Chelyabinsk to the Ob (1418 kilometers), the Middle Siberian section from the Ob to Irkutsk (1871 kilometers), and the South Ussuriysky section from Vladivostok to the station. Graftskoy (408 kilometers). The second stage included the road from St. Cape on the eastern shore of Lake Baikal to Sretensk on the river. Shilke (1104 kilometers) and the North Ussuri section from Graftskaya to Khabarovsk (361 kilometers). And last but not least, as the most difficult, the Circum-Baikal road from the Baikal station at the source of the Angara to Mysovaya (261 kilometers) and the no less difficult Amur road from Sretensk to Khabarovsk (2130 kilometers) ...

The first crutch at the western end of the Siberian route was entrusted to score a student-trainee of the St. Petersburg Institute of Railways Alexander Liverovsky. How did they manage to discern in the student who did not show himself at that time a bright, large-scale figure,

chivalrous, one of those personalities who enriched and strengthened with their remarkable talent and professional audacity all the many years of construction, all its stages from beginning to end - as they saw, it is incomprehensible to the mind. He, Alexander Vasilyevich Liverovsky, twenty-three years later, in the position of head of the work of the East Amur Road, scored the last, "silver" crutch of the Great Siberian Way ... And he also completed the construction of the unique, 2600 meters, Amur Bridge, the very last structures on the Siberian road, put into operation only in 1916 ...

Nikolai Georgievich Garin-Mikhailovsky was appointed head of survey work on the West Siberian road in 1891. The first surveys were carried out here earlier, he was only required to clarify individual details and give a final conclusion. However, the chosen direction of the route very soon surprised and alerted the engineer Garin-Mikhailovsky. From the Baraba steppe, she was sent to Kolyvan, a rich trading village on the Ob, where she had to cross in the most inappropriate place, where the river used to overflow on both sides to its fullest ... Garin Mikhailovsky set about reconnaissance. Downstream, the Ob became more and more thin and its banks were all swampy. I had to look higher ... and with the help of fishermen and hunters I found crossings, which could not have been better, and I chose the village of Krivoshchekovo as the place to cross the Ob.

Later... he writes in his diary: "On a 160-verst distance, this is the only place where the Ob, as the peasants say, is in a "pipe". At Kolyvan, where it was supposed to draw a line, the flood of the river is twenty miles, and here - four hundred sazhen. The change in the first printing project is my merit, and now I look with pleasure at what is in construction

the line outlined by me has not changed! .. I also look with pleasure at how the settlement called Novaya Derevnnya has grown on the other side. Now it's already a whole town ... ".

This "whole town" grew first into Novonikolaevsk, and then Novosibirsk, the largest city in Siberia with a population of one and a half million, the brainchild of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

And from Tomsk, the most sonorous city at that time, where the only university in Siberia had just been opened and a technological institute was founded, I had to turn ninety kilometers south and leave it aside. Tomsk still cannot forget this insult. A branch was led to it from Taiga station (Garin-Mikhailovsky himself chose the place for this station and the name for it), but together with the branch, the new route, which Nikolai Georgievich found and defended, turned out to be shorter than the former one, as he called it, "primarily printed" directions.

The fate of Tomsk, set aside from the main road, so frightened the mayors of the eastern cities, where the Siberian route had not yet reached, that in Irkutsk at a dinner in honor of the arrival of the new Minister of Railways M.I. Khilkov, where N.P.

Mezheninov, the head of prospecting work from the Ob to Irkutsk, the local governor-general Goremykin expressed himself quite frankly, saying that "let the prospectors go blind if they want to pass by Irkutsk - maybe the blind will get into the city." What Mezheninov answered this, the memories do not convey, but he could hardly be offended, knowing first of all the same state interest from which Garin-Mikhailovsky proceeded. Irkutsk, fortunately, did not fall out of this interest.

On the North Ussuri road, repeated surveys carried out by O. P. Vyazemsky also changed, shortened and reduced the cost of the new route, significantly (30 kilometers) moving it east of the Ussuri River and thereby rescuing it from deep rocky cuts and most of the flooded places. Vyazemsky was a resolute opponent of the laying of the CER and refused to work on it, but he was unable to straighten out this (Manchurian) direction, which cost Russia too dearly.

Nansen called his book about this journey respectfully and accurately - "To the country of the future". More than once he exclaims in it: "An amazing country! Amazing country!"

Even at a time when the news of the beginning of the Trans-Siberian Railway had just sounded in the world, the famous English economist Archibald Kolkhun, who was able to immediately appreciate its enormous significance, predicted:

"This road will not only become one of the greatest trade routes the world has ever known, and will fundamentally undermine the English maritime

trade, but will become in the hands of Russia a political tool, the strength and significance of which is even difficult to guess. Siberia is far from being that barren plain, a dull place of exile, as Europeans usually paint it. On the contrary, it is the richest country, with many hundreds of thousands of acres of the most fertile land, with an enormous mineral fund, a country whose full industrial development may, in time, usher in a new economic era. But the main significance of the Siberian Railway lies not in this, as yet distant result, but in the fact that it will make Russia a self-sufficient state, for which neither the Dardanelles nor Suez will play any role any more, and will give her economic independence, thanks to which it will achieve an advantage the likes of which no other state has ever dreamed of."

Regarding the role of the hero of this essay, Valentin Rasputin also gives an example of fair, truly historical criticism:

"P. A. Stolypin resolutely rescued the Trans-Siberian from the Manchurian "captivity" (CER), returning the through passage of the Siberian road, which was designed from the very beginning, to Russian soil. In 1908, ten members of the State Council, including Finance Minister Kokovtsev, Minister of Trade and Industry Timashev, senators Witte, Goremykin, Protopopov and others, all influential figures experienced in asserting their opinions, spoke out decisively

against the bill of the Duma on the construction of the Amur road, justifying his position with the high cost of construction and the waste of money on "this desert region".

Now you understand the whole difference: criticism from the point of view of the interests of the fatherland, studying the lessons of its history, and criticism from the point of view of the interests of a biting article, like the one mentioned in the chapter "War. Emperors" by S. Brezkun, where the only argument is the placement of the Witte name in a row, separated by a comma, with Roosevelt ("Alas, Tsar Nikolai listened not to Russia, but to advisers like Roosevelt, Witte ...").

Yes, Witte was wrong, along with 10 other members of the State Council, objecting in 1908 to the construction of the Amur section of the road. But at the same time, Valentin Grigoryevich Rasputin recognizes his outstanding role in the emergence of the Trans-Siberian Railway in general in Russia. And - an important point! - Rasputin clearly shares the problem of the CER in different eras - before and after the Russo-Japanese War:

"And even the laying of the CER on Chinese soil can hardly be blamed on him: a through route in a thunderstorm situation on the eve of the war was required immediately, and the northern, Amur version in permafrost conditions with all its "flowers" and "berries", which never and nowhere had not yet met, it was impossible to speed up, and subsequently they suffered no less with the Amur road than with the Circum-Baikal section. Undertaking such a grandiose and unexplored enterprise as the Siberian road proved to be, of course, it was impossible to foresee all the difficulties, all the steps and

troubles that over and over again fell on the builders as a punishment for invading these dense reserved places.

That is, as an acting minister in 1892-1903, Witte was right to launch the CER. Witte defended the CER branch connecting Vladivostok with Russia in Portsmouth - even after the lost Russo-Japanese War. It remained a salvation for the Russian Far East for the entire period until 1916, when, upon completion of the bridge across the Amur, a Russian branch was also launched.

But as a (tired) retiree, State Councilor Witte was wrong in 1908 to overestimate the exclusivity of his offspring, the CER.

Let me repeat this simple geographical statement. In the Chita region, near the city of Sretensk, the Trans-Siberian Railway bifurcated: the future Priamursky section went to Vladivostok along the terrain, often mountainous, bending around Manchuria in a giant arc, and in addition, it required the construction of the largest bridge in Russia - across the Amur of Khabarovsk. They finished it only in 1916. Another branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1389 versts, went through Manchuria to Vladivostok with a straight arrow, a chord, and besides being 514 versts shorter, it passed mainly through the steppes (except for the Greater Khingan) and was ready already in 1901. On July 1, 1903, 5 months before the war, the Trans-Siberian Railway was opened, even without the Circum-Baikal Railway, ferrying trains across Lake Baikal on a special ferry, and in winter

launching rails on the Baikal ice. In his memoirs, the writer Vladimir Nabokov admits how he was forever struck by the photograph: sleepers and rails laid on ice, a steam locomotive, wagons go along Baikal. A subtle esthete, he understood what a feat was behind this fantastic picture.

And immediately, to the day, on July 1, under the pretext of testing the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the transfer of Russian troops to the Far East began.

That's why in the chapter "War. Emperors ", I called the First Logistic - the Crimean War. The British, having built the first (!) Railroad in Crimea, Balaklava - Sevastopol, simply filled up with shells, destroyed Russian artillery, and in the last days of the siege reached the stage of a "non-contact (on the Russian side) war", destroyed 3,000 Russian soldiers in Sevastopol a day without receiving return fire, just like NATO with Serbia in 1999... This "memento mori" should be remembered first of all when talking about the CER, the only road connecting Vladivostok with Russia! If we lost Primorye then, there would be no need and NOT anything to lead the Trans-Siberian Railway. It was in those years that the colonel of the General Staff

N. A. Voloshinov proudly wrote: "... All powers look with envy at our Vladivostok."

And in order to imagine the full depth of the then intellectual abyss, you need to find out what kind of ingenious, saving move with the CER

Witte was scolded - "launched the Trans-Siberian on Chinese soil, gave it to strangers hands".

Probably, these "well-wishers" would have scolded the "Road of Life" to Leningrad as follows: "Wrong. Roads should be laid on the ground, soil. On the ice, cars can fail, so you need to come up with something else. What? "We don't know, but we have to think..." Fortunately, Alexei Kosygin, who laid out The Road of Life, did not even have to think about the possibility of such criticism, since "his" leader knew what to do with these "Vasisualii Lokhankins". In Nikolai's speech (when he threw off his father's ministers), they, one might say, sat down on their knees, accompanying with capricious cooing every august spoon carried, every movement.

The Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway gave birth to a whole new country: Zheltorossia was called it in the newspapers of the early twentieth century, ironically playing on the consonance with Novorossia. But even more historical, sad irony turned out to be the fact that this Zheltorossia outlived Tsarist Russia itself for 12 years, that its capital Harbin remained the main Russian, non-Soviet city after leaving the Crimea. "Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway", the occupation of Manchuria by Japan, the war ... Only the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" erased the Russian trace in Zheltorossia. And for comparison with the aforementioned Witte transport agreement: the most global, eternal Cooperation Agreements between the USSR and the PRC (where there is a lot of "brotherhood, unity, views", where it was stated not

only the cultural, but also the social community of "social systems" ...), did not interfere with the armed border conflict either ... Although, if you do not fall into excessive criticism, these Soviet-Chinese treaties also worked, as long as there was a real common cause - resistance to the then American hegemony.

I hope that at the crossroads of these two topics - Witte and the Far East - an important example of Russian history and geopolitics has been captured like an airplane by searchlights. As at the beginning of the harsh twentieth century, despite all the losses, they defended the Contour of the country, its most important natural border, the Pacific coast. It may be difficult for someone to break away from lispings over beautiful pictures with a person in a colonel's uniform, with a kindly sad look, but having rechecked all the facts mentioned in this part of the "War. Emperors. Witte", and may be established in the understanding of the realities of that era, and in general - in the criteria for evaluating historical characters.

Surely you have come across books of an already established genre, let's call it conditionally: "Statistical data from the era of Nicholas II", "Russia on the eve of the revolution" ... Figures that really cause pride, Russia at that time was the world leader in terms of economic and demographic growth. But how to "divide" them between the main characters of that era? To some extent, those who associate the then success with the name of Nikolai P. are also right. It simply depends on the degree of conventionality, as, for example, you can read: "Under Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov defeated Napoleon" or: "Under Maloyaroslavets

The Russian army under the leadership of Kutuzov won.

In the period 1909-1913, industry grew by 67%, higher than even today's Chinese figures. The foreign trade balance is a stable positive balance, in 1909 - 521 million rubles, in 1913 - 146 million rubles. The gold reserve beat all Russian records.

But allow such "assessments" as: "He appeared at a time when Russia was rapidly developing. The annual growth on the eve of the First World War was 12-15%, in leading industries up to

20 %. It was a Russian economic miracle, the merit of which belongs to Nikolai P. Witte, Stolypin carried out His plans, they had no independent policy. They, so to speak, decided technically, but the vector, the main impulses of movement and the meaning were set by the Emperor.

(A. Bokhanov. "Nikolai P") ... - this means to remove the spring of meaning from Russian history altogether.

Russia really developed successfully in 1894-1903, when Sergei Witte, "Alexander III's team", worked. And after the revolution of 1905-1907 - by the works of Stolypin. And Nikolay handed over both, "leaked", replaced them with "bezobrazovtsy", "Goremykintsy", "protopopovtsy" for reasons of a purely personal nature. It is possible to disassemble, prove on many points, here were given "... His

predestination..." in terms of eastern politics, the Japanese war, the Portsmouth peace.

Chapter 27 (The collective image of the "fighter")

"But if so, to such a terrible extent the king was wrong (weak, mediocre), then probably those who discovered this, who fought with the king, were right (strong, gifted)." The future "heroes of February 1917" thought something like this. And of course they were wrong. Forgotten, poor fellows, Newton's Third Law, that for the action of any force there is an opposing force, equal in magnitude and opposite in direction. The lightness of the tsar, the ease of his departure just hinted at the fact that his "changers", who so easily gained power, were also not God knows what

political heavyweights.

If the analogy with Newtonian mechanics seems unconvincing, please, in other words, Arnold Toynbee, the most popular historiologist of the 20th century, speaks about this in his famous Challenge-Response theory:

"With its response to the challenge, civilization/society solves the problem that has become before it and transfers itself to a more perfect state. The stronger the challenge, the more original and creative the response.

For example, the Rurikovichs grew for a long time, they defeated the Chinggisids in a hard struggle, and this victory was truly global in nature. Rus' was freed from the horde along with the horde (in addition): the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia.

What was the baggage of the fighters against Nicholas, the autocracy? The insignificance of Kerensky and Milyukov has been painted a thousandfold. It is more interesting among the authors of the February "Response" to the "Challenge" of the autocracy to look at the most capable and hardworking.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn. "Reflections on the February Revolution" (a chapter not included in the main text of The Red Wheel, but now widely distributed):

"Postcards with a dozen ovals "Leaders of Russia" were in a hurry to advertise them all over the country. The Satyricon depicted Prince Lvov's smear as a lifetime monument to himself" for good manners and harmlessness. jet of politics. Guchkov is a famous swindler and whistleblower, suddenly now, at the first practical steps he lost all his enthusiasm, tired and confusing. Kerensky is a harlequin, not to our caftans. Nekrasov is an ordinary demagogue, and even as an intriguer - petty. Tereshchenko - sloppy high-society suitor (All three of the latter, together with Konovalov, are dark horses of dark circles, but there is not even a need

to delve into this.) Vladimir Lvov is a madman and an epileptic (through the Synod - to the Union of Militant Atheists).

Godnev is the shadow of a man. Manuilov is a hat that is not fit for use. Rodichev is an eloquent, a rhetorician, but not a man of action (yes, he did not stay in the government for even a week). And worthy of respect, only Shingarev is impeccable in seriousness and diligence (it is no coincidence that he will be struck by the blow of the Leninist assassin), but he, the zemstvo doctor, who trained in finance, led the defense commission, and received the Ministry of Agriculture! .. - a complete amateur.

Here is the pale, pitiful result of the centenary, from the Decembrists, of the "Liberation Movement", which claimed so many victims and perverted all of Russia!

So the Progressive Bloc only rushed to power, nothing more! They were at a loss at the very first minute, and it didn't take a full week for them to understand this themselves, just as Guchkov confessed to Alekseev. When they previously imagined themselves to be the government, then behind the stone fence of the monarchy.

First, regarding the note by Alexander Isaevich ("All three of the latter, together with Konovalov, are dark horses of dark circles, but there is even no need to delve into this>"). Of course,

his delicate speech about the freemasonry of Nekrasov, Tereshchenko, Kononov. Personally, it seems to me that that February-October turmoil, instead of politics, ultimately undermines the very idea of a subtle, clever conspiracy, long-term calculation, broad plan, Masonic omniscience, finally. And that trinity would also be worthy of a strict reprimand "along the Masonic line", a decrease, as they have, probably ... by 3-4 degrees (shot Nekrasov - posthumously).

Now let's move on to the selected Solzhenitsyn, and many more temporary minister Shingaryov.

Reference. Andrey Ivanovich Shingarev. Zemsky, public, political and statesman, specialist in the field of state economy and budget from the liberal community, doctor, publicist.

One of the leaders of the Cadets party, a member of the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc, after February was not afraid to head the Food Commission ("food shortages" were the detonator of that revolution).

V. D. Nabokov wrote: "... Having become a minister, Shingarev immediately drowned in a sea of exorbitant work, inaccessible to the forces of one person. He trusted few, relied on few. He wanted to get into everything himself, but it was physically impossible. He worked probably 15-18 hours a day ... "

Today on the Internet there is a site dedicated to Andrei Ivanovich Shingarev. Milyukov, I checked, - no. This is not an argument, of course, but

one can easily find enough confirmation of Solzhenitsyn's assessment: Shingarev is probably the most worthy, capable, hardworking and consistent of all the "heroes of February". And it was him and Minister Kokoshkin that the St. Petersburg gop-sailor, breaking into the prison hospital, killed. What is called the Beginning of the Great Terror, but in truth - just Anarchy. The commissars did not give any instructions, but they were afraid to ask the killers.

I refer Shingarev's prison notes directly to the topic of this chapter. So. January 1918. Petropavlovka, then the Mariinsky Prison Hospital. The most worthy of the "fighters for a bright future" writes, when the signs of this "future" are already visible to all of Russia. The Constituent Assembly flew after the Provisional Government. The ministers are under arrest, guard soldiers are extorting money from relatives to cover their "expenses", including for the transfer of Shingarev and Kokoshkin from Petropavlovka to the prison hospital. They get it, "it would be necessary to add it," they get it, and then they kill them. And not at all because they somehow distinguished the role of Shingarev from, say, the surviving Milyukov, but simply, as far as physical accessibility, they declared this "revenge for 1905". (Remember the archers and Prince Romodanovsky?) So - Shingarev's credo.

"If I were offered, if it were possible, to start all over again or stop, I would not hesitate for a single minute to start all over again, despite all the horrors experienced by the country. The revolution was inevitable, for the old had become obsolete. The balance was disturbed long ago, and at the heart of Russian statehood, which we called a colossus with feet of clay for good reason, lay the dark masses of the people, deprived of state communications, understanding of the public and the ideals of the intelligentsia, often deprived of even simple patriotism. The striking discrepancy between the top of society and the base, between the leaders of the state in its past forms, as well as the leaders of the future and the mass of the population - struck me even in my youth,

That is why I have always stood for evolution, although it takes such quiet steps, and not for revolution, which, although quickly, can lead to an unexpected and incredible catastrophe, because there is an impassable abyss between its intelligent leaders and the masses. Now that the revolution has taken place, it is pointless to talk about whether this is good or bad. True, many, including myself, dreamed of pouring out a coup, and not a revolution of such magnitude, but this was only a manifestation of our desire, and not a real possibility. Now that the revolution has taken place on such a scale and in such a direction that no one could have foreseen then, yet I say - it is better that it has already happened! It is better when the avalanche hanging over the state has already rolled down and ceases to threaten it. It is better that the abyss between the people and the intelligentsia opened up to the bottom and finally began to fill up with the ruins of the past regime. It is better when the trigger of the gun is already pulled and the shot has taken place than to expect it from a second to a second. Better because only now can the real

creative work, replacing the clay feet of the Russian colossus with a worthy and reliable foundation.

That is why I accept the revolution, and not only accept it, but also welcome it, and not only welcome it, but affirm it. If I were offered to start it all over again, I would not hesitate to say now: "Let's start!"

And how do you? Once again to the question of the literary centrality of our history: the most capable of the "Februaryists", the engine of the Provisional Government sums up the 50-year-old struggle against the autocracy, expressing itself in images, a number of which directly rests on a textbook of literature.

Well! We have already considered a more scientific, even with figures, Milyukov's treatise on the agrarian question (Chapter 13), we also saw a logical hole gaping there (about the Russian shortage of land). Therefore, it seems to me, it will be useful to get a grasp of Shingaryov's creed. The most valuable, in my opinion, is the final, generalized, collective portrait of the "fighter" and all the arguments that guided him in the 50-year struggle:

"... A colossus with feet of clay, the old has become obsolete. It is better that the avalanche hovering over the state has already rolled down and stops

threaten. It is better that the abyss opened to the bottom. It's better to have the gun triggered and fired than to expect it. Better..."

Here, probably, the unfortunate Andrei Ivanovich was summoned for interrogation or for a walk, or they brought a package, and this stream of images, comparisons was stopped.

What catches the eye is - maybe unconsciously, but implied, standing behind the scenes Rakhmetov from Chernyshevsky's novel "What is to be done?". The local, novelistic scene of "conversion" is more important than all his boards with nails. Rakhmetov was told something (not specified in the novel) for a couple of days, and in the end he burst into tears of blessing for what should come, and curses for what should go. I deliberately do not verify the quote, relying on a 40-year-old school literature lesson on "the novel that plowed V. I. Lenin." And all the further pathos of Chernyshevsky (dreams of Vera Pavlovna, that same monologue "... The future is bright and beautiful. Love it, strive for it ..." etc.), everything is the obedient acceptance of instructions from the hands of some there "Guests from the future". The cash 120-millionth Russian empire was easily crossed out, or simply overshadowed - by the Image, the Hypothesis, the Vision.

Is it not here that the psychological roots of our "fighter" lie? Everything for the sake of the Future, holding on to cash, cash reality is a wretched, despicable thing. Yes, most likely here. Well maybe if you try

to dig even a little deeper, to find out: where does this unconditional preference for the Future, contempt for the Present come from? Here, in my opinion, Lermontov will turn out to be another step deeper from Chernyshevsky ... Once again, I apologize for this "literary ball", because in our "source" there is still a political analysis of the influential Minister Shingarev.

And the Lermontov stage of this descent (or ascent, cross out the unnecessary), these are no less famous lines:

To love ... but whom? .. for a while - it's not worth the trouble, But it's impossible to love forever.

That is, the Future for the revolutionaries is the form of the Absolute. That which is not "for a time"... In the 18th century, the Enlighteners undermined the foundations of faith. Voltaire's phrase is well-known and beaten: "If God did not exist, He would have to be invented." And in my opinion, his students of the period of the Great French Revolution continued: "And if there was a God, He would have to be redone." What they did with all the revolutionary fervor. "The Supreme Being", the so-called. "the cult of the Supreme Being" influenced many people in that Europe, but certainly not the Russians. A cart shaking through the Parisian streets with a disguised former prostitute and Robespierre mincing nearby - the "Goddess" and the Chief Priest at the national holiday, May 1794 ... Worshiped then, hung wreaths on the "defender of freedom" - the guillotine. It was hard to capture

these beauties of the descendants of Prince Vladimir, who chose the faith, including the magnificence of the Byzantine worship. But the abstract, not visible to anyone, non-textural Future was able to gain adherents, became a religion, an Ideal, which could be equaled even without trying any specifics, the present texture of today, which has now received the nickname "vile Russian reality". "The storm would have struck, right? The rimmed bowl is full!" - another famous line (N. Nekrasova), which was equal to the most constructive programs, the most businesslike and specific proposals of that era, with which they took (not with Capital!) for revolvers and bombs. This naive, but stubborn "absolutization", leading to oblivion, contempt for today's texture of life and the struggle only "for the Great Future", in my opinion, is simply superbly captured and parodied by Mayakovsky: "... One thought is put under the hair. "Comb your hair? Why?! It's not worth the trouble for a while, and it's impossible to be forever combed." Also, formally speaking, a futurist, but of a completely different kind. From among those who overcame that age-old naivety, cupronickel decadence, and their future, futurum, who perceived, roughly, materially new, more powerful locomotives, tractors, new building materials (these futurists, as you know, came out of constructivists). Abstract dreams about the Future for them were the impossible antiquities of the past...

'That was almost the entire baggage of the half-century fighters against tsarism (guilty in their eyes for the fact that he was "today's") for the Future (right by definition). Any, even useful, measure of the government is only an increase in the mass of the future avalanche ("It is better that the avalanche, hovering over the state, has already rolled down and ceases to threaten").

As it was considered earlier, only agrarian overpopulation, lack of land was objectively threatening, hanging, even, perhaps, like an avalanche. And it is extremely symptomatic that neither the fighters for the Future nor the defenders of the Present have ever seen this really hanging avalanche. More precisely, they saw it in a completely wrong light: the fact that they seriously considered solving this problem by distributing landlord lands (which, distributed to the span, was still not enough even for the peasantry, which had decreased by 3-4 million since the First World War), how they courted the peasant delegates back in the State Duma of the first convocation, it perfectly shows that they considered the only real "hanging avalanche" as one of a dozen issues of revolutionary, and then "State Duma" tactics.

Now we can return to the popular theory of Arnold Toynbee. The final paradoxical fault of Nicholas II was his lightness (that's for sure: "Mene, tekel, fares"!), mediocrity and ease of "calling the autocracy" in his performance, which led to the fact that the "Answer" turned out to be so ... - yes what is there to practice in humiliation! - turned out to be, in general, such as "in February 1917" - worse than the image, you still can't think of a comparison.

Chapter 28

It is difficult for the one who said "A" to get away from the conditional microphone, experiencing expectations: "Come on, don't delay with "Be" either!" And if

pretending to be "objective criteria", a measure of politicians' evaluation, then come on, apply it to the current situation, make generalizations without hiding in the safe past.

I am finally returning to our conversation on the pages of the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, which constantly switched from the question "What was being done?" (then, under Tsar Nicholas) to "What to do?" (now, with the "tandem", with the "United Russia", "Bolotnaya Square", etc.). In order to confirm the urgent relevance of history, I will reproduce one fragment. Questions were asked by the head of the political department, Mikhail Zubov.

"Is not the modern Russian government repeating the mistakes of 1905 and 1917?"

- No. She, it seems to me, is stylistically closer to the mistakes of another era.

This is the "temporary" minister Prince Lvov, having liquidated all the local Ga

administration in the country, sang in 1917: "... But we will not appoint anyone. They will choose locally. Such questions should

spread not from the center, but by the population itself. The future belongs to the people who have revealed their genius in these historical days. What a great happiness to live in these great days!" The current government is more likely to ignore the "people's genius" than it will so naively admire them. And what is more dangerous: the naivety or the cynicism of the ruler? In my opinion, the whole sum of our history says that the first. ... even to the point of cynicism.

The leader of the Octobrist party, Guchkov, once confessed to the chief of staff Alekseev, with whom they "renounced the tsar" together: "We imagined ourselves to be the government, that we would continue to work behind the stone fence of the monarchy." Here's what the current ones definitely don't have: Yes, let them be outraged by the "cynical castling of the tandem", but at the same time we rely 100% on our own strength.

- How big was the role of foreign influence on protest in the early 20th and early 20th centuries? Or, on the contrary, does spy mania do more harm?

- Strictly speaking, there is a difference: in 1905, 1917, Japanese (borrowed by the Americans) and German money for our revolutions can be interpreted as special operations during the period of hostilities. To condemn them is reminiscent of those rules that if ours, then a "scout", and if theirs, then a "spy". Another thing is that ... let's say, if Russia had an extra hundred million in gold in 1905, for counter revolutionary work in Japan ... yes, there would simply be SOMEONE

hand over! Solidity, solidarity around the emperor. The money would come back... if it wasn't... on the way back and forth, you know, things like that happen.

Today we carried out... standardization of the procedure for receiving Western money by our NGOs. While the standards have become very similar to Western ones, the protests against "such totalitarianism" are, of course, a symptom. But besides the legal ones, there are other funding channels... For Gorbachev, for example, the whole fight against drunkenness was reduced to a victory over legal vodka, and the result is memorable.

In Tolstoy's novel "War and Peace" there was an aphorism: Yes, Muscovites burned Moscow in 1812. But not those who remained, but those who left it. An abandoned large wooden city must inevitably burn down.

And I would formulate: it is NOT those benefits and grants that come from the West to the country that become the conductor of Western policy in Russia, but those billions that go to the West. "For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also" (Gospel). Here I will interrupt my criticisms with a practical suggestion. what I propose to conclude to the authorities and the Parachute Pact" - here opposition. It is useless to fight with foreign accounts. As you know, Aleksashka Menshikov kept his (corrupt) money in a London bank,

a lot of things grieving Tsar Peter. But since then, the means of communication, electronic transfers have only grown. Smartphones are there, the "Bank-Client" system, \Mer-topeu ... as a historian I can vouch: Menshikov did not have them.

"
The conditions of the Parachute Pact" are simple: for 15 years, the upper echelon of power, together with their families, hand over passports. And can't get new ones. Foreign business trips of officials - according to one-time documents. Let because of this "voluntarism" the competition among them will be reduced: not 850 people per seat, maybe 250 will remain ... But the leaders of the opposition, too. A protest rally? - please, at least on Red Square! You can even hold a rally in the Kremlin - I saw a quite convenient platform near the Tsar Bell. And free access for oppositionists, leaders of all parties to federal TV channels, even though you are Udaltsov, Zhirinovskiy, Yashin, even Nemtsov himself, but ... also, only those who signed the "Pact", handed over their passports. Otherwise, in connection with the work on this book, I had to to read a lot of émigré memoirs, those same Miliukovo-Kerenskys... Paris-1920, New York-1927... I'll say frankly: harmful, hard work. his people, country!

One of the main rats of Russian history, Bezobrazov met the Japanese war provoked by him in Switzerland, and died as early as 1930, in Belgium - one might say, he declared, he drew a trend, now, though more often associated with London.

- And why "Parachuting"?

- Yes, I noticed one strange rule in civil aviation. 300 passengers from the liner in which case they will not jump out. So they are there, imagine! - and pilots, flight mechanics - also do not give out parachutes! And from that mutual trust on board, responsibility ... somehow grow, in my opinion. And without the possibility of leaving, the attractiveness and even the very meaning of foreign accounts will slowly fade. Say: absurd, a rally in the Kremlin! But for 600 years, people often gathered there, and then it was considered absurd that the top security officials, generals do not even have accounts abroad, like that "Aleksashka", but entire businesses, networks of firms.

- How did the protest political parties of the early twentieth century differ from the opposition of the twentieth] century?

- Well, maybe ... then on the political map there was a big "terra incognita", the peasantry. The authorities and the opposition danced around him. Considered: the peasantry is a stronghold of the autocracy. The tsar, by means of electoral laws, sought to give them as much representation as possible. Further, Count Witte was amazed: "The peasantry appeared in significant numbers, but it turned out ... they have only one program: "an additional allotment of land." The government (refused) ... and the peasantry followed those who said: "First of all, we will give you land and freedom as an appendage," i.e., the Cadets (Milyukov, Gessen) and the Trudoviks.

The Cadets, of course, did not even have half an idea: where to get this land, but ... the intrigue began to whirl, "the work of the Duma began to boil." I don't want to reduce everything to the "cynicism of the Duma members", and the Milyukov-Hessen intrigue was longer, and most of the intelligentsia sincerely "believed in the people" ...

Now there is no such "whale", an object of manipulation and long naive hopes. The interval between believe - lost faith is shorter than the short circuit. So... these new "believe", ideas should be thrown into the furnace more often. Hence all these political scientists, and the "creative class".

anti-king

Concluding the description of the most difficult and even ... the most offensive period of our history, I reviewed once again the quoted and mentioned books and found, as it seems to me, a certain paradox. It is simply useless to argue with the "cosmopolitans" about these events, there is one implied refrain: "That's how they should be!". That is, "cosmo ... watered", which means that the view is much wider, "cosmically" wider than the narrowly national one ... Only for some reason their own country is always crossed out of their "space".

But many authors of an impeccably patriotic direction idealize Tsar Nicholas from purely patriotic motives! Say, if you remove (paint over) the "stains" of blood, dirt, slander, smeared, liberals, revolutionaries, then the general

the picture of Russia will become brighter, cleaner, more beautiful...

But after all, a certain trick is obtained here: the better the king, the worse the people who overthrew him, or even simply did not protect him. Continue to develop this trend further and you will reduce - out of patriotic motives! - the Russian people to the "Jews who crucified Christ"!

This primarily applies to authors like Bokhanov, whose works have already had to be compared with "cakes in the form of a book" because of their cloying and senselessness (printing beauty, glossiness, gilding, gift-giving of this edition complete the comparison).

This paradox also affects our Church - remember the recent 2008-2011 wave of rumors / rumors after the publication of the greetings of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Provisional Government "on the second day after the abdication of the king"! In the articles of that "wave" Solzhenitsyn's well-known assessment of February 1917 was often quoted: "In the days of the greatest catastrophe in Russia, the Church did not even try to save, to reason with the country." What, our clerics were supposed to either fight with the Provisional Government "for Nicholas", or go "to the desert, catacombs", mourn for 1917 and beyond?

You see, the living, functioning institution of today's society is reproached in the name of ... "Gorbachev of the late 19th - early 20th century"! Truly, "the dead suffice the living."

Emperor Nicholas II abdicated for himself and for his son in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. But Mikhail Alexandrovich did not abdicate, on March 3 he referred the question of the future form of government to the discretion of the Constituent Assembly, and before it convened, he called on all citizens to obey the Provisional Government. Former Tsar Nikolai reacts in his diary: "Mishin's manifesto ends with a four-tail for the elections of the Constituent Assembly. God knows who advised him to sign such a disgusting thing "... It is easy to find a dozen more quotes that simply smear Michael, who abdicated the throne without having the right to it, blocked the opportunity for all other worthy applicants, actually abolished the monarchy ... " A strange and criminal manifesto, which Mikhail had no right to sign, even if he were a monarch ... An act of madness and betrayal "(Vasily Maklakov).

But by the time they handed over the throne, like a grenade with a pulled out pin, it is more important to remember one objective, quantitative parameter: Mikhail took a day from the country, Nikolai - 23 years.

So, from March 3, Russia actually stood at a crossroads (2 months after the assassination of Rasputin). At the first meeting of the Holy Synod under the new government, on March 4, the new chief prosecutor of the Synod of Lvov announced that the Church would now take measures to calm the population and form an idea in society about the legality of the change of power. From 7

March in the correspondence of the Synod, the house of the Romanovs began to be called "reigned", that is, the former. Instead of prayers for the reigning house, in the troparion of Matins (morning service) it sounded: "... Save our Blessed Provisional Government, you commanded him to rule."

On March 9, in the message of the Synod "To the faithful children of the Orthodox Russian Church on the occasion of the events now going through," it proclaimed: "The will of God has been accomplished. Russia has embarked on the path of a new state life. May the Lord bless our great Motherland with happiness and glory on its new path."

But in reality, the Church held out for Tsar Nicholas longer than others, this becomes clear if you think about the situation that has developed since 1906. Following the "gift" to society - the State Duma, the tsar had to return the Church - the Patriarchate. After all, the centuries-old unity of the Church with the state after 1906 led to a legal, even philosophical absurdity: now it made decisions, laws, including those relating to the Orthodox Church, the State Duma, a body in which there were representatives of other religions in general. Ten-year fluctuations are also in this matter, evasions, twisting of arms and brains to an absolutely loyal clergy,

as if they were negotiations with a hostile country, with Bismarck or Wilhelm, they exposed Nicholas II to the country no less than Khodynka, the "ugly gang", Tsushima, "Bloody Sunday" ...

Only one theoretical trick remains: "in Rus' then there were only the tsar and his enemies, the Masons" (revolutionaries, Jews ...). True, for this solo victory of Freemasonry, the Russian people must be removed from the "list of actors" (when did it disappear - in 1881? 1861? 1812? 1801?).

In serious monarchist books, like The Romanovs. A feat in the name of love "TsPolmatov, there is still an active people: there they demand to extradite the tsar for reprisal, and the commissars-"shooters" had a chance to save Nikolai's family from lynching several times before the basement execution, as, for example, at the Yekaterinburg railway station.

There is a people, there is, the popular opinion was also recorded by Vasily Rozanov: "... An old man of the years of BO-ti, and such a serious one, of the Novgorod province, put it: "from the former king it would be necessary to pull the skin one by one with a belt." That is, not immediately rip off the skin, like the Indians scalp, but you need to cut ribbon after ribbon from his skin in Russian.

Probably, Rozanov's interlocutor, unfamiliar with the Criminal Codes, simply wanted to measure all his resentment, amazed indignation at the fact with all that phantasmagoric scale of biblical torment: here was the country, and here is Khodynka, the Lena massacre, on January 9, one war, the second ... and - no country! Probably wanted to say that there is,

or there should be (!) two parallel Scales: Crimes and Punishments. But... royal punishments begin only with the "Overthrow" mark, because an autocratic monarch, even purely theoretically, cannot be subjected to any intermediate punishment at all. Arrest, for example, the restriction by law of freedom of one whose free will is the highest law, if you think about it, is impossible even logically!

So all these "stripes of skin" remain for the ascending steps of Crime. But, I think, that peasant would have been embarrassed after the first incision, the first drop of Nikolai's blood, and would have sent the former monarch to the monastery, like Vasily Shuisky ...

The most important Word, over which one should still think and think (!), said John of Kronstadt: "We have been given the king of a pious life." Today they are trying to exchange this Word for nickels of political assessments and slogans, but if you think about it ... St. John said the maximum that can be said good about Nicholas without prevaricating: a pious life, not a word about politics. A wonderful husband, father, uncle, nephew (especially cousin and nephew - uncles, grand dukes and half a word across was his problem). Similarly, Gorbachev: for all his political crimes, he is an ideal husband and

dad. But the creators of empires - family impious deeds in life, second marriages, wives-nuns, wives-suicides, children who died in casemates or in captivity of children ...

You can't demand from Nicholas the strength of Alexander 11, the scope of Peter G, but we also had a very underestimated monarch Fedor Alekseevich (six blessed years of gathering strength) and Fedor Ioannovich: meekness, physical weakness, pious life and ... pious politics! We, thank God, not California! - they managed without governors - "terminators", supermen.

But that is why this figure is so restless: among the Saints, he is "Napoleon", proudly putting his hand behind the half ... of the sackcloth, commander-in-chief of 1916-1917. And among the generals - "Saint", mechanically issuing a resolution "God's will for everything" in response to any military report ...

In February 2011, a documentary about this most important period in Russian history was shown on TV. The authors: M. Shiryayev, M. Smolin, N. Smirnov, N. Simakov - perfectly and convincingly exposed the mechanism of the then propaganda that inflated the figures of Russian sweat, and how this mechanism put pressure on the Russian government. But they also have the same convenient stamp: "the hardness of Nikolai P" and "the softness of Witte." But these fantasy, popular prints, fairy tales are not only cloying, in the long run they are very harmful. How?..

You see... Tribes living by hunting, gathering, cattle breeding, can afford to wander in myths, happy being among nymphs, elves, good and evil spirits, fauns... But

for a state that has factories, railways, power plants, it's simply dangerous to suddenly say that $2 \times 2 =$ (maybe somewhere, depending on the weather and mood) and 5 and 7.

And the basis of construction, the "right angle" - from 40 to 150 degrees ...

It is dangerous to undermine the foundation so much, the power of the Fact, the Accuracy. Speaking in this situation about the "hardness of Nicholas", you are depriving Russia of the very concept of Hardness, the criteria of hardness. How is hardness measured? According to the "Brinell scale"? But if ... plasticine and diamond, steel and leatherette - it's all the same, it doesn't matter, from what tomorrow in Russia you will order to make nails, bearings, gun barrels? .. And it is dangerous to undermine the idea of Justice even in the simplest, Tahitian community!

And the psychological phenomenon is not even that today, in the twentieth! century, Brezhnev, Bokhanov, Multatuli, etc. write about the firm Nicholas and the treacherous Witt. The main phenomenon is that even then, literally six months later, the generals and ministers forgot their fear and pleas for peace, and a few years later, quite formidable memoirs appeared ... almost reaching Tokyo. "Japan was on the verge of exhaustion and crisis"?! Reread the protocol of Tsarskoye Selo

advice (where even the spirit of Witte was not!): "Sakhalin and Vladivostok can be taken, then the conditions of the Japanese will be even harder." Clever Muravyov, Izvolsky and Nelidov refused to go to Portsmouth, and Witte, having concluded the "Portsmouth Peace" on September 5, 1905, actually won back half of the already surrendered Sakhalin - and received that insulting nickname.

But, okay, he, Witte, died, and before his "memoir winners" - a new war, new trials! And the spirit of black ingratitude, irresponsibility, the spirit of such juvenile hooligans who escaped capture, shoved the case "on to their uncle" ... all this remained in reserve until 1917. And the one in the staff car, who wrote down: "Everywhere is deceit, cowardice, then accidentally look in the mirror, could continue: and treason ..." "... AND HERE TOO."

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This staff car, this ... "Fors on wheels" (if we return to the conspicuous similarities between Nikolai P and Gorbachev) turned out to be the place where the history of the three-hundred-year-old Romanov dynasty ended. Without really multiplying such comparisons, analogies, one must nevertheless admit that the history of the USSR is very similar to the history of the Romanovs accelerated by about 4. times. Also from Troubles - to Troubles. (Here we must not forget that: 1) there were troubles in the Western European countries, 2) the countries of the rest of the world, except for Japan, are inferior to Russia in the duration of periods of stable, untroubled development.)

The "founding fathers" standing under fire of furious criticism are also similar: Stalin and Peter G. "Bloody maniacs" recall the horrors of private life, a wife in a monastery, a wife who shot herself, Tsarevich Alexei, Yakov Dzhugashvili, executed associates.

And the same impeccable family men - "destructive fathers": Nikolai P and Gorbachev.

I mentioned the books of A. Bokhanov several times without quoting any fragments. It is technically difficult to show that the entire volume is, in fact, a children's "Playing with the Tsar". Not even "To the good tsar", but in general "To the tsar": "...Let's all close our eyes together and imagine that 1917 and beyond did not exist in Russia at all. And the king, on the contrary, was. The only "quotable" moment seemed to be the following, stylistically quite close to the Pravda newspaper, when it was under the control of Gorbachev-Yakovlev: "If we talk about, say, Bloody Sunday, then this, of course, was a great provocation. The sovereign had nothing to do with this, he was not in St. Petersburg at all ... As for the personality of the sovereign - well, he could not be responsible for everything. The local authorities in St. Petersburg showed their sluggishness, trusted this priest, provocateur Gapon, who was backed by very specific terrorist groups "...

But no, it's definitely A. Bokhanov, the book "Nikolai PTS", although of course, change the points to "Tbilisi, Vilnius", substitute "regulation,

consensus, comrades" - and you can sign: A. Yakovlev, M. Gorbachev ... "Cezhavu"

The relationship with "modernizations" is similar. While "bare technology" is being borrowed in Europe, the equipment is a success, world records in the pace of industrial development. Stalin's five-year plans, the entry of Peter's Russia into first place in the world in the production of cast iron and close to that in copper, fabrics (counting canvas) ... When, instead of engineers, tutors, bonnes, philosophers were "imported" (personally and in the form of book products) - immediately chaos, confusion in the minds. And most importantly - failure. In contrast to Fodzon, which was successfully copied at GAZ, the "products of the Chicago school" (liberal monetarist theories) are acting up in our country. Yes, take it wider. They hardly work, it's scary to say - many "freedoms". Jury trials, advocacy ("ablakat is a hired conscience"), which still bear the bloody and dirty stain of the "Zasulich case", today have everything ... except the trust of the people. Freedom of "the press, meetings, parties", proclamations applied to the department of information and organizational support of that privatization and those loans-for-loans auctions. What and who remains here - free also from "freedoms"?

three to four years after

Speransky's answer

In his youth, Tsar Alexander traveled in company with Mikhail Speransky almost all of Europe. Needless to say, it's a contrast. "Distances of enormous size ..." And on the way back, approaching St. Petersburg, the tsar asked: "Well, Mikhal Mikhalych, how do you like it? .."

Well, it was clear. Watched from one window! Answer like this - it will turn out that you are not a patriot. Answer like this - insincere with the king ...

It always seemed to me that it was the honesty of Speransky's answer that gave him a reserve of royal trust and respect, so that, having gone through all the intrigues and disgrace, he, the son of a poor deacon, surrounded by princes and counts ... even 25 years later he sat in the State Council, judged the Decembrists.

"Your Majesty," Speransky replied then, "they have better laws, but we have better people.

he said "laws", "Codes", volumes on the , Speransky did not mean specific ones. I think that when shelves, "Vaults", but more broadly - "orders" ...

Just don't take it as propaganda of courtly dexterity or practical advice: they say, if fate decides for you to ride around Europe with Putin or Medvedev, then you really know how to answer!

No. Speransky, it seems to me, expressed the real Objective Historical Law, soaring immeasurably higher than all the hundreds of Marxian, pre- and post-Marxian volumes. I will only slightly correct and develop the formulation of Michal Mikhalych further:

With good laws (orders) - bad people can live ... and. With ... like ours, only good people can (you) live. 'That is, I am not saying that people there are bad or worse than ours.

The meaning of my formulation is as follows: survival itself there is not yet a proof of human qualities. "There", in contrast to "with us", - people could also be supported by the established Order.

Actually, their legislators, public figures, state organizers aspired to this - to the organization of life, independent of various ephemerals, like the soul.

In our country, people must support the Law (Order), in general, something that, on occasion, is unlikely to support them themselves. Which speaks not only of the famous "Russian sacrifice", but also of our other age-old sign (property) - the belief that somewhere, sometime they will figure it out anyway: who supported to the best of their ability, and who only leaned on, leaned against to Russia.

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